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Abstract 
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand whether the virtue ethics 
of St. Thomas Aquinas are relevant to contemporary society and if they can be 
applied to the instance of people with chronic illness, in the specific case of this 
dissertation, those with osteoarthritis. 
Modem medical ethics has tended to exclude virtue ethics from its 
discipline. Only recently has virtue ethics been explored as a source of ethical 
reflection in medical ethics. Virtue ethics in modem medical ethics literature tends 
to focus on 'role virtues' for health care professionals, leaving the patient population 
largely ignored. I propose to use Thomistic virtue ethics to help create a patient- 
centred virtue ethics which allows one to understand how the illness affects the 
patient's life. I then examine how the patients demonstrate virtuous action in an 
attempt to minimise negative effects on the basic goods and to promote happiness. 
I understand natural law to be the foundation of the virtues. Rather than 
employing Aquinas's theory of natural law, I use a new natural law theory called the 
'basic goods theory. This theory holds that there are seven basic goods for which 
people act. By analysing patient narratives taken from a qualitative study on chronic 
illness and virtue ethics, one can understand how the basic goods are pursued in the 
lives of those with osteoarthritis. The argument of my thesis is that the patients, in 
an attempt to gain the basic goods or limit the damage done to them by the 
osteoarthritis, will employ the virtues. What emerges is a pattern of damage done to 
certain of the basic goods, with the patients using a general pattern of virtuous 
activity to counter the damage. The significance of these findings opens a number 
of doors for further research. 
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This dissertation is concerned with applying Thomas Aquinas's virtue ethics 
to patients with chronic iflness. What I am trying to establish is whether Thomistic 
virtue theory, established nearly 800 years ago, is of relevance to the chronically ill in 
what many call the pluralistic, individualistic and liberal society of western culture. 
Can applying a virtue theory written in the middle ages aid a chronically ill person in 
achieving happiness in the context of a modem society? Does the pattern of 
virtuous activity change in the context of chronic iEness? Do some virtues take on 
heightened significance for the chronicaUy iH while others fade in importance? Is 
Thoýnistic virtue theory an appropriate theoty to apply to patients with chronic 
illness? 
I would Eke to examine whether people still act in virtuous ways without 
exPlicitly understanding their actions in virtue terminology. In order to do so, an 
interdisciplinary approach must be taken, one which embraces moral theology, 
medical ethics, and healthcare research. An analysis of the use of virtue ethics in 
medical ethics finds what little virtue literature exists is directed toward establishing 
'role-virtues' for healthcare professionals, leaving the patients forgotten. While 'role 
virtues' are necessary, one wonders if the energy spent on virtue ethics is not better 
directed toward developing a patient-centred ethics. It is the patients who need to 
integrate their illness into their entire fives, not simply their professional careers. To 
meet this need, Thomas Aquinas's virtue ethics is utilised because his virtue theory 
is one of the most well-developed and examines in-depth almost all aspects which 
go into producing a happy life. 
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I argue that it is the natural law which serves as the foundation of Aquinas's 
virtue ethics, and it is the natural law which allows one to understand more fully 
how illness affects the fives of people with chronic illness. The specific natural law 
theory I employ is the basic goods theory which holds that there are seven basic 
goods which people strive to attain in order to achieve human flouxishing. The use 
of these seven basic goods allow one to understand how the fives of people with a 
chronic illness are affected by the disease. To come to this understanding, I draw 
from a qualitative, phenomenological analysis of a patient population suffering from 
osteoarthritis. The narratives of the patients come from a pilot study on virtue 
ethics and chronic illness funded by the European Conununity. ' 
The themes which arise from the patients' narratives allow one to 
understand which basic goods are impacted by the disease. Once it is understood 
that a specific basic good is affected, human life and health for example, one can 
also understand that certain virtues, such as the allied virtues of temperance such as 
abstinence and humility, should be present in the patients' lives as they attempt to 
attain happiness. The results of the pilot study will be analysed to determine if 
evidence of such virtues were present. 
However, to understand more thoroughly what I propose to examine in 
this dissertation, it is necessary to clarify some of the key terms or concerns. It 
may come as a surprise, but chronic illness itself is a relatively new concept and 
needs to be examined more precisely in order to understand what it means. I 
then examine the current state of medical ethics in regard to chronic illness. 
1 The Relevance of Virtue Ethics to Patients with Chronic Illness, Grant Holders: Prof. Alastair 
V. Campbell (Project Co-ordinator), Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, U. K.; 
Dr. Emilio Mordini, Psychoanalytic Institute for Social Research, Rome, Italy; Prof. Henk ten 
Have, Department of Ethics, Philosophy and History of Medicine, Catholic University of 
Nijmagen, Nijmagen, The Netherlands; Dr. Andrew Edgar, Centre for Applied Studies, 
University of Wales, Cardiff, U. K.; Dr. Soren Holm, Department of Medical Philosophy and 
Clinical Theory, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. EC Contract No: BMH4-98-3112. 
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Virtue ethics itself must be discussed in order to make clear how I employ the 
term. The methodology of the dissertation and of the qualitative study utilised 
has to be carefully explained to avoid any conceptual confusion in interpreting 
the results of the study. Finally, a brief outline describing the content of the 
chapters and the arguments that I advanced in them is necessary to give an 
overview of the dissertation. 
CHRONIC ILLNESS 
The idea of chronic illness becomes established in western 
medicine between the First and Second World Wars. In 1927, the Index 
Medicus, a database of all medical publications, lists for the first time "Illness, 
Chronic. " In 1947, the listing changes to "Chronic Illness, see Illness, Chronic. " 
In 1957, it is given its own heading, "Chronic Illness. "' The term 'chronic' does 
not imply anything about the severity of the disease, but rather refers to a disease 
of long duration that involves very slow changes to the person. ' Any illness or 
disease lasting more than three to six months, depending on one's definition, can 
be classified as chronic. That chronic illness is recognised with its own heading 
is attributable to two factors: modem medicine's ability to combat secondary 
infections, and improvements in drug and surgical treatments. Until the 1940s, 
secondary infections such as pneumonia were the most frequent cause of death in 
chronically ill patients. Advances in drug and surgical treatments improved the 
life expectancy of these patients. ' Previously, there had been no overriding need 
2 David Annstrong, "Use of the Genealogical Method in Exploration of Chronic Illness: A 
Research Note", Social Science & Medicine, v. 30,1990, pp. 1225-1227. 
3 Oxford Concise Colour Medical Dictionary, ed. Elizabeth Martin. (Oxford: Oxford University 
press, 1994), p. 126. 
" Uta Gerhardt, "Qualitative Research on Chronic Illness: The Issue and the Story", Social 
Science & Medicine, v. 3 0,1990, p. 1249. 
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for a separate category for chronic illness because of the death rate of patients 
with chronic illness. 
Chronic iUness differs from Mnesses that are treated and cured. For a 
patient with a sinus infection, the definition of health refers to the state of the 
person before the infection. The person can return to his/her usual level of 
functioning and suffer no long term debilitating effect. However, for a person with 
chronic illness, health has a new definition. It is not a return to a situation prior to 
Mness. Now, the person must focus on coping with an Mness, re-evaluating 
personal development and goals and creating a new lifestyle. ' The person is 
"continuaUy appraising his or her symptoms, pains, disease progression with respect 
to their significance for well-being and survival, and coping accordingly. "' After 
receiving a diagnosis of a chronic illness, the course of fife planned by a patient may 
often drastically change. The change can be so deep that the patient and family 
often take months to assimilate the scope of it. The vast amount of changes to be 
faced make the patient often appear pre-occupied with the wrong problems, 
unresponsive, or unable to understand the scope of the treatments required. 
Disequilibrium occurs after diagnosing! The psychological reaction to chronic 
illness is a transitional process - from initial shock and denial to gradually 
assimilating information and adjusting to the new disease. There are adjustment 
disorders, anxiety disorders, depressive states, and in one-third of males, sexual 
dysfunction. ' The crisis period passes and the patient begins to develop a sense of 
how to five his/her life and how to integrate the chronic illness into it. The long- 
5 Helmut Milz, "Healthy III People: Social Cynicism or New Perspectives? ", Health Promotion 
and Chronic Illness, ed. Annette Kaplun, (Copenhagen: World 
Health Organization, 1992), p. 32. 
6 Robert Lazarus, "Coping with the Stress of Illness", Health Promotion and Chronic Illness, 
ed. Annette Kaplun, (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 1992), p. 
11. 
'Shelley Taylor, Health Psychology, (London: McGraw-Hill, 199 1), p. 370. 
' Elspeth Guthrie, "Emotional Disorder in Chronic Illness: Psychotherapeutic Interventions", 
British Journal of Psychiatry, v. 168,1996, pp. 265-273. 
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term difficulties requiring long-term attention become apparent. These difficulties 
fall into the categories of physical rehabilitation, vocational rehabilitation, social 
rehabilitation, and psychological issues. ' 
How the patient perceives the Mness is key in determining the patient's 
response to it. There appear to be eight basic illness concepts in patient illness: 
where the person attaches a personal meaning to it; as enemy-, as punishment; as 
weakness; as rehef; as strategy; as irreparable loss or hamr, and as value. " Illness 
perceived as challenge, value and internal control are related to mental well-being 
and adaptive control. Illnesses perceived as enemy, punishment, relief, or strategy 
are associated with psychological symptoms and maladaptive coping. Current 
theory holds that it is not the particular condition itself that determines 
psychological distress in patients but the severity of the disability and their 
subjective perceptions that are associated with the condition, in addition to the 
psychological characteristics of the patient. " 
MEDICAL ETHICS IN REGARD TO CHRONIC ILLNESS 
The corpus concerning the sociological and psychological impact of chronic 
illness is vast, because at any ýven moment, fifty per-cent of the population will 
suffer from chronic illness. The fifty per-cent who do not have a chronic illness can 
expect to be diagnosed with at least one before their death. Given the widespread 
occurrence of chronic illness, one would expect modem medical ethicists to have 
spent considerable amounts of time and energy addressing any ethical concerns. 
Yet this is not the case. 
9 Taylor, Health Psychology, pp. 368-369. 
10 Gerhard Schussler, "Coping Strategies and Individual Meanings of Illness", Social Science & 
Medicine, v. 34,1992, pp. 427-430. 
" J. Ormel, "Chronic Medical Conditions and Mental Health in Older People: Disability and 
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Modem medical ethics is mainly concerned with issues surrounding the 
be iig and end of fife. Patients who are in no imminent danger of death have a 9Mnln 
low status when it comes to ethical consideration of medical issues. At best, 
patients -with a chronic illness could expect to find some ethical discussion 
concerning the allocation of scarce medical resources if their particular disease 
warranted discussion, such as renal dialysis or waiting fists for cardiac surgery. 
However, ethical reflection extending to the general category of chronic illness is 
sparse. 
Modem medical ethics tends to gravitate toward problem-solving, so it is 
not surprising that it leaves alone the patient with chronic illness who has no 
immediately obvious ethical problem. The patient is left to get on with the job of 
living with the illness. Given the pluralistic nature of contemporary western society, 
it could be perceived as condescending to tell a person how to five a good fife with a 
chronic illness; therefore, easily identifiable problems that focus upon any 
infringement of an individual's rights to live out his/her perception of a good life 
constitute the bulk of modem medical ethics. " 
VIRTUE ETHICS IN REGARD TO MEDICAL ETHICS 
This orientation away from aiding the individual to live a good fife would 
appear odd to most moral philosophers from the time of Aristotle to the 
Enlightenment. " Virtue ethics had been an established major ethical theoxy for this 
time period whose specific goal was attaining happiness for the moral agent. It is a 
teleological theory aimed toward aiding the individual achieve happiness or human 
Psychological Resources Mediate Specific Mental Health Effects", Psychological Medicine, v. 27, 
1997, p. 1065. 
12 The 'Introduction' section of chapter two, pp. 21-24, discusses the relationship between modem 
medical ethics and virtue ethics. 
13 Alastair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 84. 
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flourishing. It does this through promoting virtues, or modes of ethical action 
which allow the human person to more ft4 realise his/her human nature. As a 
teleological scheme, virtue ethics acknowledges that "there is a fundamental contrast 
between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his- 
essential-nature. "" The task of virtues is to enable the person to go from the first 
stage to the second stage and to fulfil his/her true nature and achieve final 
fulfAment. 
The virtue theory of Aquinas holds with this claim; however, with a 
difference. His belief that humans are created in the image of God and that their 
final, complete fulfilment will rest in the bw*vision causes Aquinas to stress 
buaia& rather than mdaanav: z. (1a2ae. qq. 1-4) Earthly existence possesses happiness, 
but only imperfect happiness. This is a difference between bau-iti& and emlaanawk 
Aquinas understands the complete fulfilment of humans to occur with the ba6fic 
uýýn, and understands humans in relation to this. Eudamxru: i does not take any 
afterlife into consideration and deals with eartWy life. This did not prevent Aquinas 
from creating a complete list of intellectual and moral virtues to aid humans 
achieve as much as possible this earthly fulfihnent. It is this earthly fulfilment with 
which I am concerned. I think more than any other virtue theory, Aquinas's virtue 
ethics develops virtues which are applicable to the widest range of human actions 
and offer the most guidance for humans in their attempts to achieve happiness. " 
Thomistic virtue ethics, along with virtue theory as a whole, has been 
experiencing something of a renaissance lately. For decades, virtue ethics had lain 
dormant. Beginning with the Enlightenment, virtue ethics started a gradual decline 
as the language of individualism, rights, and principles became entrenched in ethical 
" Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2 nd ed., (London: Duckworth, 
1985), p. 52. 
'5 The relationship between Aristotle and Aquinas will be discussed in chapter three, pp. 52-54. 
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discourse. It was further marginalised through the increasingly pluralistic nature of 
western society. Only recently have philosophers and theologians returned to it as a 
source of ethical reflection. 
These two neglected areas turn out to be compatible. Virtue ethics, with its 
explicit commitment towards aiding the individual achieve happiness, proves able to 
make a contribution to the field of medical ethics in regard to chronic illness. Most 
patients with chronic illness will still five in the every-day society and not reside in a 
hospital or institution. Their illness is not an exemption from the stresses of 
everyday life. The opposite is most often the case: the daily stresses are often 
aggravated. Their need to function in their role of spouse, parent, or employee 
while suffering from a chronic illness can complicate matters drastically. Virtue 
ed-&s can offer them some guidance in how to act in order to achieve satisfaction in 
their fives. The purpose of virtue ethics is to reflect on human nature and 
detem-line which patterns of acting promote human flourishing. Chronic illness 
may affect parts of the patients' fives and thereby limit their ability to flourish. 
Virtues accommodate the damage done to their Eves and so may present an 
opportunity to allow them to flourish more My. 
METHODOLOGY 
There are two methodologies present in the dissertation. First, the 
methodology of the argument I attempt to advance in the dissertation. Second, the 
methodology of the qualitative healthcare study which I employ to support nry 
thesis. 
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The Methodology of the Dissertation 
I hope to be able to move from the theoretical account of Thomistic virtue 
theory to implementing it in the practical setting of patients with osteoarthritis. 
There are several stages in doing this: investigating the use of virtue ethics in 
modem medical ethics to understand how it is utilised, examining Thoýnistic virtue 
theory-, developing natural law so as to understand it as the basis for the virtues and 
providing a context for understanding how osteoarthritis impacts a person's fife; 
interpreting the results of the pilot study on patients with osteoarthritis through the 
basic goods theory-, examining the presence of the virtues in the fives of the patients 
interviewed in the pilot study-, and examining the relationship between how the 
basic goods were affected and the choice of virtues as important for the patients in 
their attempts to achieve happiness. 
To investigate the use of virtue ethics in modem medical ethics, I will carzy 
out a literature search going back for the past two decades, when virtue ethics 
started being re-examined in ethical theory. Modem medical ethics starts to evolve 
as known currently in the 1960s, and from this time until the 1980s, there are very 
few accounts of virtue ethics in the field, and few more even after 1980. The 
literature will be critically examined in order to understand how medical ethicists 
employ this definition virtue and how they employ it in relation to medical ethics. 
After understanding the use of virtue ethics in modem medical ethics, I 
suggest that there is conceptual confusion as to what virtue ethics is and that how 
medical ethicists attempt to integrate it into the modem principle-based account of 
medical ethics is flawed. A more comprehensive virtue theory is needed, and I wilI 
argue that Thomistic virtue theory can overcome the flaws inherent in the field. My 
account of Aquinas's virtue theory is based on a close reading of the translated text 
of the Sunrw 7bea6giie, his final and most mature account of virtue ethics. 
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Throughout the dissertation, when I make claims that certain virtues are present in 
the lives of the patients, I will try to clarify this assertion with quotes from his 
writings. 
To understand more completely how the virtues operate in people's lives, I 
argue that Aquinas believed that the foundation of the virtues was the natural law. 
There is not much written on the natural law in the Sunvm and to understand more 
My his thoughts on it, I examine the secondary debates in Thomistic studies. A 
clear, developed doctrine on natural law is needed in order to apply it to the 
concrete circumstances of people's fives. An examination of Aquinas's writirýgs and 
the secondary literature concludes that considerable division exists within the 
Thomist community concerning natural law. I then propose the basic goods theory, 
a theory heavily indebted to Aquinas's thoughts, as an alternative to Aquinas's 
position, which offers a thorough, specific account of natural law. I acknowledge 
this theory raises controversy in the field of moral theology and I examine it 
critically, making use of literature critical of the theory in order to understand the 
limitations of the theoxy. 
It is one of the aims of the dissertation to determine if the basic goods can 
make sense of how osteoarthritis affects the fives of the patients. The patients' 
narratives are analysed in order to see which basic goods are affected by the 
presence of osteoarthritis. The five major themes which arise from the narratives 
can be explored to understand how they relate to the basic goods. " An example is 
that the patients' concern over how the illness impacts their health is easy to link up 
16 The seven basic goods are human life including health, knowledge and appreciation of beauty 
and goods, playful activities and skilful work, self-integration or inner peace, peace of conscience 
and consistency between one's thoughts and deeds, peace with neighbours and society, and peace 
with God or some-more-than-human source. See Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John 
Finnis, 
"Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends", American Journal ofJurisprudence, 
v. 32,1987, pp. 107-108. 
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to the basic good of human life and health. However, not A concerns are as 
obviously linked to a basic good as this one and there is no scientific way to do so. 
No common denominator exists to give an exact correlation between a theme 
expressed and its necessary link to a basic good. When the patients mention that 
they must strive to keep a measure of self-worth because it is undermined by the 
attitudes of others, does this go under the basic good of inner peace or peace 
among neighbours and society? It has a bearing on both. I try partially to resolve 
this ambiguity by not being restricted to a one-to-one correspondence, in which 
self-worth can only be applied to one basic good. Self-worth is applied to both 
basic goods because it appears relevant to both basic goods. Still, it should be noted 
that while empirical studies bring realism into ethical analysis, one result is some 
conceptual confusion. " In order to try to prove that the patients exhibit certain 
concerns for basic goods or show signs of the virtues, I frequently quote from the 
interview transcripts and from Aquinas to show some correlation. 
Based on the understanding that the basic goods theory can offer on the 
impact of osteoarthritis on the patients' fives, the virtues are then examined to 
understand their relevance to the patients in their attempts to achieve happiness, 
given the circumstance of their chronic illness. What promotes the natural law is a 
virtue, what attacks the natural law is a vice. Therefore, in the patients' attempts to 
achieve the basic goods, there should be signs of the virtues being employed. 'Me 
basic idea behind my argument, and the link between basic goods and the virtues, is 
that when osteoarthritis adversely affects a basic good, the person then seeks to 
repair the damage done to that good, and to do so, employs the virtues. This raises 
the concern of how to recognise the virtues. Our society does not employ virtue 
" Soren Holm, Ethical Problems in Clinical Practice, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1997), pp. 23-24. 
12 
language so how can one be certain that the patients are in fact talking about virtues. 
The patients do not name virtues in their narratives. Yet, it is doubtful whether a 
contemporary virtue ethicist would use them in describing his/her life either. It is 
simply not common in our society to think in terms of the virtues. Our 
contemporary ethical consciousness does not operate in such ten-ns. To counter 
this, I have stated above that I wiU try to quote from Aquinas in order to show the 
fink between virtue theory and the virtues in the fives of the patients, using quotes 
from their interviews. Part of what I hope to discover is whether the virtues are 
parts of human nature which operate regardless of whether one specifically thinks in 
virtue terminology. 
The Methodology of the Qualitative Study 
The qualitative study which I use in the dissertation comes from an ongoing 
three-year study, "The Relevance of Virtue Ethics to Patients with Chronic Illness", 
funded by the European Commission, begun in 1998, on applying virtue ethics to 
patients with chronic illness. In this study, four groups of chronically ill, patients are 
being studied. The illnesses being examined are endometriosis, end-stage renal 
disease, depression, and rheumatoid arthritis. A pilot study, "Living WeU Through 
Chronic Illness: An Exploratory Study of the Relevance of Virtue Ethics to Patients 
with Osteoarthritis", was carried out on five females between 63-89 years of age 
who had been diagnosed as suffering from osteoarthritis for a minimum of eighteen 
months. It is the completed pilot study on osteoarthlitis will be used in this 
dissertation because the interviews with patients with the other chronic iUnesses are 
still incomplete and no results are as yet available. 
The interviews were conducted by a healthcare researcher using a 
qualitative, phenomenological model. Each interview lasted between one to two 
13 
hours and was taped and then transcribed. The interviews were modeRed on the 
'in-depth' model of qualitative research, which usually only covers one or two 
subjects and is loosely structured in order to allow the interviewee to pursue what 
she perceives as meaningful issues. " In order to identify recurring themes in the 
patient's narratives, the transcripts were subjected to Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). IPA attempts to understand the content and 
complexity of the interviewee's beliefs. It emphasises investigating the meaning the 
interviewee places on the phenomenon being discussed over a mere listing of the 
how many times themes are mentioned in a discussion. " Each transcript was 
examined and significant words, phrases and explanations were noted and then 
given a code which captured the essential meaning of its content. The recurring 
occurrences of codes across interviews revealed themes and patterns between 
themes. The themes were witness to shared understandings between participants, 
such as gratitude, having realistic perceptions about chronic ffiness, and insight into 
that which maintains one's quality of life. 
Qualitative methods have been used for a long time in the social sciences 
and are the principal methods used by anthropologists in studying the behaviours 
and customs of cultures. 'Mey are also employed in sociology, serniotics, 
psychology, history, and education. Qualitative studies question social phenomena 
and study people in their natural settings rather than an artificial one, and include a 
number of different methods. They examine people's subjective understandings of 
18 Nicky Britten, "Qualitative Interviews in Health Care Research", Qualitative Research in 
Health Care, 2 nd ed., eds. Catherine Pope, Nicholas Mays, (London: BMJ Books, 
2000), pp. II- 
12. 
" Jonathan Smith, Maria Jarman, Mike Osborn, "Doing Interpretive Phenomenological 
Analysis", Qualitative Health Psychology, eds. Michael Murray, Kerry Chamberlain. (London: 
Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 218-219. 
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their own lives, either through direct observation, interview, analysis of texts, 
recorded speech and video tapes, or a combination of these approaches. " 
However, support for qualitative research methods is not universal. It is 
criticised for being unscientific, subjective and therefore biased, and the research is 
difficult to duplicate, amounting to nothing more than anecdote, personal 
impressions and conjecture. " As one conunentator put it: 
Personal accounts of illness are often viewed with considerable ambivalence 
as a research source. On the one hand they provide a density of texture, a depth of personal meaning, and an insight into the experience of illness not 
readily available through other means ... On the other hand these very 
qualities seem to make any systematic, valid and reliable attempts to create 
generalisable propositions difficult, if not impossible. "" 
Yet, qualitative studies are now an important and recognised part of healthcare 
research. The narratives that the interviewees offer are edited versions of reality 
which are neither objective nor impartial. Rather, the interviewee constructs a 
narrative that reveals what is important to him/her and speaks for his/her reality. " 
This allows one to understand how the illness impacts on the interviewee's lifestyle, 
values and goals. 
20 Catherine Pope, Nicholas Mays, "Qualitative Methods in Health Research", Qualitative 
Research in Health Care, eds. Catherine Pope, Nicholas Mays, (London: BMJ Books, 1999), 
pp. 1-7. 
2 'Ibid, p. l. 
22 Ian Robinson, "Personal Narratives, Social Careers and Medical Courses: Analysing Life 
Trajectories in Autobiographies of People with Multiple Sclerosis", Social Science & Medicine, 
v. 30,1990, p. 1173. 
23 Catherine Riessman, "Strategic Uses of Narrative in the Presentation of Self and Illness: A 
Research Note", Social Science & Medicine, v. 30,1990, p. 1197. 
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Osteoarthritis 
As was mentioned earlier, this dissertation will use the results from the pilot 
study for the EC project, done through interviews with patients suffering from 
osteoarthritis". Osteoarthritis is defmed as: 
a disease of joint cartilage, associated with secondary changes in the 
underlying bone, which may ultimately cause pain and impair the function 
of the affected joint (most often the hip, knee, and thumb joints). The 
condition may result from trauma and is most often common in those past 
middle fife; it may also complicate many of the other diseases involving 
joints, such as rheumatoid arthritis ... Osteoarthritis is recognized on X-ray by narrowing of the joint space (due to loss of cartilage) and the presence of 
osteophytes and irregularity at the bone margins. Treatment consists of 
aspirin and other analgesics, reduction of pressure across the joint (by 
weight loss and the use of a walking stick in osteoarthritis of the hip), and 
corrective and prosthetic surgery. " 
Patients with arthritis differ greatly in their efficacy in controlling pain and 
other symptoms of arthritis. Self-efficacy, the belief that "one has the ability to 
engage in a course of action sufficient to attain a desired outcome", plays a large 
role in management of the disease. " People with self-efficacy beliefs tend to have a 
lower level of pain, lower psychological distress and less functional impainnent and 
report having a better over-all health status. There is evidence that patient 
education and training in coping skills can produce enhancement in self-efficacy and 
that patients with active cognitive coping strategies have a higher level of self- 
efficacy than those who are passive in nature. " 
24 Teresa Swift, Living Well Through Chronic Illness: An Exploratory Study of the Relevance of 
Virtue Ethics to Patients with Osteoarthritis, Bristol: unpublished, 2000. Contact Centre in Ethics 
for Medicine for copy. 
'5 Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary, p. 470. 
26 F. J. Keefe, et al, "Pain Coping Strategies that Predict Patients' and Spouses' Rating of Patients' 
Self-Efficacy", Pain, v. 73,1997, pp. 191-192. 
27 Ibid, p. 192. 
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THE OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
The dissertation begins by asking whether a need exists to pursue further 
work in the area of virtue ethics in modem medical ethics. After having decided 
that such a need exists, the middle part of the dissertation is concerned with putting 
the elements of virtue theory in place in order to apply it to patients with chronic 
illness. The final main chapter examines the results of this application. 
The second chapter explores virtue ethics as part of modem medical ethics. 
The results of this chapter suggest that present approaches to virtue ethics role in 
medical ethics either aim at integrating virtue ethics into a profession-centred 
principle-based ethics or attempt to integrate the virtues into an Ethics of Care 
theory wlýich cannot work in clinical practice. A comprehensive virtue theory is 
needed which can be applied to the patient who resides at the centre of medicine. 
This is why Aquinas is studied in chapter three. 
The third chapter is an explication of Aquinas's virtue ethics. To 
understand the theory, Aquinas's writings on several topics are first discussed: telos, 
ethical theory, natural law, happiness, reason, passion, and habit. I have tried to 
remain as close to Aquinas's translated text as possible and let his writings speak for 
themselves. The chapter is mainly descriptive. There are two areas worth 
mentioning in this introduction. The first concerns the foundation of the virtues. I 
have chosen to argue that the basis for Aquinas's virtue ethics is the natural law, 
rather than natural law as a ethics of the becoming of a human person, as argued by 
scholars such as Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. " There needs to be a 
sound basis for determining what constitutes a virtue because this becomes 
important later on in the analysis of the pilot study. 'Me second area deals with 
28 See Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Being and Goodness", The Concept of the Good 
in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 199 1), pp. 179-207. 
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Aquinas's thoughts on the effects of iUness on one's happiness. I searched the 
Swmm in order to understand if Aquinas had addressed the question of illness. 
Aquinas does not fully develop any theory on this subject matter; however I think 
that his thoughts on the topic can be gleaned from what he did write : when pain 
becomes too great, it so disorganises any ability for a person to rationally pursue 
his/her fife that it robs that person of the ability to achieve happiness. 
The natural law is used in the dissertation as a means of analysing what areas 
of life are damaged by chronic illness. The fourth chapter begins by examining 
Aquinas's statements on natural law. Aquinas's remarks on the natural law are brief 
and largely limited to the primary precepts. The result is some lack of clarity and 
confusion in an attempt to apply natural law to the particulars of everyday life. I 
choose instead to utilise the basic goods theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle 
and John Finnis in an effort to understand what goods are involved in human 
flourishing. This theory allows one to perceive which specific goods are impacted 
by chronic illness and how the patients react to these losses. 
The fifth chapter applies Aquinas's virtue ethics, based on natural law, to 
patients with osteoarthritis. The patients in the pilot study were interviewed with 
the aim of understanding how the virtues are of relevance to their fife with 
osteoarthritis and the interviews analysed by a healthcare researcher. I use the 
transcripts from the interviews and the five themes that emerge from the analysis, 
determine which basic goods appear to be affected and then examine how the 
patients act virtuously to assist them in attaining these goods. 
The conclusion discusses possible areas of future study and reflects on the 
diffictAties and advantages of applying ethical theory to clinical data. While I believe 
that there is good reason to see this line of study as worthy of further pursuit, any 
18 
claims made in this new area must be linited because of the lack of corroborating 
studies. The theory of falsification is addressed in order to understand the merits of 
the hypothesis. People employ falsification in order to examine if a hypothesis is 
falsifiable, which is considered a necessary condition for the advancement of 
knowledge. In the final part of the conclusion, I ask what should be done with this 
study in terms of implementing it, and I suggest that this task involves collaboration 
with the fields of education, psychology, and pastoral theology which have expertise 
in aiding people develop new ways of thinking and adjusting lifestyles. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE THEORY 
IN 
MEDICAL ETHICS LITERATURE 
20 
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I am proposing to establish the relevance of virtue ethics for 
people dealing with long term illness or disability. Unfortunately, there are few 
writings relating the two. The two dominant approaches found in literature are (a) 
Ethics of Care theory and (b) the promotion virtuous healthcare professionals as 
epitornised by the writings of Edmund PeUegrino. Ethics of Care theory stresses a 
deep personal involvement with and conunýtment to the patient. The virtuous 
healthcare professional approach advances a profession-centred virtue ethics. These 
two approaches represent the only systematic attempts to link virtue ethics to 
medical ethics. In addition to these, there is a miscellany of articles, largely 
explaining the difficulties of integrating virtue ethics into a modem medical ethics. 
As we shaH see, none of these approaches establishes a convincing or coherent 
justification for integrating virtue ethics into medical ethics. 
This negative picture of the place of virtue ethics in medical ethics is 
surprising when we consider that from the time of Hippocrates until the 1960s, the 
traditional medical ethics model had been virtue ethics which focussed on the type 
of virtuous physician promoted by Pellegrino. However, the reasons 
for this 
become obvious when we consider recent developments in the subject. The 1960's 
saw a change from this traditional model of medical ethics to a new species named 
'Bioethics'. Incorporating aspects of the old medical ethics, which was primarily 
concerned with the conduct and deportment of the physician, Bioethics was a 
reaction to a growing concern over the ambiguity of medical progress. 
After World 
War Two, medicine and its available interventions become more technical. 
At first, 
the advances were considered to be unequivocally good. Infants with 
diseases who 
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would have died shortly after birth now survived into adulthood, people were 
surviving diseases that would have taken their lives ten or even five years ago, fife 
expectancy rose. However, questions started arising over the perceived ambiguity in 
the medical advances. ' Geneticists worried that the gene poolwas becoming 
polluted with the genes of those who survived previous fatal diseases now having 
children and handing down the disease to future generations. Patients living long 
periods in a persistent vegetative state or in intractable pain caused some to ask 
what the traditional concepts of harm, benefit, fife and death meant. There was a 
growing need for the concerns brought about by these advances in medicine to be 
addressed in some organised format. 
By the beginning of the 1960's this need was being met in the fonn of 
conferences. The harms, inconveniences and disadvantages of medical 
interventions were examined in a critical manner. Theologians and philosophers, 
who had long examined the topics of life, death and justice, began to be invited to 
these conferences. Previously, the speakers had been scientists and medical 
professionals. The theologians and philosophers pressed for clearer definitions and 
offered structured approaches to topics and refined arguments. These conferences 
set the stage for Bioethics as the conferences in turn produced centres for the study 
of Bioethics. ' These centres realised that a multi-disciplinary approach which could 
analyse several sides of a topic was needed. In the early 1970s, scholarly analysis, 
using an interdisciplinary approach, began exploring problems in a systematic 
manner. Virtue ethics was removed from its central role in modem medical ethics. 
Code-based ethics, stressing the character of physician, in whom any ethical 
decision-making powers laid, was no longer considered suitable for the second half 
' Albert Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 11. 
2 lbid, p. 19. 
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of the twentieth century. Principle-based ethics, drawing on the insights of many 
disciplines and framed in philosophical language, seemed more appropriate than an 
ethics that placed too much trust in the physician's judgement concerning the 
patient's best interests. However, within two decades, there was a reaction against 
the exclusion of virtue ethics from modem medical ethics. Proponents of Ethics of 
Care theory, which arose from the nursing discipline, objected to the impersonal 
nature of the principle-based approach which stressed abstract principles over 
personal relationships in determining ethical criteria. Virtue ethicists formed in the 
Atistotelian-Thornistic school, such as Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, 
were concerned that in the move to embrace principle-based ethics over virtue 
ethics much of the value of virtue ethics was being unnecessarily dispensed with, 
and they argued that there was a place for role-virtues in the medical profession and 
medical ethics. 
Prior to the early 1980s, there is no evidence of any systematic attempt to 
integrate virtue theory into modem medical ethics. Principle-based ethics was 
becoming well ensconced as the dominant ethical theory to be applied to medical 
ethical problems. However, principle-based theory was only a newly crowned king, 
having in the 1970s deposed virtue ethics, the ruler in medical ethics for centuries. 
When the faH of virtue-based ethics came, it took only twenty-five years, a short 
time compared to the five or six centuries it took virtue ethics to be rooted out of 
general ethical theory? In the rrýd-1980s, virtue ethics was being called to return 
from exile for negotiations to see how it could fit into the emerging 'government' of 
medical ethics. It was not to be a return to a position of ruling; principle-based 
theory was now fully in charge. Rather, it was to assume a role more like that of a 
3 Edmund Pellegrino, "Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health Professions" 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, v. 5,1995, p. 264. 
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government minister, responsible for one area of medical ethical theory: producing 
virtuous healthcare professionals. Medical ethics was realising that a principle- 
based, deontological theory had its linlits. While principle-based ethics worked well 
with the 'stranger' medicine being practised in a western, pluralistic society, it was 
thought to be too abstract and removed from the context and complexity of clinical 
decision making. It was too rationalistic and legalistic. The appreciation of moral 
agents was left out. It was recognised that the manner in which principles, rules, 
caring or any type of ethical theory was carried out depended on the types of agents 
and their analysis. Principle-based theory was to remain the king, but virtue ethics 
was asked to assist in developing healthcare professionals capable of making good 
ethical decisions. 
There appear to be at least two reasons why virtue ethics was again a topic 
of debate in medical ethics. Virtue ethicists rallied around the banner raised by 
AlasdairMacIntyre's influential After Virtue, released in 1981. Hisbookpromoted 
a renaissance in virtue theory in general, and is referred to in nearly every article and 
book published in virtue-based medical ethics. The dissatisfaction with post- 
Enlightenment philosophy, with its emphasis on deontology, rules and principles, 
found powerful expression. At the same time, principle-based medical ethics had 
been around long enough for its weaknesses to appear and be criticised. ' Virtue 
ethics was examined anew to see how it could regain status in medical ethics. We 
shall look first at two approaches which claimed the high ground, Ethics of Care 
theory and PeRegrino's account of the virtuous physician. Both wiU be found to be 
4See Stephen Toulmin, "The Tyranny of Principles", Hastings Center Report, v. 11,198 1, pp. 31- 
39, and Danner Clouse, Bernard Gert, "A Critique of Principalism", Journal ofMedical Ethics, 
v. 15,1990, pp. 217-233, and Ronald Green, "Method in Bioethics: A Troubled Assessment", 
The 
Journal ofMedicine and Philosophy, v. 15,1990, pp. 179-197. 
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inadequate. Then, after surveying more general criticisms, the conclusion to the 
chapter will propose a patient-centred virtue ethics. 
ETHICS OF CARE THEORY 
Arising from feminist writers who argue that women tend to display an ethic 
of care whereas men display an ethic of obligation and rights, advocates of Ethics of 
Care are concerned with promoting a relationship in which one cares for, has an 
emotional conunitment to, and is willing to act on behalf of a person with whom 
one has an intimate relationship. It emphasises such traits as compassion, 
sympathy, fidelity and love while downplaying Kantian universal rules, individual 
rights and impartial utilitarian calculations. ' Advanced is the belief that intuition 
and relationships should play as large a role in our life as does reason and our search 
for a universalisable ethics. ' One group in medicine that has embraced this 
approach is nursing. Research has shown that when faced with ethical dilemmas, 
nurses tend to fall back on instincts gained through years of clinical practice. 
Experienced nurses were able to identify ethical concerns but felt frustrated at the 
lack of theoretical background or confidence to participate in informed debate. ' It 
was realised that part of this resulted from the different roles nurses and physicians 
have. Nurses tend to be more caught up in the day-to-day problems of the patient 
whereas physicians tend to see the patient only in brief meetings at infrequent 
intervals. 
5 Tom Beauchamp, James Childress, Principles ofBiomedical Ethics, 4 th ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 85-86. 
6 Alastair V. Campbell, "'The Ethics of Care' as Virtue Ethics", Advances in Bioethics, v. 4,1998, 
?. 297. 
Beatrice Sofaer, "Enhancing Humanistic Skills: An Experiential Approach to Learning about 
Ethical Issues in Health Care", Journal ofMedical Ethics, v. 21,1995, p. 3 1. 
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The current approaches to medical ethics, being in the main either 
deontological. or consequentialist, are, according to this view, unable to 
accommodate the relational basis of the healing relationship. Being based in rules 
and principles, these theories fail to recognise the social context of ethics. Care 
theory states that morality is not simply concerned with justifying acts but also with 
the development of the person. Any foundation acceptable to an Ethics of Care 
must be able to accommodate the relational basis of the clinical encounter and to 
recognise the contextual nature of ethical decisions that concern the development of 
the moral agent! Traditional ethics has tended to separate the agent from the act 
and concentrate only on the act itself. The result, an Ethics of Care theory claims, is 
an impersonal ethics concerned with abstract rules, leaving the needs and cares of 
the patient out of the question. 
The Relevance of Ethics of Care Theory to Virtue Ethics 
Advocates of Ethics of Care promote it as a part of virtue theory by making 
three points: both care and virtue stress character and relationships rather than 
maintaining distance and objectivity which are concerns of modem medicine'; 
pbnwesis or practical wisdom stresses having an understanding of the patient's needs 
in order to make a prudent therapeutic decision"; and the recognition of the role of 
emotion places care within the virtue tradition, knowledge which can only be 
obtained through having a caring relationship with the patient. " 
' Pamela Salsberry, "Care, Virtue Theory, and a Foundation for Nursing Ethics", Scholarly 
Inquiryfor Nursing Practice. - An International Journal, v. 6,1992, p. 157. 
9 Patricia Benner, "A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics", Theoretical Medicine, 
v. 18,1997, p. 5 8. 
'0 Dawson Schultz, Franco Carnevale, "Engagement and Suffering in Responsible Caregiving: 
on Overcoming Maleficence in Healthcare", Theoretical Medicine, v. 17,1996, pp. 194-195. 
11 Rosemarie Tong, "The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Virtue Ethics of Care for Healthcare 
Practitioners", Journal ofMedicine and Philosophy, v. 23,1998, p. 137. 
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1) Cam and vmw stress character mid mlatiaý ratber than disý xid o4ixý. 
One point conunon to the advocates of this view is that care as virtue ethics 
helps overcome some of the bad traits of modem medicine. Ethics of Care stresses 
emotion whereas modem medicine perceives emotion as something of a rninefield 
that interferes with good diagnosis and treatment. D. SchtAtz and F. Carnevale cite 
Veatch's observation that a paradigm shift has occurred from modem medicine to 
post-modem medicine. " Modem medicine is essentially factual in nature. The role 
of the professional is that of an expert on facts, scientific method and medical 
values. These values involve professional evaluation including quantifiability, 
predictability, and efficiency. Medicine has become an overly rationalistic enterprise 
in which caregiving is seen as a technical process whose main concern is with 
efficiency. Care has been disengaged as the basis of medicine, to be replaced with 
technical production: 
The structure of caregiving has been changed from the kind of activity that 
exemplifies what Aristotle understood as practical wisdom or pbnmis -a 
process in which the agent exercises deliberation on and interpretation of all 
the morally relevant particulars of the situation to determine the goals or 
directions, as well as the means, of action - into the kind that exemplifies 
what he understood as 'applied science' or 'techne 13 
Patricia Benner writes a sin-ýlar passage. "Objectification and distancing are 
useful for coping with the terrors of inflicting pain and facing the risk of death, but 
they are only useful for circumscribed periods and always run the risk of usurping 
human conditions. "" Proponents of the Ethics of Care worry that practitioners of 
modem medicine isolate the patient and fear any meaningful contact with the 
person who is ifl, preferring instead to maintain distance from the patient in order to 
preserve what they consider to be "objectivity". 
12 Schultz, Carnevale, "Engagement and Suffering", p. 19 1. 
13 lbid, p. 193. 
" Benner, "A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics", p. 58. 
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2) A-actical Wudan a&zes an Understandiig of the Patint's Needs. 
Care theory has a perception of responsibility in medicine that is structured 
around a sympathetic understanding of the patient's suffering. While holding that 
there is a place for distance and objectivity, it requires professionals to aid patients 
in the manner that most fits the patient's circumstances. Schultz and Carnevale 
state that the virtue of pbraxsis or practical wisdom: 
involves incorporating knowledge of the patient as person into the best 
ethical and clinical decision to be made in continuing the dialogue with the 
person as patient. It necessitates a certain level of involvement with the 
patient, what we call engaged-sympathetic care. " 
This process is characterised by narrative and dialogue. Clinical decisions cannot be 
made in advance of or apart from the caregiver's fuff participation in the patient's 
circumstances. 
3) Rocognition of tbe role ofano6ga 
Rosemarie Tong continues the line of thought of care being related to virtue 
ethics through recognition of the place of emotions in medical experience. Rights- 
based language operates on the assumption of human separateness rather than on 
connections. Care operates on different assumptions. It states that there is more to 
morality than reason alone. Morality is also about possessing the right feelings and 
emotions. In this way, through recognition of the importance of the passions, care 
is related to virtue ethics. 
16 Patricia Benner takes a sin@ar line of thought to Tong. 
Both authors worry that the market model of healthcare will become dominant and 
that the human person in the form of the patient wifl be ignored. Benner does not 
believe that rights-based principle ethics should be replaced in medical ethics, but 
15 Dawson and Carnevale, "Engagement and Suffering", p. 194. 
16 Tong, "The Ethics of Care", p-137. 
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that more consideration should be given to the role of emotion. She endorses the 
Aristotelian vision of emotion as governed by reason as a move in the proper 
direction because it comes close to capturing how one's emotional responses are 
developed in the acquiring of a habit: 
Emotions are more than 'noises' that trouble our cognitive processing; they 
create the possibility of rational action. Emotional responses can act as a 
moral compass in responding to the other person. Emotions, viewed in this 
way, signal a response to the plight of the other and guide perception of 
salient moral issues, and thus are not empty of cognitive or moral content or 
necessarily disruptive of reasoning processes. " 
The Limitations of Ethics of Care Theory as an Account of Virtue Ethics 
Two points highlight the liýnitations inherent in considering care theory as 
an expression of virtue ethics. The first point focuses on theory. The second point 
stresses the irrelevance of care theory to medical ethics. Ethics of Care can only 
play a very limited role in medicine and medical ethics because it is impractical to 
use care, either on its own or as a part of a virtue-based theory. To attempt do so is 
to grind medical care to a halt, bum out caregivers, and turn them into emotionally 
distant and cold professionals. 
1) Tbeoý Con"m 
The first argument claims that caring cannot be regarded as a virtue because 
it is possible to care for things that do not fit into a moral criterion. " One can care 
about being remote or aloof in one's professional role as physician, or care that one 
maxinuses one s profit in providing medical care. However, this simply would 
mean that one possesses a vice. Peter Allmark sees some similarities between care 
17 Benner, "A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics", p. 54. 
18 Philip Warelow, "Is Caring the Ethical Ideal? ", Journal ofAdvanced Nursing, v. 24,1996, 
p. 656. 
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and virtue. " Both are proposed as alternatives to mainstream bioethical theories, 
stress the importance of character, and recognise the role for emotion in ethical 
decision making. However, caring "is not a good per se, it is simply something A of 
us do, good and bad. The ethics of virtue focuses on the agent, the things she cares 
about, and the way she expresses that care. "" Allmark does not perceive anything 
special about the care of nurses. Everyone cares about his or her job. Assassins 
care about kifling weH and maximising profit. Store managers care about attracting 
customers and making profit. Care is not a virtue but virtue involves correct 
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caring. Allmark has a point. Care adds nothing new to virtue theory. The 
conditions for the Ethics of Care already exist within the virtues. Compassion, 
&At(respectful service), clemency and gentleness, humility, patience, perseverance, 
truth, and friendliness are all virtues described in detail by Aquinas and which the 
virtuous person would possess whether the theory of care existed or not. 
While Care made add nothing new to virtue theory, it is correct in its 
concern over caring for the sick person as such, and this is good. Yet care can be 
misguided without further ethical consideration. Some could view care as providing 
abortions for women or euthanasia for a pain-ridden patient. These are misguided 
notions about caring for a person. 
2) Etbics of Cam IS Impmaical to L*Vkm" 
The second argument against care being a virtue is advanced by Howard 
Curzer. He states that we can look at virtue in two ways: the general virtues which 
make a person a good person and the role virtues that make a person a good 
lawyer, 
nurse, or teacher. Ethics of Care advances care as a role virtue 
for healthcare 
" Peter Allmark, "Is Caring a Virtue? ", Journal ofAdvanced Nursing, v. 28,1998, p. 466. 
20 Ibid, p. 469. 
21 Ibid, pp. 470-47 1. 
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professionals. This means creating a strong emotional attachment to patients. This 
strong emotional tie creates problems for both caring professionals and patients. " 
Some people will not want to become the object of an emotionally caring team 
overnight. This strong emotional bond will cause the staff problems when they see 
the patient in pain or when they must break bad news. It is neither possible to be in 
a caring relationship with all patients, nor even to like all patients. Favouritism win 
inevitably result and lead to undesirable practices such as ageism, sexism and racism. 
Objectivity will be lost and harm the patient's diagnosis. Costs will be driven up 
through physicians wanting the very best treatment for patients. To actwith care 
will lead to staff burnout in a number of ways. They will bring problems home with 
them and use up emotional resources. Feelings of guilt will linger about not being 
able to care equally for all patients. The result will be physical and psychological 
deterioration, leading to suffering for staff, family and patients. " Curzer believes 
that it is difficult to understand care as a virtue if it leads to burnout, bias, injustice 
and inefficiency. Instead, he holds that one should act benevolently and act as if 
one really did care. The other option is to care and bum out and end up treating the 
patient in an uncaring manner. The downside of this thesis is that professionals will 
have to five a he and may become alienated from the clinical encounter. " 
Curzer makes a valid point. It is unrealistic to believe that one could treat all 
patients in the manner that the Ethics of Care would have patients treated. The 
unfommate reality is that modem medicine is, for the most part, 'stranger' medicine. 
Specialists have no real time to spend getting to know the narrative of a patient. 
The pressures of time weigh too heavily on the medical system. This problem could 
22 Howard Curzer, "Is Care a Virtue for Health Care Professionals? ", The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy, v. 18,1993, p. 54. 
23 Ibid, pp. 56-61. 
24 Ibid, p. 65. 
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be overcome only through producing large numbers of healthcare professionals and 
being willing to assume a dramatic rise in cost of healthcare. 
PELLEGRINO'S THEORY: VIRTUOUS HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS 
There has been one writer who has been more persuasive than anyone else 
in reintroducing virtue ethics into modem medical ethics. If one wants to look at 
the 'state' of virtue theory in regard to medical ethics, Edmund D. Pellegrino is the 
person to whom to turn. VVhile there are other writers in the area, they are heavily 
influenced by Pellegrino and either comment on his writings or incorporate and 
expand on his ideas. " Therefore, this section will focus on the theory of Pellegrino. 
His theory is substantially based in Aristotle and Aquinas. However, his desire to 
have virtue ethics assume a place of honour in medical ethics has caused him to 
unite virtue theory with principle-based theory. I shall argue that this results in a 
distortion of virtue ethics through reducing it to a version of principle-based theory. 
Pellegrino's Account of Virtue 
Pellegrino holds that society has lost consensus on a definition of virtue, and 
without moral consensus, there is no vantage point from which to judge what is 
right. Virtue becomes confused with confomiky to conventions of social and 
institutional fife. The accolades go to those who get ahead and get along. " 
Pellegrino believes that principle-based ethics are needed in medicine. In a 
pluralistic society, rules, laws, and principles are needed to ensure a dependable 
minimum level of moral conduct. But that minimum level is insufficient in the 
" See volume 18,1997, of Theoretical Medicine, or volume 15,1990, of The Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, which devoted entire issues to Pellegrino and his influence in this area. 
2' Edmund Pellegrino, "The Virtuous Physician and the Ethics of Medicine", Virtue and 
Medicine, ed. E. E. Shelp, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), p. 237. 
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complex and often unpredictable circumstances of decision-making, where technical 
and value desiderata intersect so inextricably. " Being a virtuous physician goes to 
the heart of the patient-physician relationship. The vulnerability and dependence of 
the patient forces him/her to trust not just his/her rights to, but also in the 
character of the physician. In illness, when people are at their most exploitable, they 
are dependent upon the kind of person who wiU intend and do the right and good 
thing. 
PeRegrino has been working on this topic since the nýid-1980s. The fuffest 
expression of his thesis, which has remained remarkably consistent throughout his 
writings, is found in his 1993 book, written with David Thomasma, The Virtues in 
Medical In this book, Peflegrino and Thomasma utifise the theories of 
Aquinas and Aristotle, stating that no one since has added anything to the essential 
notion of virtue ethics. " Their basic argument is that virtue ethics has lost its 
normative force because the moral philosophy on which it was based is no longer 
intact. There is no consensus on the connnon good or the good fife. Given our 
pluralistic society, it is too remote a possibility to restore a common moral 
philosophy for general ethics. However, virtue can be restored for professional 
ethics because there is a common idea of the telos of medical practice - the health 
and good of the patient. Yet, even in the limited realm of professional ethics, virtue 
cannot stand alone, but must be related to other etl-&al theories to create a more 
comprehensive moral philosophy that provides specific moral guides for action. 'O 
27 Ibid, p. 250. 
28 Edmund Pellegrino, David Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). In 1995, Pellegrino published the article "Toward a Virtue-Based 
Normative Ethics for the Health Professions" which is a synopsis of the 1993 book and will also 
be referred to in explaining the theory. 
29 Ibid, p. 12. 
30 Ibid, p. xiii, and Pellegrino, "Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics for the Health 
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Pellegrino argues that virtue-based ethics started its decline for three 
reasons. " First, the introduction of principle-based ethics seemed more definitive 
because of its concreteness and applicability to clinical decisions. Second, public 
attention became focused on autonomy-based, contractual relationships rather than 
on trust-based covenantal ones because of the following factors: scandal 
surrounding physicians' character and actions; a move toward more participatory 
democracy; greater public education; and a general distrust of authority. Third, the 
religious and philosophical consensus that had undergirded professional ethics in 
the West was challenged and weakened. He gives several reasons why virtue ethics 
is making a comeback in professional ethics: the limitations of principle-based 
ethics; the growing appreciation of the importance of the moral agent; and the telos 
found in professional ethics. " 
The telos of medicine is grounded in three phenomena of the healing 
relationship. " The first phenomenon considers the facts of illness themselves. A 
person becomes a patient when he acknowledges a sufficient concern over a 
physical or psychological symptom. The patient is anxious, in pain, disabled, and 
very vulnerable and exploitable. He or she can no longer pursue the things he or 
she desires without great impediment. The patient then seeks a professional to aid 
them in restoration. The second phenomenon is the act of profession, made when 
healthcare professionals ask how they can be of help. This question implies a 
promise that they possess the knowledge and training to assist the patient. This 
promise establishes a covenant of trust volunteered by the professionals and 
imposes obligations on them. The final phenomenon is the act of healing itself, 
where the promise made by the professionals create the telos of the relationship, 
31 Pellegrino, "Toward a Virtue-Based Normative Ethics", p. 264. 
32 bid, p. 264. 
33 kid, p. 267. 
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which is the helping and healing of the patient. The virtues that are needed by the 
physician to establish a healing relationship with the patient are fidelity to trust, 
compassion, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, integrity, and self- 
effacement. " 
Problems with the theory 
There are at least three problems with Pellegrino's and Thomasma's theory. 
It is not with the assertion that physicians should posses virtues, for this assertion is 
correct, as is the assertion that in being a virtuous physician, one cares about the 
weU-being and happiness of the patient, and that this goes to the heart of the 
patient-physician relationship. The main problem arises from trying to integrate 
virtue ethics into the principle-based ethics that dominates medical ethics. 
PeUegrino and Thomasma state that a good disposition is not enough to guarantee 
right moral choice and that principles are needed (making one question the need for 
virtues), but that virtues are needed so that one will obey the principles. Their 
writings leave one confused over the use of principle-based ethics as the 
foundations for the virtues. While they attempt to find a foundation for virtue 
ethics, perhaps it is more logical to base them on the natural law rather than 
principle-based ethics. Similar confusion ensues from their use of a circular 
argument to link the virtues to principle-based ethics and their equating the virtues 
with principles. The result of this confusion is that it renders their concept 
unworkable. Or more accurately, the theory does work, but as a principle-based 
theory rather than virtue theory. In effect, by deflating the virtues to simple 
expressions of the principles, the theory is virtue ethics more in name than in 
substance. What is needed is an approach that takes only a virtue ethics theory, 
34 Pellegrino and Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, pp. 65-154. 
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such as that of Aquinas, and does not worry about linking it to other ethical 
theories. While Pellegrino and Thomasma would argue against this criticism of their 
theory, stating that they were weIl within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, a 
close look at their writings seems to suggest that the charges carry enough validity to 
make a respectable case. 
The Use of Principle-Based Ethics as a Foundation for Virtue Ethics 
The authors state that principle-based ethics must remain a part of medical 
ethics. While I agree with this view, I would contend that any effort spent on 
integrating virtue ethics into a profession-oriented principle-based medical ethics 
results in confusion. The main role of virtue ethics in medical ethics lies in assisting 
the patient. There is certainly a linited role for virtue ethics in developing a 
virtuous healthcare professional, as Pellegrino clearly demonstrates. In trying to tie 
the virtues too closely with principle-based ethics, the virtues appear to be demoted 
to a position where a virtuous person is one who simply follows the principles, 
sin-ýIar to the proposition made by Beauchamp that each principle more-or-less 
corresponds with a major virtue. " It is odd that the authors move into the 
principle-based approach on the reasons that they give in their book. Pellegrino and 
Thomasma. begin to link the virtues to principles by first stating the problem with 
the circularity of virtue ethics: 
The morally good act is one done by the virtuous person; the virtuous 
person is one who performs morally good acts. This circular reasoning is 
tolerable when some common notion of the good is accepted by all. When 
there is no such common notion, the logical consistency between character 
and moral1y good acts is no longer sustainable. " 
35 Tom Beauchamp, "What's So Special About the Virtues? ", Virtue and Medicine, ed. E. E. 
Shelp, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), p. 31 1. 
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Being from the Aristotelian-Thomýstic tradition, one could assume that to find an 
acceptable common notion of the good, they would use either natural law or 
metaphysics as the basis of virtue ethics. Instead, they employ principle-based 
ethics. The authors state that the need for guides for specific moral action is acute 
and that people should turn to the principles to ground ethics. They write: 
Principles are general or universal guides to action. They may be derived from more fundamental moral postulates and intuitions or accepted as prim faaý moral truths that should be respected unless there is a morally 
compelling reason not to do so. "' 
If principles are universal guides to action, then is there a need for the virtues? 
They must add nothing if our actions are prescribed for us by principles. The 
statement also raises the question of how universalisable principles are formed if 
society is so pluralistic that a definition of the common good cannot be found. If 
there is enough common ground to develop common principles, why is there not 
enough common ground to form a common good? Pellegrino would most likely 
reply that it is because principles are about protecting individual rights, and hence 
the only common ground is that where people agree not to interfere in the other 
person's pursuit of ful0ment. However, if people can agree that they value certain 
things, such as freedom of expression, the ability to determine one's own future, 
and to be treated with justice, does this not indicate the existence of a shared notion 
of common ground in society? They would have been better off arguing from a 
natural law theory. One finds it difficult to imagine that a person could disagree 
with a statement saying that human life itself, creative play, rewarding work, taking 
pleasure in things of beauty, inner peace, peace with family, friends and neighbours 
is something on wl-ýich rational people cannot agree. The basic goods would appear 
to have enough common ground to be accepted by most of society. Pellegrino and 
37 Ibld, p. 18. 
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Thomasma state that a common good is not possible in general ethics, due to 
pluralism, but medicine has a view of the common good in its orientation to help 
and heal the patient. This allows the virtues to be utilised in the professional ethics 
of medicine. While virtue ethics is not perceived as sufficient as a foundation for 
medical ethics, it is not expendable. The character of the physician is at the heart of 
moral choice and action. 
Their endorsement of principle-based ethics confuses one as to whether 
they are committed primarily to virtues or to principles. It would appear to be 
principle-based. "It is our contention that virtue-based ethics, as well as the newer 
alternatives to principle-based ethics, must somehow be joined to principle-based 
ethics if the limitations of each approach are to be balanced by the strengths of the 
other. "" Their emphasis on principle-based ethics as the dominant method of 
ethical discourse leads to some confusion over how the virtues function in this 
method. They appear to equate virtues with principles. 
Equating Virtues with Principles 
Peflegrino appears to agree with Beauchamp, who writes that virtues are 
dispositions to do what people should do as a matter of duty, and principles of duty 
are convictions about the proper character that people should cultivate. Beauchamp 
writes that: 
For every principle of duty there is a corresponding trait of character of 
virtue, which is simply a disposition to act as specified in the principle; and 
for every virtue of character, there is a corresponding action that conforms 
to a principle of duty. " 
The principle of beneficence corresponds to the virtue of benevolence, truth-telling 
to truthfulness, gratitude to gratefulness, fidelity to faithfulness, confidentiality to 
" Pellegrino and Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, pp. 19-20. 
39 Beauchamp, "What's So Special About the Virtues? ", p. 31 1. 
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confidentialness. The correspondence will not always be one to one but one could 
reconstruct it so that there is a one-to-one correspondence. Beauchamp believes 
that approaches based on the virtue of the investigator lack sufficient bite. Rights 
and moral imperatives are effective instruments for guiding moral conduct whereas 
exhortations to virtue are difficult to transrnit. " When the virtuous person is 
confused, then virtuous character is insufficient and hence duty or principles are 
needed. In Beauchamp's vision, the virtues are not virtues in the Aristotelian or 
Thornistic sense. Rather, they are simply descriptive tags to describe the person 
who obeys the principles. The virtuous person is the one who is good at following 
the principles. Pellegrino denies this conclusion, but his argument appears circular. 
Circularity of the Argument Linking Virtue Ethics to Principle-Based Ethics 
The attempt to link virtue ethics to principle-based ethics creates confusion. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, several times deny that the virtuous person is the one 
who simply uses the principles rightly. "Manifestly, this cannot be the case. One 
may master the techniques of moral analysis and yet be a person of dubious 
character - something not so rare as one might hope among skifled ethicists. "" One 
can have a good grasp of ethical principles and not apply them properly, just as one 
can have people unaware of principles and yet be counted on to act rightly, given 
their character. Yet, on the following page, they state that good disposition alone is 
not enough to guarantee right moral choice. "Moral principles are benchmarks 
against which we may assess the moral quality" of the relationship between act, 
intent, and circumstance. " In other words, if one acts against the principles, then 
one is viClous. Then, on the foUowing page, they deny this: 
40 bid, p. 325. 
41 Pellegrino and Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, p. 20. 
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the virtuous person is not virtuous because she respects the principle, but 
because she recognizes the fundamental and universal nature of this 
principle, sees it not just as a duty in the Kantian sense, but as part of her 
character - incised, so as to speak, in the etymolo&al sense of the word 
(character, ' into her very person and identity. " 
This again raises the question of how the universal principle is recognised as 
universal when people are unable to come to a definition of common good in order 
to know what principles would promote the good. Whereas they criticised the 
circularity of virtue's definition, they create more confusion by embracing a similar 
circularity regarding linking virtues to principles: 
Principles, then, are general statements of what guides the actions of a good 
person. A person is not virtuous because he follows the principles or does 
his duty, as Kant would have it. Rather, the principle derives its validity 
from the moral relationship that should obtain between rational beings 
capable of choosing their own values, ends, purposes, and life plans. " 
Principles are principles because people agree that they should be principles. That 
appears to be what gives principle their validity, because people agree that they 
should be valid. There is enough common assent to agree on this point, yet not 
enough to agree on any other points. While it is true that this is what happens in 
practice, and it does tend to work, there is still circularity in the reasoning. 
Principles operate in a manner which let People agree to disagree and keep 
relationships on working terms. What virtues are needed for, according to the 
authors, is to ensure that people are of a certain character that they will obey the 
principles. The "virtues are conditions of possibility for the implementation of 
principles and moral rules ... without the virtuous agent, no amount of rule making 
will ever change the behaviour of individuals. "" In the end it is the principles that 
decide ethics, with virtues only giving the disposition to seek out principles. "In the 
view that we take, the four principles are derived 
from obligations owed by 
43 lbid, p. 22. 
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physicians. These obligations, in turn, derive from the promise to provide 
competent help, which is at the heart of the medical relationship. "" Previously, 
they said the virtues were at the heart of the medical relationship. It causes one to 
wonder whether, despite their protestations concerning Beauchamp's view of the 
virtues, they do believe that possessing the virtue of benevolence equals honouring 
the principle of beneficence, and that possessing the virtue of truth is to obey the 
principle of truth-telling. There is no difference between the two. Yet, there is one 
more confusing statement: 
In the long run, whether or not a conceptual link can be established between 
principle, duty, and virtue is not as important as recognition that the 
character of the physician is an irreducible factor in the healing relationship. 
How he or she will interpret the moral principles, selects the values that will 
predominate, and shape self-interest, will be more important than how the 
moral principles are formulated and described. " 
They have stated that virtues are insufficient as a basis for medical ethics, but in this 
passage they seem to be suggesting that virtues are needed for the basis of medical 
ethics, for without them the principles are useless and could never be rightfully 
employed. Although some would argue that is is more a question of roles than 
foundation, I argue that it appears to make virtues more foundational than 
principles. 
Approaches Similar to Pellegrino's 
There are two other authors who have made systematic attempts to 
integrate vinue theory into medical ethics, James Drane 
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and William F. May. 
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Their writings are worth mentioning because they are in-depth studies; however, any 
attempt to review their work at length would repeat Pellegrino's basic argument. 
Drane believes that modem medical ethics has become depersonalised, partly 
through its use of rules and principles. It has forgotten that the context of medicine 
is that of one individual caring for another individual. Like Pellegrino, he does not 
make a bid for an exclusive ethics composed of virtue and character. He holds that 
principles are necessary to help make concrete ethical decisions. " William May is 
similar is this respect. He believes that the virtues do not deserve pre-eminence but 
that they do constitute an important part of the ethical terrain. As with Drane, May 
sees the virtues bringing some humanity back into the clinical encounter, and some 
hurnihty into the physician's character: 
just as important as principles may be those virtues that we bring to a 
dispute: a measure of charity and good faith in dealing with an opponent, a 
good dose of caution in heeding a friend who approves only too quickly 
what we think and say, humility before the powers we wield for good or in, 
the discipline to seek wisdom rather than to show off by scoring points, 
sufficient integrity not to pretend to more certainty that we have, and 
enough bravery to act even in the rnidst of uncertainty. " 
GENERAL ACCOUNTS OF VIRTUE IN MEDICAL ETHICS 
LITERATURE 
Not everyone is an advocate of a profession-centred virtue ethics in modem 
medical ethics. Dissatisfaction with current accounts of the theory is found 
throughout the literature. The criticisms are aimed at two points: metaethical 
discontent, and criticism of virtue theory itself. These criticisms are directed at 
49 William F. May, The Patient's Ordeal, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 199 1), "The 
Virtues in a Professional Setting", Medicine and Moral Reasoning, eds. KWM Fulford, Grant 
Gillet, Janet Martin Sockice, (Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 75-90, 
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42 
utilising virtue ethics in professional ethics. They do not consider applying the 
virtues to a patient-centred ethics. There are also miscellaneous articles making 
single points but offering no systematic assistance in integrating virtue ethics into 
medical ethics. Only two articles endorse the move to a patient-centred ethics, and 
these provide only a brief, inadequate sketch. 
Typical of the metaethical criticisms is Alasdair MacIntyre. He does not 
believe it prudent to derive medical virtues from invariant human virtues. In fact, 
given our liberal, pluralist culture, medical virtues become vices. Previous medical 
virtues were formed in a shared and socially established morality where the 
physician could assume that a patient's values and attitudes toward life were simýlar 
to his/her own. A patient could realistically place his/her autonomy in a physician's 
hands and not feel as though any autonomy was violated. Social change has 
destroyed this notion. The invitation to trust in the character and values of the 
physician, once considered a virtue, has now taken on the aspects of a vice, because 
one is entrusting one's self to a person who could have opposite moral beliefs and 
values. " Assuming that certain virtues are still relevant to a profession-centred 
ethics, which thereby imposes all of these virtues on the public, will cause cases of 
harm and actual injustice. It is perhaps better to engage in the principle of 
subsidiarity and promote the virtues in the patient in order to aid them in dealing 
wkh iUness. 
Tom Beauchamp and Robert Veatch are among the most vocal critics 
concerning the integration of virtue ethics into medical ethics. Their criticisms are 
not as metaethicaUy oriented as MacIntyre's; rather, they can see only harm rather 
than benefit coming from an integration. Beauchamp believes that the virtues have 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, "How Virtues Become Vices: Values, Medicine and Social Context", 
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insufficient power for resolving ethical problems, whereas the principles are 
effective tools for deciding moral conduct. The virtues are relegated to the role of 
being positioned to correspond with a principle, so the virtuous physician is the one 
who respects the principles. Virtues are merely dispositions to do what people 
should do as a matter of duty while principles of duty are convictions about proper 
character that people should cultivate. In contexts which rely on a person of good 
character to achieve a desired objective, virtue theory is sufficient: however, when 
simply going on the strengths of a person, character is not enough and duty is 
required. 53 
Robert Veatch sees the virtues as obsolete and unnecessary. Many of the 
virtues promoted throughout history are repulsive to the adult autonomy model 
embraced by western culture, such as cunning, hatred of the enemy, or obedience to 
the husband. Even if the virtues were not repugnant to our modem culture, they 
could not operate in a pluralistic culture. And even if they could operate, there is no 
need for a professional-centred virtue ethics because 'stranger' medicine has made 
the virtues as unnecessary. " 
There are numerous articles making one point about the relevance of virtues 
to medical ethics, but which make no attempt to integrate the virtues into medical 
ethics. For example, Elizabeth Telfer's article on temperance asserts that medical 
ethics should pay attention to this virtue because it deals with the moderation of 
food and drink and, therefore, is of concern to one's motivation and character in a 
sphere that is bound up with health. " Similarly, Earl Shelp makes the point that 
Evaluation and Explanation in the Biomedical Sciences. eds. Tristram Engelhardt, Stuart 
Spicker, (Dordecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 108-110. 
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courage is relevant to the patient-physician relationship because it is the task of the 
physician to teach the patient that they are embodied beings and how they are to 
five with an embodiment that implies suffering and mortality. " While these points 
are valid, they offer little in the way of describing how virtue theory can be united 
into a profession-centred medical ethics dorrdnated by principlism. The two 
approaches that are concerned with a more systematic approach towards such an 
integration are Ethics of Care theory and Edmund Peflegrino's theory of virtuous 
healthcare professionals. However, as was shown, both are inadequate for 
integrating into a profession-based medical ethics for different reasons. Moreover, 
they still leave the central person in medicine, the patient, out of the equation. 
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: PATIENT-CENTRED VIRTUE ETHICS 
)While there has been much debate concerning how or if one could integrate 
the profession-based virtue ethics into modem medical ethics, there has been no 
movement to advance the idea that the whole project is misconceived and that an 
approach centred on the patient is needed. OrAy two articles, Karen Lebacqz's 
"The Virtuous Patient"57 and Larry Churchill's "Damaged Humanity. The Call for a 
Patient-Centered Medical Ethic in the Managed Care Era 
, 58 
, suggest rejecting the 
idea of a profession-centred medical ethics in favour of a patient-centred ethics. 
However, these articles are the first tentative steps towards thinking about a patient- 
centred virtue ethics and thus are somewhat cursory and lacking a systematic 
approach to the subject. The authors note that the patient is primarily responsible 
56 Earl Shelp, "Courage: A Neglected Virtue in the Patient-Physician Relationship", Social 
Science and Medicine, v. 18,1984, pp-356-359. 
57 Karen Lebacqz, "The Virtuous Patient", Virtue and Medicine,, ed. E. E. Shelp, (Boston: 
D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 275-288. 
58 Larry Churchill, "Damaged Humanity: The Call for a Patient-Centered Medical 
Ethic in the 
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for him/herself in dealing with illness. The relationship with the physician is of 
secondary importance when compared with other concems facing a chronicaUy M 
patient. When viewed in this light, the emphasis placed on the virtues of healthcare 
professionals appears mistaken in its emphasis on developing the role-virtues of 
physicians while ignoring the virtues needed by the patient. The point that the 
patient wifl go home after a brief meeting with a physician and have to learn to 
adapt to a new life is under-emphasised. The relationship with the physician is a 
small, albeit important, part of the patient's daily fife. 
This is the point that ChurchiH is making when he sees the patient as being 
at the centre of medical relationships. He wants to avoid any notion of making the 
patient-physician relationship central to the healing process. Rather, the patient and 
their needs should be central. The relationship with the physician is simply a means 
to an end, that being health. " Presumably, he believes that it should be left in the 
patient's hands to determine how to deal with and incorporate an illness into 
his/her fife. The relationship with the physician, while important to the patient, is 
not the patient's primary concern. Living a happy life is the prine concern and the 
patient will be focussed on how to achieve this end. 
Lebacqz advocates a patient who is not passive in the face of Mness. Rather, 
some directed activity on the part of the patient is needed, a game plan so to speak, 
to confront the effects of the illness and remain in control of one's life. She 
perceives that three virtues are needed for patients to deal with their illness - 
fortitude, prudence, and hope. Illness represents a threat to self and changes one's 
self-concept. The old self-image is eroded; one feels extremely vulnerable and 
loses 
one)s life story. Things can no longer be taken 
for granted. Being a patient involves 
lbid, pp. 115-117. 
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dealing with physical distress, personal threats and a new social role. The virtues of 
a patient will have to deal with the stress of pain, discomfort, physical limitation, 
loss of autonomy, violation of privacy, vulnerability and loss of self. The western 
view of a good patient is one where the patient is long-suffering, making the best of 
everything, not complaining but enduring, not moaning but being cheerful, obeying 
orders, but not making demands. "The chronic patient adjusts to lirrýtations, forges 
a new life based upon them, and bears pain with good wil"' Her perception of the 
virtuous patient is not one who is passive. The virtues she sees for patients are 
fortitude, prudence and hope. She has a Thomistic interpretation of these virtues. 
She cites Josef Pieper, a Thomist, and uses his definitions for the virtues. Fortitude 
is important because it deals with not succumbing to the evil of illness. The allied 
virtues of courage, patience and perseverance, are needed by the patient in order to 
keep one's spirit from being broken by fear, grief or sadness. Prudence is needed to 
accurately perceive danger and take courageous actions, otherwise the bravery is 
simply rashness. Prudence also gives one the opportunity to grow and learn, 
through examining our embodied being and to examine our hves. Hope, the 
theological virtue, involves letting go of control and depending on fate or God, 
something outside of oneself and not letting despair take control of one's fife. " The 
virtues, Lebacqz argues, counter passivity in the face of iUness and promote a 
strength in the patient that allows illness to be a less distressing event. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF A 
PATIENT-CENTRED VIRTUE ETHICS 
" Lebacqz, "The Virtuous Patient", p. 279. 




As we have seen, the two main approaches examined, Ethics of Care and 
profession-based virtue ethics, have fundamental flaws which make them both 
impractical to implement and irrelevant in the sense that they miss the point that the 
patient is ultimately at the centre of medical ethics. Lebacqz and Churchill argue 
this latter point, and while the direction of their articles is the same that I will take, 
there are some weaknesses in their approach. The virtues promoted by Lebacqz, 
fortitude, patient and perseverance, are geared toward getting a patient though an 
iflness and not succumbing to despair. They do not reaUy address a patient with 
chronic Mness who wiU have to five with long-term suffering. The virtues that she 
offers will not so much promote happiness as let one merely survive an ordeal. 
Happiness still must be pursued even in the face of chronic illness. While her 
model may be appropriate for helping a person endure a hospital stay and a very 
short recovery period before a return to a normal level of health, a person with 
chronic illness returns home to a likely permanent level of reduced health. This 
person will have to learn to be happy in daily existence for the rest of his/her fife, 
just as any human needs to learn how to be happy in daily life. To achieve this, a 
comprehensive approach to virtue ethics must be employed. 
Models of virtue ethics such as Lebacqz's or Churchill's, that stress only 
what are basicaUy role-virtues for sick individuals, ýniss the fact that the patient must 
continue on as a whole person, not simply a patient. There is something of a 
dualism present in these models, as if the ill person ceases existing as a 
full human 
being and is issued role-virtues as a crutch to aid enduring the 
illness until health is 
regained. The role-virtues are prescribed like any other medication a sick person 
must take and have little to do with life when 
healthy. A virtue theory more 
integrated towards every aspect of one's fife is needed to address the chronically 
ill 
person. This theory would treat virtue ethics as 
its own theory and able to resolve 
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ethical problems on its own, provided that natural law is part of the whole theory. 
It would not treat virtue ethics as a quasi-theory with a few notable points that are 
to be extracted and integrated into another ethical theory, which is what modem 
medical ethics attempts to do. 
The virtue theory of Thomas Aquinas may offer an adequate approach to 
the problem of finding a virtue theory which can embrace the whole of a person's 
life, including illness. One possible advantage of Aquinas is that his virtue ethics 
could avoid the mistake of Lebacqz and Churchill in that he applies the virtues to 
every facet of an individual's fife. He attempts to examine each type of human 
activity that promotes happiness and relate it to the virtues. This is the type of 
virtue theory that can be applied to nearly every conceivable human condition and 
situation and which may be applied in understanding how people with chronic 
illness Eve so as to attain happiness. 
However, this is simply a hypothesis, and the reality could turn out to be 
completely different. The move to a more complete virtue theory such as Aquinas's 
could improve the task of integrating virtue ethics into modem medical ethics from 
a patient)s perspective. Yet, the outcome is by no means certain and it could prove 
to be too bold a step. To take an ancient theory written in greatly different 
circumstances and attempt to integrate it into modem medical ethics may not work 
Society has changed dramaticafly. The readership Aquinas wrote for is not the 
readership of modem medical ethics. Several things have changed since Aquinas 
wrote his treatise on the virtues. Society is no longer familiar with the language of 
virtue ethics and lacks a widely embraced notion of the common good and an idea 
of human flourishing. A complete virtue theoty, as compared to one that embraces 
a few role virtues, may be unworkable in modem, pluralistic society. It might turn 
out that a systematic account of Aquinas's virtues is now an outmoded expression 
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of ethical analysis. Even if virtue ethics is found to be relevant to contemporary 
society, it still faces heavy challenges in what is perceived by its critics to be its 
inability to provide a detailed ethical analysis of human acts. This fact may only be 
compounded by society's unfamiliarity with virtue language. When applied against 
the specifics of human acts, the theory could emerge to be too theoretical. 
While it may very weU emerge that Aquinas's theory is not weR adapted to 
our modem society, the opposite may be the case. There is a tendency in modem 
culture to divorce ourselves from our past, considering ourselves either radically 
different from our ancestors or that we have evolved into their superior offspring. 
We may not be as unique as we like to think. Humans have always confronted 
changed, as the adage states: The more things change, the more they stay the same. ' 
The coflective wisdom and experience of our ancestors may have something to teU 
us about our contemporary situation. As the author of Ecclesiates writes: 
What was will be again; what has been done will be done again; and there is 
nothing new under the sun. Take anything of which it may be said, 'Look 
now, this is new. ' Already, long before our time, it existed. Only no 
memory remains of earlier times, just as in times to come next year itself will 
not be remembered" (1: 9- 10) 
Not every new thing turns out to be a good replacement for the old. 
Aquinas's virtue theory may turn out to be a great aid to chronicaUy iR patients. At 
the end of After Vinw, Alasdair MacIntyre writes that: 
if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark 
ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the 
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been 
governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of 
this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are waiting not for a 
Godot, but for another - doubtless very different - St. Benedict. " 
MacIntyre is referring to the need to return to a new understanding of 
community which will act as the basis of one's moral life, which is why he refers to 
62 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2ne edition (London: Duckworth, 1987), p. 263. 
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St. Benedict. One wonders if the new St. Benedict wiU turn out to be St. Thomas 
Aquinas whose virtues are as relevant to our post-modem, pluralistic society as they 
were to the middle ages. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INNOVATION OF AQUINAS: 
THE CHRISTIAN GOD, THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES, 
AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARISTOTLE 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to gain an understanding of Aquinas's virtue 
ethics. While difficult to achieve in a single chapter in detail, because Aquinas's 
theory draws upon much of the I+ým Skw7dae and the entire Smmda Sxxzdae, one 
can summarise his work and attain a working knowledge of Thoýnistic virtue ethics. 
While the following reading is contested, I hold that what emerges is a teleological 
theory, indebted to natural law, whose aim is to supply a conduit from natural law to 
human flourishing. This conduit is the virtues. The virtues are characteristics that 
facilitate the following of natural law and thus allow the person to attain a degree of 
fulfilment. Virtues arise from dispositions that we take care to nurture, and 
dispositions act so as to order our desires rightly. Dispositions help order our 
emotions to desire the good and avoid the evil. In deciding what one should pursue 
or evade, reason plays a decisive role. All of these elements must be understood 
before one can feel competent in understanding Thomistic virtue ethics. 
While the intent of this chapter is to explain Aquinas's theory, some 
anticipatory comments will be made regarding the following chapter on natural law 
and on the fifth chapter dealing with applying Thomistic ethics to patients with 
chronic illness. As mentioned in the outline of the chapters in the Introduction 
chapter, the natural law is important because it provides some specificity in regard 
to determining which basic goods allow a person to flourish. This can be related to 
patients suffering from chronic illness to see where such basic goods are lacking and 
which virtues can serve to supply these goods. Concerning the fifth chapter, 
questions and points will be raised when we address the case of chronically ill 
patients and the virtues. Aquinas's concern is that some people carry such heavy 
burdens, such as a debilitating illness, that they will be drastically hindered in their 
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opportunity to achieve happiness. This wifl be highlighted for consideration in the 
last section of this chapter. Also emphasised will be the point of understanding 
how certain emotions respond to certain situations and how the virtues are hence 
linked to the passions. This allows one to target which virtues will be of relevance 
to patients confronting emotions such as anger, aversion, pain or hope. 
When one reads Thomas Aquinas and secondary sources on Aquinas, one 
may conclude that Aristotle is ever present throughout Aquinas's works. This is 
true: Aristotle had a formative influence on Aquinas's thoughts. Aristotle's system 
provided Aquinas's starting point and affected his method of analysis, but Aristotle 
did not wholly determine the content of Aquinas's virtue ethics. ' Aquinas did not 
simply over-lay a Christian interpretation on to Aristotelian thought. He added a 
new emphasis that stressed bwtitu& rather than emkomaii. In doing so, he created a 
different virtue ethics. By setting up the theological virtues as the most important 
of the virtues, Aquinas radically changed the nature of Christian virtues. The 
emphasis is no longer solely on achieving happiness in this life. It is placed first on 
achieving happiness in the after-fife, explaining why the theological virtues attain 
ascendancy among the virtues. This changes the function of the moral and 
intellectual virtues from allowing the person to achieve what could only be an 
imperfect happiness in earthly fife to a function where one is oriented to achieving 
one5s teleological goal - perfect happiness in the beatific union. 
The virtues, first examined by Aristotle, take on a different quality when 
viewed by Aquinas, a quality that will be discussed more thoroughly in later pages. 
However, it is difficult to understand how Aquinas's virtues are different without 
first perceiving how they fit into his system of thought. Any such summary vAl 
1 Michael Haren, Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Traditionfrom Antiquity to the 
Thirteenth Century, 2nd ed., (London: MacMillan Press, 1992), p. 189. 
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need to address the following topics - telos, ethical theory, reason, the passions, 
natural law, happiness, dispositions, and then finally virtue. The topic rely on each 
other for his ethical theory to function. The first point in understanding Thomýstic 
thought is comprehending the telos around which he bases his system of thought. 
TELOS 
Most of Aquinas's writing on virtue ethics is found in the second part of the 
Stanma, 7heSaw7dae. (la2ae. qq. 1-114,2a2ae. qq. 1-189) It is atthe start of this rrýiddle 
part that Aquinas addresses the condition of human beings because humans, in his 
belief, are in the middle of a journey. M. D. Chenu writes that in determining the 
Sunvw's structure, Aquinas referred to the Platonic theme of emanation and return: 
theology is the science of God, so all things were to be studied in their relation to 
God, either in their creation or in their final end, thereby everything is judged in 
tenns of the highest causality. Everything becomes an object of theology. Aquinas 
approaches each creature as to how it came from the first principle and how it will 
return to its end. ' Chenu writes of Aquinas's approach: "AR creatures, and 
particularly human creatures, all events, and particularly human events, are framed 
between these two causes - the efficient cause, God-Creator-and-Conserver (Ia 
Pars) and the final cause, God-Beatifier-and-Glorified". ' It is important to note 
Chenu's summary because the dissertation deals with the human events between 
these two causes. The meaning of human nature and the purpose of life are meant 
to be understood in terms of such events. Humans are meant to understand 
themselves as being made in the image of God and as returning to a union with 
God. Human nature is to be comprehended in terms of this, and it is only in 
2 M. D. Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, trs. A. M. Landry, D. Hughes, (Chicago: 
Henry Regent Company, 1964), pp. 304-308. 
3 Jbid, p. 31 1. 
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understanding this architecture that one can come to an understanding of human 
happiness. 
Aquinas's theory of exýus et mditus is not universally accepted among present 
day theologians. Perhaps the most contemporary rebuke is that of James 
Gustafson, who bases his rejection on the findings of modem science. He states 
that Aquinas's claim, that all creatures come from and return to God, is not 
sustainable because science now tells us that in all probability the universe will end. 
For this reason we can neither subscribe to the Christian belief in the eschatological 
renewal of all creation nor hold with Aquinas's belief that all creation, including 
humanity, is oriented toward its ultimate fulfilment. ' jean Porter disagrees with 
Gustafson, stating that he fails to distinguish between the natural and the 
supernatural sense in which creatures are said to return to God. While it is true that 
Aquinas looked forward to the supernatural fulfilment of the person and of all 
creation at the general resurrection, he did not anticipate that the fulfilment would 
come about as a result of a natural process. But this does not matter because he 
held that creatures return to God in that they attain perfection in accordance with 
the ideal of the specific type of creature that they are. This means one can say that 
creatures love and attain God as they attain the good proper to them as members of 
a particular species. ' The notion of return can be seen as a 'natural' process 
whereby creatures return to God as they fulfil the ideal of their nature. 
With his discussion of happiness at the beginning of the Prim Swwzdae, 
Aquinas begins the return trip, to 'God-Beatifier and Glorified'where humans shaH 
4 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance ofAquinasfor Christian Ethics, 
(Melksham, Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press, 1994), pp. 53-54, and see James Gustafson, Ethics 
and Theology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 54-55. For a good overview of 
the various secondary source debate over this point of Aquinas, refer to Porter. She 
discusses 
several claims, with Gustafson's being one that takes into account recent scientific 
findings to 
critique Aquinas. 
Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, pp. 53-54. 
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attain perfect happiness- the lem*visim. Aquinas's belief that the person's end was 
to achieve happiness through the hw*viýim made his argument teleological. 
Understanding sacred scripture as a prio7i allowed Aquinas his first principles and a 
pre-given knowledge of truth. From this a prio? i assumption, an argument can be 
made from sacred scripture for the person's telos. Aquinas understood theology as 
a deductive science, beginning with what is known and moving toward that which is 
less known. It is a derived science, one that is not obliged to demonstrate the truth 
of first principles. It is the task of the theologian to draw out inferences from these 
first principles. God communicates with humanity through scripture, and human 
reason is employed to extrapolate theological doctrine from scripture. Geoffrey 
Turner points out that the first principles of theology as a science are the articles of 
faith found in, or rather derived from, scripture. ' A consequence of his being 
imbued in sacred scripture is that Aquinas had the knowledge to determine the 
purpose and end of humanity. This destiny is the beatific vision, which is revealed 
in scripture. God is the ultimate end of each person. This point has implications 
for the basis of Aquinas's ethical theory. Various Thornists hold different theories 
concerning Aquinas's foundation. Joseph Pieper suggests a teleological approach to 
Aquinas. He holds that Aquinas believed humans were ordained to an end that is 
inscribed in their very being, existing in them since creation. Creation is a key to A 
the basic concepts of Aquinas's vision of the world. Every-thing is created, except 
God the Creator. This createdness determines entirely and all pervasively the inner 
structure of the creature. God created humans oriented toward an ultimate end 
consisting in the beatific vision! 
6 Geoffery Turner, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the 'Scientific' Nature of Theology", New 
Blackfiriars, v. 78,1997, p. 469. 
7 Joseph Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas, trs. John Murray, Daniel O'Connor, (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1957), pp. 47-61. 
57 
Others, such as Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, describe 
Aquinas's ethical theory as teleologically deontological, meaning that the person is 
oriented toward God and that his/her future good is aimed at bavi&&, irnpýing 
that while a person is oriented toward God and his or her future good is aimed at 
beatýu&, a person can never act with injustice toward someone, no matter what 
'good' consequences may be gained from the act. ' Stwnp and Kretzmann accept 
metaphysics as the basis for Aquinas's virtue ethics. Humans become more perfect 
as they realise their potentialities, and because humans are made in the image of 
God, it would be difficult to believe that one is realising one's potential by being 
unjust toward another. Some actions are never acceptable for human beings to 
perform because they are at odds with our potential nature. There exist universal 
moral norms that are to be respected. Similar to this position is Alan Donagan's 
who perceives Aquinas's structure of morality as a deontology resting on a 
distinctive teleology of pre-existent ends. ' James Lehrberger holds that Aquinas's 
ethical theory is neither teleological nor deontological; rather it transcends both. " 
He states that Aquinas's theory unifies and synthesises partial and fragmentary 
insights offered by deontology and teleology without their attendant difficulties. 
Lehrberger understands Aquinas as incorporating the teleoloýst's concern for the 
production of a good end with the deontologist's concern for the inherent quality as 
criterion for a right act. Lehrberger has a point worthy of discussion. Aquinas may 
not fit into C. D. Broad's classic formiAation of the distinctions between 
deontological/teleological. Lehrberger is arguing that it is anachronistic to push 
8 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Being and Goodness", The Concept of Good in 
Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 199 1), p. 12 1. 
9 Alan Donagan, Human Ends and Human Actions. - An Exploration ofSt. Thomas's Treatment, 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1985), p. 15. 
10 James Lehrberger, "Deontology and Aquinas's Virtue Ethic", Saints, Sovereigns and Scholars, 
ed. R. A. Herrara, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 107. 
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Aquinas into either of these categories. Lehrberger argues that Aquinas transcends 
deontology and teleology. Deontology and teleology differ over whether an act's 
rightness is found in its intended consequences or by its own inherent quality. 
Aquinas, as a virtue ethicist, understands ethics as a practical enquiry that is not so 
much concerned with rules of moral obligation but with what promotes human 
flourishing. There do exist laws, based on natural law, that humans can never 
violate because the object of the act can never be good, meaning it can never lead to 
human flourishing. Jean Porter argues a similar point to Lehrberger and offers a 
more satisfactory explanation. She writes that Aquinas's: 
overall moral theology is teleological in the sense that it holds that the final 
purpose of human life gives the moral fife its ultimate point, but it is not 
teleological in the sense that action and virtues are evaluated by the degree 
to which they foster or hinder the attainment of that final purpose. " 
Humanity is created in a certain way and does have a distinct destiny, but 
this does not imply that any action that brings one closer to that destiny is morally 
acceptable. There is a deontological aspect to Aquinas. He is concerned that every 
moral action should possess a good object. The deontological and the teleological 
are inextricably linked. In perfonning a virtuous act, one must have a good object. 
While not every wrong act is necessarily a vicious act, using one's pedagogical skills, 
a craft, to teach others racial prejudice is a vicious act. Developing the virtue of 
moderation in regard to eating in order to produce health is a virtuous act. The 
object of the acts, to hate without just cause and to foster health, help define the 
species of the act as either virtue or vice. It is contradictory to say that one can 
become more like God through immoral acts. 
11 Porter, "Desire for God: Ground of the Moral Life in Aquinas", The Thomist, v. 47,1986, p. 65. 
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THOMISTIC ETHICAL THEORY 
It is Aquinas's belief that the human person is created in God's image and 
will return to a final and complete fulfilment by resting in the vision of God that 
allows Aquinas to begin to build a theory of acceptable human behaviour, one based 
on a teleological ethic. Alasdair MacIntyre writes that in a teleological scheme 
"there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he- 
could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. "" It is the task of ethics to enable 
human beings to come to a realisation of how to make the transition from the first 
state to the second state. The principles that promote virtues and prohibit vices 
instruct humans on how to reach the second stage and fulfil their true nature and 
achieve final fulfilment. The desires and emotions that are inherent in humans are 
to be put in good order through the virtues. Hence: 
we have a threefold scheme in which human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be 
(human nature in its untutored state) is initially discrepant and discordant 
with the precepts of ethics and needs to be transformed by the instruction 
of practical reason and experience into human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it- 
realized-its-telos. 13 
It is the use of right reason that allows the person to achieve this telos. 
Aquinas understood human nature as being composed of two very powerful 
forces - reason and emotion. Modem pHosophy tends to criticise Aquinas for not 
giving enough of a role for emotions in his ethical theory. Although unfair and 
wrong, this comment does address the prominence that reason plays in Thornistic 
thought. Good and evil are understood in tenns of being in or out of line with 
reason. The ability to reason leads us to develop an ethical theory based on or 
12 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. - A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed., (London: Duckworth, 
1985), p-52. 
13 Ibid, p. 53. 
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derived from first principles of practical reason. While there are many first 
principles of human action, they all have in common the fact that they are the 
precepts of the natural law. (la2ae. 94.1.2) The first precept of all moral action is that 
we are to do good and avoid evil. We are able to tell what is good for humans 
through reflecting on natural law. This first principle of practical reason forms our 
thoughts on ethical thinking. John Finnis writes that the goods wbýich Aquinas 
proceeds to identify- 
will all be referred to in principles of the form: X (say, human fife) is a good, 
to be pursued and preserved ... and what damages X is a bad, to be avoided, 
actions that are good as means to realizing such basic goods are to be done; 
actions bad as harming a basic good are to be avoided. " 
First principles are considered to be self-evident and cannot be demonstrated. 
While they are considered apparent, they are not innately in us but rather we come 
to know them gradually and they are formed from sensory memory and 
expetience. " 
The moral norm that dominates ethical fife is the love of neighbour as self. 
This is the articulation of the command to do good and avoid evil. Finnis calls it 
the "first, architectonic, and master principle of morality ... a principle conceived 
by 
Aquinas ... as the 
import, the specifically moral significance, of the first practical 
principles when taken together. " 
16 
The basis for morality is human nature. Human beings have a natural desire 
to pursue the good. Human goodness is found in acting in harmony with this 
nature. We are aided by reason, which is capable of discerning human nature. 
Moral good is every object that enables the person to actualise himself/herself 
according to the nonn of his or her essence, which is known through the natural 
14 John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, Oxford: (Oxford University Press, 
1998), p-86. 
15 lbid, p. 88. 
16 lbid, p. 128. 
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law. It is by using right reason that a person's actions will be moral. Human actions 
are only truly human when activities are knowingly and willingly performed because 
these acts utilise the will and reason, faculties which are constitutive of humanity. " 
Freedom, power and mastery are key to understanding proper human actions. 
Aquinas distinguishes between human acts and the acts of a human. Human acts 
constitute a moral order whereas acts of a human can be any act. Finnis argues that 
human actions are human only when people are in control of them as ruler, master, 
and owner. Free will is essential to being human and hence the explanation of why 
reason is so important. 
18 
There is some debate over what Aquinas believed was the main constitutive 
of a moral act. On one end, there is Grisez/Boyle/Finnis who take Aquinas as their 
basis for saying that it is on account of basic goods that people act. They promote a 
deontological theory that focuses on the act of achieving basic goods which fulfil 
people. We act for a diversity of basic goods which serve as principles of action 
because they are ultimate rational grounds that propose we act in certain ways to 
achieve certain benefits. 'Me basic goods are diverse, reflecting the inherent 
complexities in human nature. They are reasons for action with no further reasons 
and as primary principles, they are incommensurable with one another. Each basic 
good is necessary for fulfilling us as human beings and therefore we are to act for 
the basic goods and to avoid what opposes basic goods. Virtues are character traits 
that organise the various aspects of the complex human personality. When these 
various aspects of our personality are properly ordered by the virtues, 
harmony is 
introduced. Attaining the virtues leads us toward the ideal of integral human 
17 Ralph McInerny, "Ethics", The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, eds. Norman Kretzmann, 
Eleonore Stump, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 197. 
18 Finnis, Aquinas, p. 20. 
62 
fulfilment, a key component to their moral philosophy, which is the realisation, as 
far as is possible, of all the basic goods acting in complete harmony. 19 
On the other end of the spectrum is the proportionalist school. Louis 
Janssens, a proportionalist, understands Aquinas as holding that the moral goodness 
and moral evil of an action is determined by its end, meaning the ultimate intention 
toward which the agent acts. Countering the claim that this is relativistic, Janssens 
states that the agent's end will be objectively good or evil. " Between the claims of 
the deontologists and proportionalists is James Keenan, a virtue ethicist. Keenan 
perceives Aqwnas as approaching morals at the level of intentionality, insisting that 
we cannot simply look at external actions, but must first consider how we think and 
what we intend, that intention is the beginning of our actions and the start of the 
type of people we become. He states that a wrong intention makes the external act 
wrong and that a right intention must have in the external act an appropriate 
expression of the intention. Any objectively right act is a virtuous act if arising from 
a virtue itself or it may be a natural virtue. Any act which is objectively wrong 
would be either a vicious or an incontinent act. If this is absent, then the external 
act is wrong. Virtues and vices allow us to measure intention. All of morality 
comes down to virtue. A tight intention must be just and prudent, aimed at giving 
the other his/her due and doing so in fitting circumstances. " 
Also in the rrýiddle is jean Porter, another virtue ethicist, who disagrees with 
Grisez/Boyle/Finnis. She believes Aquinas to hold that intrinsically evil acts are 
19 Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate 
Ends", American Journal ofJurisprudence, v. 32,1987, pp. 99-15 1, and John Finnis, "Practical 
Reasoning, Human Goods, and the End of Man", New Blackfriars, v. 65,1985, pp. 438-45 1. 
20 Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil" Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, eds. 
Richard McCormack, Charles Curran, (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 69-71. The 
proportionalist position will be more fully developed in the 'Proportionalist Critique of Grisez- 
Boyle-Finnis' section in the following chapter. 
21 James F. Keenan, "Ten Reasons Why Thomas Aquinas is Important for Ethics Today", New 
Blackfriars, v. 75,1994, pp. 354-362. 
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defmed in terms of harm done to people and not in terms of basic goods being 
attacked. Attacking a basic good does not equate with harming a person, because 
not each attack on a particularisation of a basic good is an attack on a person if that 
particularisation clashes with another particularisation. " As for the 
proportionalists, she writes that Aquinas explicitly contradicts any claim that the 
object of the act itself does not enter into its proper description or its moral 
evaluation. " She mentions Aquinas's Est of four aspects which determine an 
action's morality: an action is good in that it exists) it has to have a good object, be 
done in appropriate circumstances and the agent must have a good intention. " 
Emotions are the second important part of 'Mornistic ethical theory. 
Aquinas understands emotions to be morally neutral, neither virtues nor vices, 
neither good nor evil. They are part of what it is to be an embodied human and are 
in themselves normal. Emotions are subject to reason and will and in a sense 
voluntary in that they can be conunanded by the will or not be restrained by the 
will. (la2ae. 24.1. ) However, when they start to dorninate reason, getting out of 
reason)s control, they become maladies. " Aquinas needs a moral structure that can 
hold the passions in a proper check. He believes that the "moral order consists of 
putting our minds to the pursuit of the objects of natural inclinations, such that we 
pursue them well. "" He does not believe that it is possible to categorise each moral 
act, for the morality of an act depends on object, circumstance and end. Thinking 
through each imaginable circumstance in which a moral agent finds him or herself 
acting toward every conceivable object, and for each potential end is unfeasible. He 
continues to hold that each human act must have a good object which promotes the 
22 Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, pp. 91-92. 
23 Ibid, pp. 92-93. 
24 Ibid, p. 94. 
25 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 286. 
26 McInerny, "Ethics", p. 21 1. 
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fullness of being and is in accord with reason; that the end must be in line with 
reason, and that due circumstances must be present to make an act morally 
good. (1a2ae. 18.3., 18.8., 19.9. ) However, he believes Aristotle's virtue ethics was 
correct in stating that sometimes actions must be spoken of vaguely-, it is impossible 
to prescribe what each person, given his or her special circumstances, should do in 
each case. Virtuous actions do not come out of a stamping-press. The personalities 
and circumstances of each human vary so much that it is too difficult to prescribe 
how every person is to act in a given situation. What can be given are generalities 
which indicate the approximate appropriate behaviour. Human actions must be in 
line with reason, and performing each kind of rational activity well is a distinct kind 
of virtue, so the human good consists in the acts of a plurality of virtues. " One of 
Aquinas's constant themes is that the defection of reason or inconsistencies with 
reason governing us is the very essence of wrong action and choice. Allowing one's 
emotions to hold sway over reason is the best way to go about doing wrong. One 
of the tasks of the virtues is to keep this from happening. Things go terribly astray 
when emotion subverts reason and makes it its servant. Finnis writes that "Reason 
in passion's service does its master's bidding by inventing intelligent and attractive 
but, in the last analysis, specious and imperfectly intelligent rationalizations for 
doing what one (emotionally) wants. "" Inasmuch as reason is a main concern in 
Aquinas's work it is necessary to devote some attention to its consideration. " 
REASON 
" McInerny, "Ethics", p. 203. 
28 Finnis, Aquinas, pp. 73-74. 
29 As for relating the final end of human beings to the content of 
Aquinas's moral system, 
Aquinas's moral theology presupposes that we can derive moral content 
from independent, 
nontheological grounds. The content of morality 
does not have to be established solely on 
theological grounds. See Jean Porter, "Desire for God: 
Ground of the Moral Life in Aquinas" 
The Thomist, v. 47,1986, p. 65. 
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"Reason is the first principle for all human acts, and whatever other 
principles may be found, they obey reason in some way". (1 a2ae. 5 8.2. ) As the above 
section has emphasised, acting moraUy is simply to act in a manner which most 
befits human nature, for indeed, the foundation of the moral life is human nature: 
people move toward that which fulfils and perfects therrL Reason can perceive 
these needs and when people act in the light of reason to satisfy these needs, they 
act well and are good. If a person's reason is impaired or if it neglects these needs, 
he/she diminishes him/herself and is bad in some respect. If they function to the 
extent of their capacities, they five a good fife and are happy. Goodness fies in 
people's acting in harmony with their natures. We are to recognise what we are and 
to act appropriately, for we are creatures of reason. " Happiness will occur when 
our passions and appetites are properly constrained by the order of reason, the 
reason that guides the person to achieve his or her potential as a member of the 
human race. Without reason to regulate our desires, we will never achieve 
happiness and be no better than a beast in the wild, foRowing wherever each passing 
passion leads it. "The point of man's having been endowed with reason is that he 
should be able to work out an order in which to realize the promptings of nature 
intelligently, and not merely to follow them indiscriminately. " (2a2ae. 69.4.1) 
Being able to reason relies upon possessing knowledge. As Brian Davies 
points out, Aquinas was an empiricist who held that human knowledge depends on 
sense experience. WMe knowledge is drawn from our sense experience, sense 
experience alone does not give a person intellectual knowledge of a thing. The 
human inteflect understands a thing by abstracting from sense data. " To link this to 
morality, morality is about questions wlýich concern veracity or falsity. We can 
30 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 227-23 1. 
31 lbid, p. 125. 
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think about a question in two ways: theoretically (or speculatively) by starting 
through premises that we know to be true and then moving to conclusions that 
follow from these premises, or by practical reasoning, which is concerned with 
moral matters. It is practical reasoning that is of concern to tbýs work. Practical 
reasoning relates to synderesis, the apprehension of basic principles. Practical 
reasoning begins with general principles, such as do good and avoid evil, which are 
immediately recognised as true by the intellect. Such a fundamental moral principle 
is known as all other knowledge is known, through sense experience. This 
knowledge is not innate, but rather the product of synderesis", the procedure 
whereby the inteflect forms norms out of experience. It is infaflible thought 
concerning first principles. Without such certainty in matters of knowledge we 
could never be sure of anything. 
33 
While Aquinas believed that the human mind could artive at truths through 
reasoning, he saw it as weak and compared it to the angelic mind, which was the 
model mind. Patrick Quinn argues that: 
Aquinas )s model of mind is a non-sensory intuitive one which, on his 
account, would appear to devalue the human intellect. The unflattering 
references to a weaker and inferior human mind and the illustration given in 
S. T. 1.89.1. of a slow leamer all contribute to this conclusion. 34 
The human mind is weak because of the "discursive process of human 
cognition which results from the application of our understanding to the potentially 
intelligible data that is acquired from sense. "" The mind struggles to understand 
through a lengthy and difficult process. The angelic mind has a swift, immediate 
and intuitive grasp. It comes to an immediate grasp of first principles whereas 
32 "Synderesis is called the law of our understanding inasmuch as it is the habit of keeping the 
] ecepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human activity. 
"(1 a2ae. 94.1.2. ) )r V3 
Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 232-233. 
34 Patrick Quinn, "Aquinas's Model of Mind", New Blackyý-iars, v. 77,1996, p. 222. 
35 Ibid, p. 215. 
67 
human beings have to reflect sensory experience to arrive at these principles. 
Aquinas would have preferred that humans had an intuitive rather than a discursive 
mind. Yet, the mind must intellectually depend upon the senses or it would be very 
difficult to hold that it functioned naturally at all, given that we are corporeal beings 
who inhabit a physical world. The lower intelligence of humans makes it necessary 
to have a greater range of species for it to understand, which are derived from 
sensory images. He likens human souls to slow learners who are divinely appointed 
to have bodies so they can have a wider body of images from which to learn. This 
intellectual feebleness is why there exists a close relationship between the human 
body and soul. " However, humans are left to endure bodily existence and all of its 
benefits and burdens, which leads to the next category, human passions. 
THE PASSIONS 
Our desires stem from our passions, which are our emotions. Passions are 
to be found in the appetitive power of the soul rather than in the apprehensive 
power, for the appetitive power is drawn to things as they are, while the 
apprehensive power is not drawn to things as they are, but rather knows a thing "by 
reason of an intention of a thing. " (la2ae. 22.2. ) Passions themselves are morally 
neutral and are part of what it is to be an embodied being. Unruly passions, out of 
reason)s control, are more closely related to the beasts than to humans. 
" When 
brought under the sway of reason, our passions are humanised. Good and evil, 
for 
humans, is understood in terms of being in line with reason. Passions tend toward 
good if they agree with reason or toward evil if they are out of 
line with reason. 
" Ibid, pp. 216-220. 
37 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, (London: 
Victor Gallancz 
Ltd., 1957), p. 286. 
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It is the moral virtues that deal with appetite. Appetite is the desire born 
from the perceiving of an object that is of interest to the life of the body. It is the 
seat of the passions, the place where the passions first start to stir, just as the seat of 
a wave is a disturbed patch of water that the wind catches. In la2ae. 60, Aquinas 
deals with the relationship of moral virtue to passion. Passion is a movement of the 
sensitive appetite, whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of 
movement for an appetite. It is a mean between passions because its effects 
establish a mean between passions. "Virtue overcomes inordinate passion, yet it 
induces ordinate passion. " (la2ae. 59.5. ) Passions that are contrary to each other 
engage the same virtue. "For moral virtue consists in striking a mean, which mean 
between contrary passions is fonned by one and the same note". (1 a2ae. 59.4. ) 
With respect to the form of appetite, there is a dual nature to its reactions, 
according to whether it has found itself face to face with useful or harmful objects. 
In regard to useful objects its behaviour is what is called concupiscible, having to do 
with what we desire and with what moves our affections. In regard to harmful 
objects, the reaction is called irascible, dealing with that which causes anger to rise 
within us and summons up our aggressive emotions. Passions fall naturally into 
these two groUPS. 
38 
The concupiscible passions revolve around love, which is the root of all 
passions. The human appetite is modified by some desirable object. Tfýs 
modification happens because the appetite takes pleasure in the object. The human 
and the object are compatible and there is an immediate experiencing of affinity - 
there is a pleasure or complacency that constitutes the passion of love. This 
prompts the appetite to want to take possession of the loved object. 
38 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 272. 
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Given the context of this dissertation, it is worth spending time discussing 
the passions. Aquinas understood the passions as being the basic element that 
motivates the human to act and the material with which the moral virtues work. " 
There are six emotions that comprise the concupiscible passions. Aquinas pairs 
them in three groups. Each group has one emotion that is concerned with objects 
that are beneficial to us and help us to attain our happiness and one emotion 
concerned with objects that we find harmful or which interfere with our attaining a 
beloved object. Love itself has been discussed. Hatred is its opposite and causes us 
to reject what is harmful to us and to avoid what is evil. Desire is the emotion that 
occurs when the loved object is absent and prompts us to seek out this object. Its 
opposite is aversion, which is a feeling of repulsion that fills us at the mere thought 
of evil. Pleasure is the result that the object gives us once it is attained. " Pain is our 
response to the presence of evfl. 
The second group of movements of the sensitive appetite is the passions of 
the irascible. These are the more intense, fiery emotions which arise when we are 
presented with an obstacle to overcome in achieving our good or when trying to 
avoid an evil. There are five emotions that compose the three groups of the 
irascible passions. Hope is based on a desire of a future good and is characterised 
by the feeling that difficulties stand between our desire and its fulfihnent. When 
hope becomes difficult to the point of appearing insurmountable, a form of hatred 
succeeds desire. The pursuit is abandoned and the person no longer wishes to hear 
the impossible good mentioned. This retreat from the appetite itself and the 
39 Timothy McDermott, in the glossary to I a, 2-11 of the Summa, defines substance as "the most 
primary sense (or category) of being: that which exists without existing-in another thing. The 
word 'substance' is often used as equivalent to essence, a use which Aristotle called 'second 
substance' in contrast with 'first substance' as defmed above. " Timothy McDermott, "Glossary" 
Summa Theologiae, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964), p. 234. 
40 As was noted before though, pleasure is good when it is in line with reason and evil if it is out 
of line with reason. 
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accompanying rancour against the former object is despair, the second irascible 
passion. Fear and daring comprise the second group. Fear is a reaction of the 
sensitive appetite before a future evil the person imagines is present. It reaches its 
peak before a difficult evil that appears hard to avoid. Daring is fear's opposite. 
Instead of wilting before evil, it attacks it so as to overcome it. This is not the virtue 
of fortitude or courage because it is an impulse of the sensitive appetite and is not 
based on prudent calculations for success. 
Anger has no contrary and stands alone in the third category. It is a reaction 
to a present evil whose effects the person is actuaUy experiencing. It implies a hope 
of revenge, otherwise it is simply sadness. It does not will evil, as does hatred, but 
seeks to be avenged of evil. It is not the virtue of justice, but a substitute for justice 
in the passions. Anger is a blind passion that does not proceed from an objective 
moral judgement of reason. " 
Temperance controls the concupiscible passions. Aquinas believed that the 
concupiscible emotions are ordered toward the same goals and do not require 
different virtues, "their movements f6flow one another in a certain order as having 
the same purpose" to achieve a good. (la2ae. 60.4. ) The concupiscible passions A 
pursue the good and avoid evil. However, the pattern is not the same for the 
irascible passions. They are directed at different things. Daring and fear face 
danger and are controfled by the virtue of courage. Hope and despair confront a 
challenging good and so need the virtue of magnanimity (enterprise). Anger seeks 
to overcome harmful opposition and so needs the virtue of meekness. (la2ae. 60.4. ) 
It is in knowing these emotions that a better understanding of the patient's 
situation wilI emerge. By comprehending how chronic illness affects the patient's 
41 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 272-286. 
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emotions, one wifl be better able to know which virtues wifl be most necessary. 
Aversion and pain, those emotions of the concupiscible passions, require 
temperance and its allied virtues that promote health, such as continence, sobriety, 
and fasting and their vices of incontinence, drunkenness and gluttony. Temperance 
is necessary for keeping one's mental health intact, for it considers good 
manners(which concerns play), honour, clemency, and humility and their vices of 
wrath, cruelty, and incontinence. The irascible passions are those intense emotions 
that will propel one to fight the bad effects of the illness. In this fight, one looks to 
courage and its allied virtues of daring, magnanir*(enterprise), patience and 
perseverance. It will consider the vices or traps to avoid, such as fear, fearlessness, 
pusiHanimity, and the vices opposed to perseverance, which are spinelessness and 
obstinacy. We can predict that these virtues and vices will be relevant to patients 
because of the natural law, which gives us some insight into what basic goods 
promote human flourishing and how their absence creates human suffering. 
NATURALLAW 
The virtues are able to exist only because they rest on the natural law. 
Without the natural law, there is no way to define what is virtue and what is vice. 
Aquinas believes that, apart from simple acts with no moral bearing, which 
promotes the natural law is virtuous and that which acts against the natural law and 
deforms it is vicious. In fact, it is the natural law that allows us to understand what 
it means to be human, apart from our supernatural sense, and what actions allow 
hwnans to flourish. 
The following section on natural law will be an overview because the subject 
is important enough to merit its own discussion in the following chapter. Natural 
law offers increased specificity in regards to what will bring fulfihnent to a person. 
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The prescriptions of virtue ethics can be vague in that each person is different and 
will have different means for each virtue. Virtue ethics describes only a general 
good that is promoted by virtue. Natural law states that there exist several types of 
'basic goods'which comprise human flourishing and fulfilment and through an in- 
depth discussion of the various goods of the natural law, more specificity can be 
applied to the cases of patients with chronic illness discussed in chapter five. 
It is the goal of happiness that the virtues specifically promote. However, 
Aquinas must have some criteria for determining what is a virtuous action. It is not 
enough simply to decide that action X is an example of virtue Y. There must be 
some criterion for judging what constitutes a virtue. To discover this, Aquinas's 
wider ethical theory must be examined. To understand Aquinas's ethical theory in 
regard to the virtues, one has to look outside his writings on virtue. In the P? irm 
Sawidae of the Sunvm Aquinas formulates his theory of natural law. It is a system of 
primary and secondary principles, accessible to human reason, a reason that is an 
imperfect and rational participation in God's eternal law. Maria Carl, in her article 
"Law, Virtue and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory", describes how law and 
virtue neither compete nor stand in need of reconciliation of each other in 
Aquinas's ethical theory. " Flis theory of natural law and virtue is based on a theory 
of natural inclinations, and specifically the human inclination to reason. Carl argues 
that law and virtue are complementary because both law and virtue relate to reason 
and happiness. " The first principle of practical reason is concerned with human 
happiness or beatitude. (1a2ae, q. 90. a. 2) So, it is to happiness that the law must be 
42 Mana Carl, "Law, 
1997, p. 427. 
43 Ibid, pp. 427-428. 
Virtue and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory", The Thomist, v. 61, 
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referred. (1a2ae, q. 90. a. 2) 'Me law is to order our action to the final end of 
happiness. " 
Carl believes there is danger in marginalising the importance of happiness 
and looking solely at primary precepts of natural law, found in 1a2ae, q. 94. a. 2. 
Aquinas states that there are several primary and self-evident precepts of the natural 
law. The first principle of practical reason is to do good and avoid evil. He says 
that what practical reason apprehends as good is naturally conunanded by reason 
and then articulated in the form of practical precepts. These propositions are the 
primary principles of the natural law. What human reason apprehends as good are 
goods to which every human has a natural inclination. Humans are a natural 
substance and as such possess a characteristic set of inclinations arising from their 
substantial form, which is the rational soul. Aquinas believes that these 
"inclinations determine and define the natural and appropriate human goods. 
, 45 
Hwnans are oriented to the preservation of life, procreation, gaining knowledge, 
and living in conununity. Carl believes that it is clear in this passage that happiness 
forms laws which are to guide us to happiness. The four basic natural law precepts 
define a complete essential definition of human nature because they specify our 
basic natural inclinations to ends or goods that arise from our human essence. 
Aquinas describes the universal and self-evident first principles of natural 
law as "the seeds of the moral virtues. " (1a2ae, q. 63. aa. 1-3) He suggests that the 
principles of natural law are the principles of the virtues, meaning that natural law is 
prior both cognitively and ontologicaUy to virtue. The purpose of the law is to lead 
humans to proper virtue. Because virtue is what makes a person good, it follows 
44 Ibid, p. 429. 
45 Ibid, p. 43 1. 
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that law functions to make those who follow it good. Law commands virtuous 
actions and prohibits vicious ones. Carl describes this relationship: 
Specifically, the natural law commands acts that are suitable to human 
nature and forbids acts that are opposed to human nature; a virtue is a habit 
that disposes one to an act suitable to the nature of an agent and a vice is a 
habit that disposes one to an act contrary to the nature of the agent. 
Therefore, the acts that the natural law commands are the acts that generate 
the habits of virtue; and since the virtues in turn dispose to the same good 
actions ... the perfection of the virtues denotes that the agent also fulfils 
perfectly the precepts of the natural law. " 
Carl sees a two-fold relationship between the virtues and the natural law: the 
contents of the precepts are virtuous actions while the end or final cause of the 
precepts is virtuous dispositions. "Thus while the natural law is ontologically prior 
to virtue in order of generation as cause to effect, virtue is teleoloocally prior to law 
as final cause to that which is for the sake of the final cause. "" The virtues are 
perfections of our natural capacities or inclinations and are subject to the natural 
law. This is how one can determine what is a courageous or a temperate act. If an 
act causes one to veer from the natural law and not pursue one of the basic goods 
that fulfil and promote human flourishing, then it is not a virtuous act. If it causes 
one to act against the natural law, it may be considered a vice because it works 
against one's achieving his/her full human potential, a potential that is achieved by 
following the precepts of the natural law. Having this knowledge allows Aquinas to 
continue to develop his theory of virtue, for the basis of determining what 
constitutes a vu-tuous act has been estabhshed. 
As was mentioned earlier in this section, one of the benefits of the natural 
law is that it offers increased specificity in regard to human fulfilment. A natural 
law theory that heavily incorporates Ihomistic theory is the 'basic goods' theory of 
Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, which will be adopted throughout 
46 ibid, p. 442. 
47 Jbid", p. 442. 
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this dissertation. While this natural law theory will be developed in full in the next 
chapter, it wM be used throughout this chapter to help comprehend Aquinas's 
theory. The basic goods theory is derived from the works of Aquinas but not 
lirnited to them. In his Aquvw, Finnis states that his exposition often goes beyond 
what Aquinas states and that the basic goods theory uses Aquinas's work as a "point 
of departure for a free-standing philosophical treatment of ethical theory. "" 
However, the two works are very complementary and a short summary of the basic 
goods theory will enhance an understanding of Aquinas's ethical theory. The theory 
deals with the first principles of practical knowledge and morality, the relationship 
of these first Principles to other thought processes, the relationship of these first 
principles to the ultimate ends of human beings and the relationship of the these 
principles to religion. " 
What is of interest to this dissertation is their Est of the basic goods. The 
basic goods provide a concrete account of the inherent complexities of human 
nature. The basic goods are reasons for acting which need no further reasons for 
which to act. They are not contingent facts about human psychology nor an 
accident of history, but rather they are features which fulfil humans and which 
correspond to the complexities of human nature. " They fall into seven categories. 
There are basic goods deal with fife, maintaining fife, passing life on, health and 
safety. Other goods deal with knowledge and aesthetic experience. The goods that 
deal with people being both rational and animal are excellence at work and play. 
Harmony between individuals and groups concerns living in peace with others, 
cultivating our neighbours and possessing friendship. The basic good of inner 
48 John Finnis, Aquinas, p. ix, referring to Grisez's 1965 article, "The First Principle of Practical 
Reason", that appears to be the origin of the basic goods theory. 
49Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends", p. 100. 
50 Ibid, p. 105. 
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peace desires no inner conflicts among our feelings and choices. The sixth basic 
good deals with peace of conscience and consistency between one's self and its 
expression. The final category of basic goods deals with peace with God or some 
nontheistic but more-than-human source of meaning and value. Basic goods 
constitute the end of natural law and will be referred to in further sections. There is 
not a hierarchy among the basic goods. They are different in irreducible senses and 
it cannot be said that one is meaningMy better than another. " Human nature is 
inherently complex and we act so as to achieve these basic goods and achieve a 
sense of fulfAment. 
Having this basic understanding that the natural law refers to happiness 
allows one the background needed to understand more fi4 Aquinas's concept of 
happiness. 
HAPPINESS 
Kevin Staley, in his article "Happiness: The Natural End of Man? ", argues 
against some commentators on Aquinas who assert that Aquinas held no natural 
end for people, but either only the beatific vision or natural inclinations to finite 
ends which are directed toward a plurality of goods, not a unified state counting as 
true perfection. " Staley writes that Aquinas thought that we are directed to one 
end, which is attained in a two-fold manner; naturally and supernaturally. I hold 
with Staley's approach: that Aquinas believed that the person's end is to attain an 
earthly happiness as well as attaining a supernatural happiness in the beatific vision. 
As I read Aquinas, this consists of a person possessing a unified state, working 
toward imperfect happiness on earth while at the same time working toward the 
51 Ibid, p. 137-139. 
52 Kevin Staley, "Happiness: The Natural End of Man? ", The Thomist, v. 53,1989, p. 227. 
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ultimate goal of the beatific vision. The two goals are not separate but 
complementary. As we work toward earthly happiness, our work is informed by the 
theological virtues, which tells us as to what constitutes human acts: those acts 
which bring about our flourishing good as human beings. These same theological 
virtues make it possible for us to attain our ultimate goal. 
Being indebted to Aristotle, Aquinas would have had difficulty in denying 
that people have an earthly end of attaining happiness, to which they are guided by 
the use of reason. However, as a Christian, Aquinas held to a belief in the 
supernatural end of humanity. This led him to transcend Aristotle's moral and 
social theory. He understood the grace of the theological virtues as perfecting 
human nature and only through knowing and possessing the ultimate good, God, 
can people be satisfied. All of a person's desires are directed to this end, and to 
attain this supernatural end, the person has need of supernatural virtues which are 
given through grace. It is a mistake to read Aquinas as supplementing Aristotle, 
with little of significance separating the two. Michael Haren properly notes that 
Aquinas understood people's perfection lying as the attaining of the beatific vision, 
for which grace is needed. Where Aristotle was concerned with earthly happiness, 
which Aquinas called 'imperfect happiness', Aquinas believed that true perfection 
came about in heaven. " To understand how people are to achieve this supernatural 
end, an understanding of the end is required. At the beginning of la2ae of the 
Sunvw, Aquinas turned his focus from systematic theology toward moral theology. 
He considered the nature of the person, and deterrnined the person's end to be 
happiness, both heavenly and earthly. Brian Davies surnmarises Aquinas's belief 
that happiness: 
53 Haren, Medieval Thought, pp. 181-190. 
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is not a matter of 'whatever turns you on. ' It is something to be understood 
while bearing in mind that human life has a goal. It is an objective, the 
nature of which might not be at all obvious from consulting our feelings. In 
fact, Aquinas says, it is nothing less than God. " 
Human actions are not simply directed to this or that end which a human may 
perceive as good, but whether he or she realises it or not, the action is also 
performed in the pursuit of an ultimate goal. The goal, or final good, at which the 
person alms is God, for God alone deserves to be the final good at which one aims. 
Aquinas decided that people act for an end. This determination is effected 
by the rational appetite, called the will. As was noted in the section on the passions, 
appetite is the desire born from the perceiving of an object that is of interest to the 
fife of the body. It tends to the good, those things that fulfA the human being. 
Through use of their free wifl, which is the union of the fac* of wifl and reason, 
people move themselves to their end by the rational appetite. There can only be 
one last end, for "it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed 
indefinitely. " (1a2ae. 1.4. ) Nature tends to one thing only and the will is fixed on this 
last end, for everything desires its own perfection, "The ultimate end ought so to 
fulfil a man's whole desire that nothing is left beside for him to desire. " (1a2ae. 1.5. ) 
Nothing will lull the will except the universal good that is God. (la2ae. 2.8. ) This last 
end will fill the person's appetite, leaving nothing else for him or her to desire, so 
that the appetite will not tend to something else. Of necessity, it is for the last end 
that the person desires all he or she desires, and this, Aquinas believed, is for two 
reasons. First, whatever one desires, one desires it "because of its evidence of 
good" and if what one desires does not lead directly to one's perfect good, it at least 
tends to one's perfect good, for "everyniunal perfection anticipates the consummate 
perfection which comes with the final end. "(la2ae. 1.6. ) Secondly, the 
last end 
54 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 228. 
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moves the appetite that is "the first mover with respect to other motions 
secondary causes do not set in motion except as set in motion by the first 
cause. " (1a2ae. 1.6. ) All people desire this last end of happiness, for it is in the nature 
of things to fulfA their perfection. "When men sin they turn away from that in 
which the idea of the ultimate end is truly realised, not from the intention of 
reaching it, which rnistakenly they seek elsewhere. " (1 a2ae. 1.7. ) 
Happiness is two-fold. First, if one considers happiness in its cause and 
object, which is God, who is the thing itself we desire to attain, then the last end of 
people is an uncreated good. Secondly, if one considers the essence of happiness, 
which is the attainment or possession of the thing desired where one enjoys the 
thing desired, then the last end is created, for it resides in the person. (1 a2ae. 3.1. ) 
Taken in its created sense, happiness is then an operation, where potentiality, 
implying imperfection, is actualised, implying perfection. By "a single, 
uninterrupted and continuous act our minds wiH be united with God. "(la2ae. 3.2. ) 
Given that happiness consists in the knowledge of God, happiness will be found in 
the operation of the intellective part, and more specifically in the speculative 
intellect rather than in the practical inteflect. (la2ae. 3.5. ) Because happiness is an 
operation and is concerned with the person's last end, it must be the person's 
highest operation and highest power. This power resides in the intellect whose 
"highest object is divine good, ... the activity of contemplating the things of 
God is 
principaUy in happiness. " (la2ae. 3.5. ) 
Therefore, our: 
last end and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists 
entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had i 
here, consists first and principally in contemplation, but secondarily, in an 
operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and 
passions. (la2ae. 3-5. ) 
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The goal of contemplation is considering the truth and seeks the principle of 
truth, which is God. (2a2ae. 180.1. ) In heaven the body is perfect because the 
happiness of the soul will overflow onto the body, so that it too will obtain 
perfection. (la2ae. 4.6. ) The object of happiness is not bodily good, but bodily good 
will give a: 
certain charm and perfection to Happiness. ... Although the body has no part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, 
yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being fifted up. (la2ae. 4.6. ) 
True happiness in this life cannot be attained, because true happiness excludes every 
misery and each evil and fulfils every desire, which is impossible to achieve in this 
fife. However, a person can achieve a certain participation of happiness in this life 
through the person's natural powers. (la2ae. 5.5. ) Such earthly imperfect happiness 
can be achieved through having the proper external goods necessary for the 
operation of contemplative and active virtue, or in having the fellowship of friends 
so that he or she may do good to them and exercise his or her virtues on 
them. (la2ae, 3,7-8. ) This imperfect happiness can be lost, such as when 
contemplative happiness "is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when 
knowledge is lost through sickness: or again by certain occupations, whereby a man 
is altogether withdrawn from contemplation. " (la2ae. 5.4. ) Concerning active 
contemplation, the person"s will can change and fall from virtue to vice. 
The dissertation, in chapter five, will concern itself with understanding how 
patients who suffer from chronic and sometimes debilitating illness can achieve an 
earthly happiness. This happiness will be achieved through the operation of the 
virtues that attempt to pursue the entire range of basic goods. 
Finnis examines Thomistic happiness through the basic goods theory and 
states that happiness turns out to be "satisfaction of A intelligent desires and 
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participation in A the basic human goods (whatever they are), and thus a fulfilment 
which is complete and integral (integrating all its elements and participants)"" 
Happiness is about fulfAment, a fulfilment coming from attaining the basic goods. 
None of the human goods amounts on its own to complete human well-being or 
fulfilment. The: 
human condition would be not so much another, additional basic good as, 
rather, a state of affairs which, by excluding all lack and bad (deficiency in 
attainment of basic goods) and fulfilling every desire (for intelligible, basic 
goods) , would be satisfactory ... and lacking nothing desirable" 
Aquinas made it clear that there exists no state of affairs in the world that can bring 
about bwi&&, a good that fully and completely satisfies a human being. Yet, he 
does retain the concept of beatia& inperkrt, incomplete fulfilment. While the term 
appears to be paradoxical (beatia& meaning perfect good), Aquinas is getting at a 
belief that each basic good is not going to bring one happiness and that no amount 
of earthly basic goods will bring perfect human fulfilment. Reason seeks "a more 
complete and coherent guidance-by-reasons-for-action than is supplied by a set of 
reasons for action considered one by one. "" Reason guides the practical principles 
and each practical principle directs a person towards a basic human good that is 
only one good among many and is incomplete: 
Reason, then) seeks a more complete - one may say integral - directiveness 
not of each first practical principle taken on its own but of all taken 
together. That is to say, it is obviously desirable to make all one's choices, 
actions, states of mind, and feelings harmonize with all the first practical 
principles taken integrally, i. e., in their combined guiding force. This 
desirability is a source, a principle, of the integral directiveness of practical 
reason. Aquinas ... calls 
it the good of (practical) reason or reasonableness 
its significance for us is such that Aquinas can say that it is the proximate 
goal of our existence. Those who instantiate this good in their character and 
action have its intrinsic result, the good of virtue" 
55 Finnis, Aquinas, pp. 85-86. 
56 fbid, p. 104. 
57 Ibid, p. 106. 
58 Ibid, pp. 106-107. 
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Human fulfilment for Aquinas is the organising point of individual and 
social choice toward something attainable as far as is possible within the 
circumstances by one's own actions. Ms is virtue in action, meaning practical 
reason in action: 
For virtue simply is the perfection of the human capacities involved in 
action, i. e., the powers of understanding and responding to intelligible 
goods and of choosing and carrying out one's choices well -a perfection 
which involves bringing those powers of intelligence, will, and (as sharing in 
rational choice and action) emotion into co-operative harmony with each 
other and with the human goods. " 
To achieve this imperfect earthly happiness, human fulfilment, or human flourishing 
requires training and discipline. This is why creating proper dispositions is 
important. 
DISPOSITIONS 
It has become evident by now that humanity has an inclination to goodness. 
What is needed is to learn the best ways in which particular goods can be realised in 
life, and this is from the practice of creating dispositions to seek out these goods. 
By the time Aquinas has addressed dispositions in the Prbw Smm", he has already 
discussed happiness, human action and its morality, and human emotion. He is 
now ready to move from understanding what constitutes human flourishing to how 
to achieve human flourishing. Creating proper dispositions is the first step. 
Aquinas's habiws is best rendered by disposition. In Iýs introduction to his 
translation of Aquinas's work on disposition (la2ae. 49-54) Anthony Kenny ýves 
one of the better descriptions of disposition: 
The notion of disposition is best approached via notions of cqwcity and 
mtion. Human beings have many capacities which animals lack: the capacity 
to learn languages, for instance, and the capacity for generosity. These 
capacities are realized in action when particular human beings speak 
" Ibid, p. 107. 
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particular languages or perform generous actions. But between capacity and 
action there is an intermediate state possible. When we say that a man can 
speak French we mean neither that he is actually speaking French, nor that his speaking French is a mere logical possibility ... A disposition, said St. Thomas, is half-way between a capacity and an action, between pure 
potentiality and full actuality. " 
One's actions are not random. They are done voluntarily and their source 
comes from our dispositions. Aquinas quotes Aristotle's Metapbysics in defining 
disposition - "A disposition, says Aristotle, is a state which is either a good state or a 
bad state for its possessor either absolutely or relatively". (la2ae. 49.1. ) Dispositions 
are qualities of a person which modify his or her substance. " Our habits determine 
the manner in which we realise our own definition. " 'Merefore we speak of 
dispositions as either good or bad in that they help us to flourish or cause us to 
deteriorate. Dispositions draw us closer to our telos or hinder us from attaining it. 
They are needed because many factors can combine in different ways to dispose the 
person in better or worse ways to achieve that telos. (la2ae. 49.4. ) The dispositions 
condition the person to act well. This relates to the will. The will inclines a person 
naturaUy toward that which the reason deems as good. However, the wiU relies on 
dispositions to incline it more readily to the pursuit of these goods. (1 a2ae. 50.5. ) 
Therefore, dispositions act so as to order our desires rightly. This is why they are of 
such importance to virtue, for virtue relies heavily on rightly ordered desires. 
60 Anthony Kenny, "Introduction", to Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, v. 22, (I a2ae, 49- 
54), tr. Anthony Kenny, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), p. xxi. 
61 Joseph Kotva gives a good description on how dispositions mould our character. "According 
to virtue theory ... we 
develop and help form our tendencies and dispositions through our choices 
and actions. Both those tendencies and dispositions also inform and direct our choices and 
actions. We are not, as the behaviorist account suggests, simply at the mercy of forces outside 
our control; we help forin our own and each other's character. We also are not, contrary to the 
voluntarist account, free from the constraints of character. Past choices and actions influence the 
kind of persons we become, and the kind of persons we become informs our choices and 
actions. " See Joseph Kotva, Jr., The Christian Casefor Virtue Ethics, (Washington: Georgetown 
University Press, 1996), p. 28. 
62 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, p. 256. 
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While we have natural dispositions within us, as a general rule they develop 
from our acts. Usually, repeated acts are required to develop a disposition. If we do 
not use our dispositions they wiH weaken or be destroyed because there are no 
countermeasures to stop them from breaking down. Disordered appetites wiU arise 
and destroy virtue. (la2ae. 53.3. ) From organising our appetites to desire the good, 
dispositions create habits, which are the basis of the virtues. 
THE VIRTUES 
Aquinas attempts to describe, classify and recommended all virtues possible 
to human perfection, while also listing their corresponding vices. Virtue is the topic 
of 211 out of 303 questions in the whole of the Second Part of the Sunnu The 
other questions of the Second Part - the purpose of life, the human act, the 
passions, the law, have in view the goal, acts, matter and source of virtue. " It would 
do weU to note before starting a discussion of the virtues that Aquinas distinguishes 
between natural virtues and moral virtues. (1 a2ae. 65.1. ) Jonathan Jacobs gives a 
good summary of the Aquinas's doctrine. Moral virtues are different from natural 
virtues that exist in a person through a natural temperament. Moral virtue comes 
through habit, and is produced through a matter of knowledge, choice and 
character. Natural virtue may exist in a person through a natural inclination to 
perform certain deeds, such as being immune to anxiety over physical harm, yet this 
is not the same as possessing the virtue of courage. Natural virtues are not unified. 
A person's natural sense of justice may put him or her at risk by taking unreasonable 
chances, a sort of meritorious recklessness; however, this sense of justice is not 
integrated with other virtues. He or she lacks the prudence and moral virtues to 
63 Lehrberger, "Deontology", p. 107. 
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carry out truly virtuous actions in other parts of his or her fife. Ffis or her action 
may mirnic the action of a morally virtuous person, but this is by chance. Natural 
virtues are of less value than moral virtues in that they lack mutual reinforcement 
and orientation. They are unable to handle difficult cases, novelty or conflict. A 
natural virtue which prevails is a matter of relative strength of characteristics, not of 
right judgement and exertion. 64 This is worth remembering in chapter five, where a 
patient may appear quite stoical in regard to suffering. This person could have the 
natural virtue of courage that is not integrated into his or her whole personality. 
Aquinas expands on Augustine's way of categorising virtue and vice. 
Augustine believed an agent may not be as good as his/her external actions appear, 
and so he developed three lists of virtues and vices: one for virtue and two for vices. 
Every moral virtue has its contrary and also a 'deceptive resemblance'., i. e., 
prudence has imprudence as its contrary and craftiness as its deceptive resemblance. 
Craftiness is the prudence of the mora. Hy bad person. Similarly, thrift has prodigality 
as its contrary and miserliness as its deceptive resemblance. Nfiserliness is the thrift 
of the selfish person. Augustine believed a person's way of acting does not 
necessarily indicate a person's goodness, for a person acting with seeming prudence 
and thrift can in reality be crafty and rniserly. " Contrast this with Aquinas who 
believed that each virtue has not one but several corresponding vices, for there was 
only one way to be good, and many ways to be wrong. He held that nothing could 
dispense us from our duty of honouring and trying to attain true exceflence: the 
whole person was to be cultivated. A thing is good if it performs well its function, 
such as an eye that sees clearly. "Hence the virtue of a thing is fixed by the linit of 
64Jonathan Jacobs, "The Unity of the Vices", The Thomist, v. 54,1990, pp. 641-653. 
65 James F. Keenan, "The Problem with Thomas Aquinas's Concept of Sin", Heythrop Journal, 
v. 35,1994, pp. 401-420. 
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which it is capable" (la2ae. 55.3. ) It is "a good quality of rnind ... by which one fives 
righteously ... of which no one can make 
bad use. "(la2ae. 55.4. ) Rational activityls 
what characterises humanity and "Reason, or mind, therefore, is the proper seat of 
virtue. " (la2ae. 55.4. ) Yet, on its own, reason is insufficient to ensure that we lead a 
moral fife. A person is not good if he or she is good only in potential, but when he 
or she actualises his/her potential good. True virtue must be seen in action. An 
" act of virtue is nothing other than free choice well applied. "(1a2ae. 55.1. ) So, the 
person must not only be disposed toward acts which are proper to a creature with 
reason and made in the image of God, he or she must act Eke a creature possessing 
reason and made in the image of God. The natural dispositions toward the good 
must lead to habits and habits are put into action, and this is why true virtue must 
be result in action. 
Virtues act to strengthen people's adherence to their goal of a good fife, for 
by nature humans are disposed to goodness. " The Fall may have changed a 
person's perception of what the good is, but the fundamental orientation remains 
the same. Virtues are hardened habits, tendencies, abilities or capacities that make it 
easy for us to do certain things or behave in certain ways, they aid us in functioning 
to the best of our advantage, and they help bring out what is truly perfective of the 
person. " Aquinas writes that: 
Human virtue is any habit perfecting man so that he may act well ... there are 
but two principles in human action, namely the intellect or reason and the 
appetite ... Consequently every 
human virtue is necessarily perfective of one 
of these principles ... if it Perfects man's speculative or practical 
intellect in 
order that his activity may be good, it will be intellectual virtue, if it perfects 
his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. (la2ae. 58.3. ) 
66 Timothy McDermott, Summa Theologiae. 
(London: Metheun, 1991), p. 220. 
67 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 
A Concise Translation, ed. Timothy McDermott, 
p. 239. 
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Tlis statement demonstrates Aquinas's belief in the intellectual and moral 
virtues, about which more will be written later. These are the virtues about which 
Aristotle wrote in the Nicomhum Ethics. It is these virtues which allow people to 
Eve a life of earthly happiness. If cultivated, they allow people to fulfil those 
characteristics which produce a contented state and are inherent in people - to take 
enjoyment in contemplation of the higher things in fife, fulfilment in learning a trade 
well which can also provide security for the craftsman's family, gratification in living 
a temperate fife which is conducive to the health of body and mind, pleasure in 
cultivating an amiable personality which attracts good friends, and satisfaction in 
acting with justice toward all one meets. These are qualities that are pleasing to all 
people, and which will cause people to feel happiness in their fife. Brian Davies 
provides a good sunimarr. 
According to Aristotle and Aquinas, human beings are things of a particular 
kind. Considered as such, they have particular needs that they must satisfy 
in order to function to the extent of their capacities. Reason can perceive 
these needs and, insofar as people act in the light of reason to satisfy them, 
they act well and are good. Insofar as their reason is impaired, insofar as 
they neglect these needs, they are diminished or thwarted and, therefore, 
bad in some respect. Insofar as they function to the extent of their 
capacities, they are living the best life possible this side of the grave, and, in 
this sense, are happy. " 
However, to concentrate first on the intellectual and moral virtues is to fall 
into the trap of seeing Aquinas through Aristotelian eyes, mentioned near the 
beginning of the chapter. The theological virtues change the complexion of the 
virtues. Aristotle understood the virtues as leading to a happiness which was earth- 
bound. Aquinas perceived the virtues as leading to an imperfect happiness that is 
earth-bound, but also to a perfect happiness which exists in heaven. 
The 
theological virtues allow us the opportunity to achieve this perfect happiness; 
however, not on their own. The moral and intellectual virtues are still required. 
In 
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fact, it would not be possible to possess the virtue of charity and lack the moral or 
intellectual virtues, for charity is the form of all the virtues. " One should not think 
of two sets of virtues existing side by side: one set of theological virtues which serve 
to allow people to attain their heavenly end and a set of intellectual and moral 
virtues which allow people to achieve their earthly end, each serving their own 
purpose and not having any inter-relation. Rather, the theoloocal virtues are the 
most important of the virtues and stand at the head of all other virtues. Through 
them, the other virtues flow and take their shape. To understand this, it is first 
necessary to understand the theolo6cal virtues. 
We can understand faith, hope and charity as the height of the process 
taking place between God and the person. The virtue which strengthens the 
person's n-dnd to see the truths that God alone sees is faith; the virtue of hope helps 
to adapt the person's wiH toward the end of seeing God; the virtue of charity occurs 
when the person's will wants to cleave to God and achieve a spiritual union. 
Charity is a friendship with God and love of neighbour and it is the greatest virtue 
for it approaches closest to God. These infused virtues allow us to flourish in more 
than a basic human way, the way in which Aristotle's virtue ethics operate. The 
cardinal virtues of fortitude, temperance, justice and prudence equip people to Eve a 
happy earthly existence. However, God has created us so that we can possess more 
than a happy earthly existence. We are called to something greater. People are 
created so that their happiness rests in God, not in any earthly possession. We need 
to possess God, and the theological virtues are the grace given to allow us to 
68 Ibid, p. 2 3 1. 
6' Form is defined as "that which brings determination to matter; the definiteness and intelligible 
4shape' of a thing. " Timothy McDermott, "Glossary", Summa Theologiae, (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1964), p. 232. Charity is a key part of any definition of virtue. Love of God and 
neighbour, and a desire to be like God and to help our neighbour are constitutive of a 
Christian 
understanding of the virtues. 
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achieve that. We cannot achieve this ultimate end on our own . 
70 This is why the 
theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral ones, for whatever 
surpasses human nature is distinct from human nature. "Faith, hope and charity 
surpass human virtue, for they are virtues of men as made partakers in divine 
grace. " (la2ae. 58.3. ) "Our reason andwiU bynature go out to God in that He is the 
cause and the end of nature ... Yet, this is not enough for them to reach out to Him 
as the object of supernatural happiness. " (la2ae. 62.1. ) The theological virtues raise 
people up "above their nature to a point where they become sharers in the divine 
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nature. " Prior to the Fall, people possessed knowledge of the beatific vision. 
With the Fall, we have lost it and much of our knowledge about God has been 
destroyed. After the Fall, the theological virtues give us this knowledge and ability 
to become close to God. 
Aquinas believed that the theological virtues drew the person closer to God 
and served to make the person more human. Humans are made in the image of 
God and their telos leads them to the beatific vision. There is an intimate 
relationship between God and humans, and that which draws the person toward 
God serves to make the person more human, meaning more divine-like. As the 
person becomes more united to God, so the person becomes more human in the 
sense that he or she fulfils his/her telos. The non-theological virtues now become 
directed toward a different end, experienced and lived out in a different way, but 
still grounded in the same faculty of the soul and still concerned with the same 
matters as Aristotle's. The intellectual and moral virtues are now also pointed 
toward heaven rather then only toward earthly life. This acts to cause the virtues to 
70 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 263. 
71 lbid, p. 263. 
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consider what is truly fulfilling of humankind. We act with justice toward our 
neighbour not only because it is fulfilling of earthly happiness, but because the 
infused virtue of charity prompts us to act with such justice. AU other virtues are 
filtered through charity. It aids us in our wish to be drawn closer to God, and thus 
Aquinas believes charity becomes our main motivation in that it helps us in 
achieving this desire and is of such fundamental importance to us, so integral to our 
being, that it affects, colours and filters all the other virtues. 
Finnis writes that after taking into consideration the implications of 
theological beliefs, the moral principle of love-of-neighbour-as-self, changes: 
the master moral principle or first precept of the natural moral law ... can now be more adequately stated: one should love one's neighbour as oneself by 
reason of the divine good as it is participated, reflected, and imaged in that 
neighbour as in every human being -a goodness that can be both respected 
and nurtured in those in and for whom one can do good. In short, one is to 
love one's neighbour as oneself on account of, and (so to speak) for the sake 
of God ... whom we all should seek (and help each other to seek) to 
resemble and adhere to, and whose glory all human beings have the capacity 
to share. "' 
Charity gives us the prompt to act with fortitude, temperance, prudence, and 
justice because we love God and want to cleave to Him, become more like Flim. 
This transforms us, and transforms our motives for acting. Charity, or love of and 
friendship with God, is then found in every other virtue. It permeates it and 
changes its quality. The outcome of a virtuous action would still remain the same; 
however the difference is in the noetic level. This means that one's motivation is 
different. One understands one's reason for acting in a different light. The moral 
virtue of liberality is no longer solely guided by wishing to offer aid to those in 
distress because it is inherently natural and fulfilling that humans aid other humans, 
but because charity concerns love-of-neighbour-as-self. The reference point for our 
72 Finnis, Aquinas, p. 314. 
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actions is no longer found within the architecture of human nature, but also in 
God's nature, of which we reflect and are called to reflect more completely. 
The intellectual and moral virtues have thus taken on a new role. They aid 
us in achieving the beatific vision. One may ask if this is really a different role, for 
instead of being the means of attaining earthly happiness, they now also aid in 
achieving the beatific vision. The role appears fundamentally the same. But these 
virtues are reoriented. The virtues of Aristotle were formulated with the concem 
being only what is necessary to achieve earthly happiness. They did not consider 
the architecture of human nature as being made in the image of God, for they saw 
human nature as only concemed with earthly fife. The gods were to be 
contemplated and the person aspired to five a fife worthy of the gods, but that was 
the extent of Aristotle's theological discussion in the Nkwzwým Ethics. With 
Aquinas, God is seen as inherent in the architecture of human nature, so inteffectual 
and moral virtues would be qualitatively different in that when the person is trying 
to realise his or her telos, which makes him/her My human, he or she is becoming 
at the same time more in the image of God. 
In their role of helping us to become more in the image of God, the moral 
and inteflectual virtues work in tandem. The inteflectual virtues give one the ability 
to discern which is the proper course of action to take while the moral virtues 
enable one to carry out the act. The intellectual virtues are more than an apparatus 
deciding on virtuous action. In fact, they have their own virtue for dealing with that 
- prudence. The intellectual virtues are divided into the speculative and the 
practical. The speculative is composed of the virtues of understanding, science and 
wisdom. Understanding is about the grasping of basic principles of reasoning, 
science is concerned with good reasoning using these principles to arrive at truth 
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regarding different kinds of things in the world, and wisdom is interested in good 
reasoning concerning the highest and last causes in the world, namely God. " In 
order of rank wisdom contains and rules knowledge and understanding. It judges 
understanding and its principles, and knowledge and its conclusions. " While these 
virtues do not appear to meet the criterion that virtue must include some form of 
outward human action, they are virtues in the sense that they make us capable of 
good activity, namely considering the truth. However, unlike moral virtues, they do 
not ensure right activity. 
The practical intellect is composed of the two virtues of art and prudence. 
Art, or 'craft'would be a better word, is correct reasoning about things to be made 
and prudence is correct reasoning about things to be done and aims at the good of 
the agent. " One function of practical reason is described as moving from a major 
prernise, expressing a general rule or principle, such as formulated by the speculative 
intellect, to a minor premise appraising one's particular circumstances in fight of a 
principle. The conclusion as to what to do is the conunand of prudence. When 
one fails to follow this conunand, it is because he or she is not appetitively disposed 
to fonow it. " 
Prudence is then an intellectual virtue and a moral virtue, or perhaps the 
moral virtue, for it takes the reason of intellectual virtue and applies it to the 
appetite of moral virtue. The analogy of an hourglass can perhaps explain the role 
of prudence. One end of the glass is the intellectual virtues and the opposite end is 
the moral virtues. Prudence could be considered the small portal through which the 
information gathered and considered by the inteflectual virtues is processed and the 
" Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 24 1. 
74 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, p. 262. 
75 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 241. 
76 McInemy, "Ethics", p. 206. 
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prudent action is passed onto the moral virtues. The decisions of the intellectual 
virtues pass onto and affect the moral virtues. The result is an intellective and 
affective disposition to perform the proper virtuous action. Our desires are 
properly ordered and our whole being earnestly wants to perform the proper action. 
The command of prudence then informs the actions of the moral virtues, deciding 
how and when the appropriate action is to be undertaken. Prudence is about being 
competent at applying general principles of morality, especially when these 
principles clash. It is about right judgement concerning things to be done, impbing 
that actions are to be undertaken. So, prudence cannot exist without the moral 
virtues. Without prudence, one cannot have moral virtues, for moral virtues are 
concerned with doing the right thing in the right manner at the right time, and it is 
the virtue of prudence that gives this ability. Moral virtues are needed because 
people five in a material world, one in which the passions become either enflamed 
or smoulder out, tending to either excess or defect, and urge one to either overact 
or not act with enough vigour. As for the theological virtues, prudence is connected 
to them in that the theological virtues assist one in understanding what actions are 
prudent. As was said earlier, the theological virtues allow us to operate in a more 
than basic human way. Our happiness rests in becoming like God, and prudence, 
informed of this knowledge through the theological virtues, allows one to make 
truly prudential decisions, those decisions which allow us to achieve this happiness. 
An example could be providing food for the hungry. Without the theological 
virtues, one could perform this action motivated by the virtues of justice and 
compassion, believing that it is just that each person has an adequate supply of 
food. The theological virtues inform the decision in the same manner, but from a 
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different angle. That person deserves such a basic right because he or she is our 
brother or sister in the family of God and as a child of God, is worthy of such acts. 
Prudence is the first of the cardinal virtues. The other three are justice, 
temperance and courage. 'Me entire structure of good works is built on these four 
virtues. They alone provide the ability to act rightly and to accomplish the good. 
They may be considered to fulffl perfectly the definition of virtue. All other moral 
virtues can be put under these four headings. (la2ae. 61.1. ) The four cardinal virtues 
are considered to be principal because they are common to all moral virtues. Any 
virtue causing a good judgement of reason may be called prudence, every virtue 
causing action to fulfA what is right or due is caUed justice, every virtue restraining 
and taming the passions is called temperance, every virtue strengthening the mind 
against the on-set of passions which could cause one to act out of line with reason is 
courage. Aquinas gives a description of how they interact. Prudence judges or 
perfects reason itself, justice puts reason into what we will so that we will to do the 
just thing, which is also the reasonable thing. Sometimes, we are caused by our 
emotions to resist reason and temperance introduces restraint on our passions. 
Other times, fear of danger or hardship causes us to want to shrink back from what 
reason dictates and we need courage to be steadfast. (la2ae. 61.2. ) 
All the moral virtues are contained under these four virtues. The other 
virtues share, in some sense, the essence of one of these virtues. They utilise some 
aspect of the essence of a cardinal virtue in regard to a specific circumstance, such 
as the virtue of humility being a form of temperance in so far as it restrains 
immoderate hope and holds these hopes within the bounds of reason. 
The cardinal virtues are more than headings under wlých the virtues are 
grouped. They are virtues in their own right that deal with primary subject matters 
commanding right action. In other words, it is not the case that 
A the virtues that 
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deal with moderating the passions come under a heading entitled temperance, where 
temperance is simply a descriptive title. The virtue of temperance itself exists, and 
the virtues under it are species of temperance. Because much of chapter five wiU be 
addressing the moral virtues, the cardinal virtues deserve a closer exarnination. 
Prudence has been discussed in the above paragraphs. justice is a virtue of wifl 
concerned with relating to others as well as oneself. The seat of justice is therefore 
found in the will. (la2ae. 61.2. ) It is a paramount moral virtue, the most 
distinguished of virtues because it is the one most closely allied with reason. justice 
is about deeds whereas temperance and fortitude are about passions. One aspect of 
justice is about rendering to another his or her due. "All moral virtues about human 
action share in common this general characteristic of justice, that it gives what is due 
to another. " (la2ae. 60.3. ) Ihe order of reason in this regard is established in 
external actions with reference to the action being fitting in itself, not with reference 
to the person's internal feelings. (2a2ae. 58.9. ) justice is generally agreed to be about 
paying what is due, and so the virtues are actions that in some way bear the 
character of justice. (2a2ae. 58.11. ) 
Therefore, justice distinguishes itself among the virtues by the fact that it 
governs relations among people. (2a2ae. 5 8.2. ) It is a virtue because the effect of the 
disposition justice creates in the individual is to ensure that the person acts rightfi4 
toward another according as reason would have him or her behave. It renders its 
possessor better, which is the nature of virtue. (2a2ae. 58.3. ) 
Aquinas believes that a just person, through ignorance or error, can coninýt 
an injustice and still be just. He or she can be fundamentally just, yet be led by 
anger or covetousness to comrnit an injustice. The person is just but has wrongly 
forgotten to appeal to his or her sense of justice when he or she should be doing 
so. (2a2ae. 59.2. ) The person does not lose his or her sense of 
justice, but shows it to 
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be incomplete and still lacking the constancy of a true virtue. 77Aquinas's thoughts 
on this matter are close to Aristotle's explanation of the incontinent person. " 
The virtue controffing or restraining our affections is temperance. The 
concupiscible power, therefore, is the seat of temperance. (1 a2ae. 61.2. ) One of 
reason 5s most important functions is to introduce moderation and balance into all 
things. Temperance is exercised on anything that threatens these qualities of 
moderation and balance, such as covetousness or jealousy. It is particularly 
exercised on the sensitive appetite, activities such as drinking, eating, and 
sex. (2a2ae. 141.4. ) 
Temperance does not seek to eliminate these pleasures, for sensible goods 
taken by themselves are not bad. They are instruments of reason and are to be used 
to attain proper ends. Measure is a keyword that can be associated with 
temperance. This is why temperance is a cardinal virtue. Measure enters into the 
very notion of virtue. (2a2ae. 141.2. ) We need to measure our actions and see if they 
are in fine with reason. 
Courage deals with aggressive emotions, and finds its seat in the irascible 
power. Its job is to strengthen the mind against the onset of passions and to help 
our virtues become resistant to change. One of the essential attributes of virtue is 
that virtues are supposed to become permanent dispositions. This is why courage is 
a cardinal virtue, for it gives the individual the courage to stand up to danger or 
difficulties and to act effectively in the face of it, thus controlling fear and ensuring 
some stability and continuity in the person's action. " The person is thus able to 
follow the law of reason by allowing him or her to possess the will, or 
desire, to 
pursue the good that reason insists on, despite the 
difficulty or danger. (2a2ae. 123.2. ) 
77 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, p. 308. 
78 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 163-165. 
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In engaging the virtue of courage, the person usually holds his or her ground rather 
than rashly attacks out of fear. Its object is to overcome fear and restrain rash 
audacity that tends to get a person into unnecessary trouble. (2a2ae. 123.6. ) A 
calculated attack is made "when it is necessary to eliminate difficulties in order to 
win safety for the future. " (2a2ae. 123.3. ) Courage keeps in mind the distant end and 
keeps the consistency needed to achieve this end. " 
The last point under virtues, of especial relevance to this dissertation, is the 
unity of the virtues. The idea behind the unity of the virtues is that one vice present 
in a person implies a unity of vices. There is no chance of a person being virtuous 
who has the vice of imprudence, for prudence is at the very heart of making a 
virtuous action. " The corruption of a vice involves the contfibuting corruption of 
other vices. One cannot be just without having prudence to understand what the 
just thing is, and the courage to carry out the just action. One must possess 
prudence and courage to possess justice. This does not mean that a virtuous person 
will never perform an unjust act and that the performance of that act shows the 
person to lack the virtues. Aquinas notes that one act does not engender a habit 
and also one act does not necessarily destroy a habit. (1a2ae. 71.4. ) The unjust act of 
a just person is an act that is out of character and does not entail defects in other 
moral virtues. It is simply an incontinent act, done for a variety of reasons. An 
incontinent act is one wMch is out of line with a person's normal actions. It could 
be that the person believed he/she was performing a just act but was acting on a 
79 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 244. 
'0 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, p. 290. 
81 Jonathon Jacobs, "The Unity of the Vices", p. 644. In a very good article on this area, Jacob 
states that Peter Geach argues against the unity of the virtues. He does not believe that a person's 
habit of sound moral judgement is vitiated everywhere once it is vitiated somewhere. People do 
not possess that degree of vigorous consistency. A defect of imprudence may not spill over and 
affect the other virtues. Jacobs believes that this type of inconsistency is possible, but that it does 
not demonstrate that the virtues are not unified. Jacobs believes that natural virtues could 
override defects in moral virtue. 
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mistaken assumption, that little thought went into the action, or that strong 
emotions shrouded reason for a short while. The incontinent person will realise the 
mistake that was made and feel bad for performing such an action. The vicious 
person wiH either realise the evil of the act and take enjoyment in the evil, or wM be 
so degenerate in the virtues that no notice or care is taken concerning one's actions. 
What is of significance to this dissertation is the importance of the unity of 
the virtues. A person needs to strive to achieve all the virtues in order to flourish as 
a human being. The virtues work so as to fulfil our human nature. Any occupation, 
lifestyle or illness that interrupts the ability to pursue these basic goods wiU have a 
bearing on one's happiness. The problem with chronic illness, or any illness, is not 
only that it may limit one's ability to pursue certain basic goods, but that the sufferer 
may so fixate on the iUness that other basic goods not impaired by the iUness are 
ignored and the illness becomes definitive of the person's personality. A disease 
that caused difficulty in pursuing several areas of fife now spreads its pernicious 
effects to many areas of life, causing the sufferer to withdraw from pursuing other 
goods. This hypothesis will be examined more closely in chapter five, through an 
analysis of interviews with patients with chronic illness. 
To sununarise, the virtues are concerned with keeping one's appetites in 
order concerning human nature. Human beings were created with an architecture 
in their nature. When this architecture is realised, the result will be happiness: both 
a happiness on earth and in heaven. The virtues, thus, operate to fulfil the person's 
telos. Reason, which is the feature which distinguishes humans from other forms of 
life, allows people to recognise their end and how best to achieve it. Human beings 
were made to live a fife of reason. The virtues allow a person to recognise when an 
action is in excess of or deficit with what is worthy of their human nature. Reason 
lets people have control over their appetites and properly order them. This enables 
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people to be more free and able to be themselves as created by God and ordered 
toward him. 
AQUINAS ON ILLNESS 
Given that this dissertation applies Aquinas's virtue ethics to patients with 
chronic illness, it is necessary to examine what Aquinas says about illness. In several 
places in the Sionma, Aquinas states that some people are denied the opportunity to 
achieve happiness on this earth. This appears somewhat startling, considering that 
life is supposed to be a gift from God which is to be enjoyed. Aquinas gives two 
reasons for why some people will never be happy. First, the imperfect happiness 
available to a person in earthly existence resides in the activity of virtue and ill health 
lirrýts one's abihty to pursue the full range of virtues. (la2ae. 4.6. ) Second, iUnessor 
other grave burdens can encumber the mind's contemplation. Imperfect happiness 
is lost when disease attacks one's consciousness or when one becomes absorbed in 
something else. (la2ae. 5.4. ) One of Aquinas's claims is that the heavy physical or 
mental burdens that some people carry are too great an obstacle to overcome in the 
attempt to achieve happiness. 
Ffis assertion is worth examining for several reasons. There is the 
theological consideration concerning why God would create a human being 
incapable of sharing in some form of happiness. Aquinas might answer this by 
saying that the Garden of Eden created by God for use by humans beings is a far 
different place then the world created through the original sin of Adam and Eve. 
Before sin, the person was umnortal. Aquinas quotes Augustine: "God made man 
to enjoy a green immortality as long as he did not sin, so that he would be 
responsible for his own fife or death himself " (1a. 97.2. ) God equipped the human 
soul with a supernatural force capable of preserving the body 
from decay, provided 
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that the soul remained submissive to the will of God. There would have been no 
suffering in Eden, because if the person were liable to suffer, he or she was liable to 
decay. If humans had persisted without sin, suffering and death would have been 
kept away. 
There is also the theoretical question on whether the role of Aquinas's virtue 
ethics is to aid such people in overcoming adversity and achieving happiness by 
summoning the irascible passions. The irascible passions are meant to fire up one's 
determination to meet and overcome arduous tasks. Therefore, they should be able 
to motivate a person to sun-nount any task. Aquinas, ever the realist, would 
recognise that in some cases, a human, through intense physical, mental or social 
conditions, simply lacks the resources to make it over the hurdles necessary to 
achieve a forrn of happiness. The obstacles and burdens that some people have to 
overcome are so great that one must hope for the grace of God to assist the person 
in achieving happiness. 
What does Aquinas's thought on illness and its relation mean to the 
sufferers of chronic iflness? The first section wifl consider his statements on iRness. 
These are scarce, but they suggest that illness is evil because of the effects of the 
pain associated with illness. The second section concludes that great pain robs a 
person of the ability to exert reason and control over one's fife and goals, thereby 
reducing one's capacity to contemplate and to pursue the intellectual and moral 
virtues which allow one to flourish and achieve happiness. 
Aquinas's Statements on Illness 
In the first section of the Sunvm, Aquinas considers whether the body is 
suitably constructed for its purposes. Bearing in mind that the primary 
function of 
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human beings is to know and to worship God, and that to achieve this end the 
proper use of reason is needed, Aquinas answers that: 
the immediate purpose of the human body is to serve a rational soul and its 
activities ... God has established the human body with the best possible 
constitution to fit it for this kind of form and this kind of activities. And if 
there seems to be any fault in the human body's constitution, it must be 
taken that such a fault is a necessary consequence of the material used to 
give the body its required adaptation to the soul and the soul"s 
activities. (1 a. 9 1.3. ) 
The body is to serve the use of right reason. For that reason, happiness 
does not centre on the person's body. Aquinas writes that the person is destined to 
an end beyond him/herself and the final goal of one's will and reason is not 
continued earthly existence but rather enjoying the vision of God. The body exists 
for the soul whereas the soul can exist without the body. "The body is to soul, as 
matter to form, and instruments for a principal cause to work through. " (la2ae. 2.5. ) 
The body does enter happiness in the sense of being a necessary vessel, because 
"happiness comes through the activity of mind, theoretical and practical, which 
cannot be performed without imagination". (1 a2ae. 4.5. ) One needs a body to house 
the mind in order to be able to exercise imagination. 
Therefore, Aquinas believes that happiness does require some perfection of 
the body. He writes "If you are speaking of happiness in this life, then manifestly 
health of body is postulated. For such happiness fies, as Aristotle says, in dx actiity 
offid1sinue, and certainly ill-health can put a stop to this altogether. " (la2ae. 4.6. ) 
Bodily health is a necessary condition for happiness and Aquinas quotes Augustine: 
if the body be such that the governance is difficult and burdensome, like 
unto flesh which sickens and weighs upon the soul, then the mind is turned 
away from that far vision in high heaven ... when the 
body no longer be 
animal but spiritual, then it will match the angels, and that will be glory 
which erstwhile was a carcass" (la2ae. 4,6. ) 
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Through iflness the body can hinder the ability to concentrate, thereby 
proving a deterrence from achieving happiness. (la2ae-4.6. ad. 2. ) When this happens, 
the imperfect happiness that one may possess can be lost. "This appears alike to 
contemplative felicity which can fall into oblivion, as when disease attacks 
consciousness, or it can be displaced by other pre-occupations which can be 
completely absorbing and distracting. " (la2ae. 5.4. ) The chief evil affect of illness 
appears to be that it hinders the person's ability to make fun use of one's mental 
capacities, for either the mind itself suffers from illness and does not function 
properly or the physical affects of an illness are so consuming that one's mental 
resources are spent coping with the effects of the iUness. 
However, there is still some delight to be had. In courageously enduring 
suffering, the person takes some pride in knowing that it has been endured 
courageously, while still having physical pain and mental suffering: 
But keen physical pain makes it impossible to experience the soul's delight 
in virtue - except perhaps through the boundless grace of God, which exalts 
the soul too powerfiilly to divine delights for it to be troubled by physical 
punishments ... Now the virtue of courage ensures that the reason is not 
submerged by physical pains. Delight in virtue prevails over the soul's pain, 
in so far as man puts the good of virtue before physical fife and all its 
attributes. (2a2ae. 123.8. ) 
To summarise, Aquinas understands reason to be the dominant feature of 
the human being, separating people from animals. VAýile plant fife consists in 
nutrition and reproduction, animal life in sensation and movement, the fife of 
humans consists in intellectual knowledge and action that is in accord with 
reason. (2a2ae. 179.1) Illness is relevant to the life of humans for two dominant 
reasons. First, illness can interfere with our ability to reason and contemplate and 
impair the functioning of the inteflectual virtues. An Mness may cause the mind to 
turn from contemplating the higher things in fife and focus on the suffering of the 
body. He writes that: 
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In the brave man, sadness of soul is overcome by the delight of virtue. But because physical pain is more palpable, and because man is more aware of 
what his senses experience, spiritual delight in the ultimate purpose of virtue fades azeay, as it uem, before the immensity of physical pain. (2a2ae. 123.8. ad. 3. ) 
Second, illness may impair the ability to pursue and attain the moral virtues 
and thereby it limits the flourishing of the human being. The result is that some 
people carry such a serious illness that they are incapable of pursuing either the 
intellectual or the moral virtues in any fulfilling manner. What solace there is to be 
taken derives from knowing that one has faced the tribulation with courage and 
made the most out of a bad situation. 
The question of this section is to see if his beliefs are in accordance with the 
experiences of people with chronic illness. That fact that 54.3%" of people with a 
disability state that they possess a good to high quality of fife poses a challenge to 
Aquinas's argument that those with heavy physical and mental burdens will not be 
able to achieve happiness. In his favour, in his time, people with severe cases of 
arthritis would have not had modem drugs or treatments to moderate the severity 
of the disease. The disease could have been all consuming, allowing neither the 
ability to work and play, nor indulge in contemplation when the pain was too severe. 
One imagines that their life was their illness. In extreme cases, the chronically ill 
would not be able to find gainful and rewarding work, nor indulge in play, nor 
pursue many meaningful relationships with others, nor pursue any of the virtues 
that would let them experience the different facets of life open to a healthy 
individual. They were not able to marshal their forces to continue on with their 
own agenda or goals. Rather, they would be like a boat adrift in the ocean, which 
82 Gary Albrecht, Patrick Devlieger, "The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life against All 
Odds", Social Science & Medicine, v. 39,1999, p. 977. Disability and chronic illness are 
overlapping but distinct concepts. Disabilities do not necessary 
imply pain, whereas many 
chronic illness appear to have pain as an inherent part of the concept of chronic 
illness. 
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goes where the currents take it, being able to impose nothing of its own will in 
being able to steer a desired course. In his own period, Aquinas was correct in 
saying that there was no opportunity available to some people because of a severe 
and chronic illness. He was correct because we can say the same thing today. 
Psychological interventions are found to be least effective on the very physically ill 
because they find it difficult to concentrate and engage in treatment. " We can apply 
Aquinas's words to the present that "keen physical pain makes it impossible to 
experience the soul's delight in virtue- except perhaps through the boundless grace 
of God, which exalts the soul too powerfiffly to divine delights for it to be troubled 
by physical punishments. " (2a2ae. 123.8. ) 
In the same question from which this quote comes, Aquinas raises another 
point which is of relevance to current studies in disability and chronic illness. 
Aquinas asks whether the courageous person takes delight in his or her acts, and he 
replies that there are two types of defight. (2a2ae. 123.8. ) Bodily delight is felt 
through physical contact whereas the delight of the soul flows from exercise of the 
virtues. In bravely enduring suffering, a person takes some delight in knowing that 
he or she has endured it courageously, while still having grief in his or her soul when 
the loss of goods and the pains of the soul are reflected upon. The illness acts as an 
obstacle to be overcome in the attempt to pursue happiness. Some happiness 
occurs from performing well given the circumstances of the illness. The body has 
to be taken into consideration. Tfýs is similar to what people with chronic illness 
report doing in order to achieve happiness. "Disability becomes a job where 
persons must marshal their entire resources and give their best efforts to succeed. 
83 Elspeth Guthrie, "Emotional Disorder in Chronic Illness: Psychotherapeutic Interventions" 
British Journal ofPsychiatry, v. 168,1996, p. 267. 
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Satisfaction is derived from doing a good job with one's fife. "" Happiness in this 
context arises out of doing well considering the circumstances that are imposed by 
chronic illness. It comes from re-estabhshing a feeling of being in control of their 
existence and pursuing it for reasonable ends, which is in accord with what Aquinas 
believes are actions worthy of a human being. 
When Aquinas states that great pain can lead to conditions where happiness 
is an impossibility, he means a pain so intense that it disorganises the sufferer's life 
so that all other goals and values in a person's life become irrelevant. The sufferer is 
at the mercy of the illness, and must go where the illness leads him or her, exerting 
little rational control over his/her existence, but merely trying to relieve the pain. 
This is one of the reasons why Aquinas holds that one in great pain cannot be 
happy: that loss of rational control is not a desirable human condition, but rather is 
one worthy of animals. 
To summarise, both Aquinas and patients with chronic illness believe that 
when pain becomes great, happiness is not to be had, for one's existence is robbed 
of reason and the ability to control one's actions. Happiness derives from being 
able to pursue the virtues that promote human flourishing. These virtues are still 
attainable to those with chronic illness without severe pain. The difference is that 
while the non-disabled person has the ability to define his or her goals without the 
limitations imposed by consideration of poor health, the disabled person has to 
gauge his/her goals by considering the limitations imposed by a chronic condition, 
and then doing a reasonable job of attaining these goals. So it is not illness itself 
that can deny one the opportunity for unhappiness, for the ifl person has the 
84 Albrecht, Devlieger, "The Disability Paradox", p. 983. 
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possibility of happiness. It is the presence of intractable pain that closes all avenues 
to enjoying life that denies one happiness. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NATURAL LAW AND BASIC GOODS: 
A GROUNDWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
PEOPLE'S NEEDS AND DECISIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the area of Christian ethics, one of the topics most attacked and defended 
is natural law. For centuries it has been considered a keystone of Catholic moral 
theology, yet it has its fair share of critics within the Catholic Church! Widely 
condemned in Protestant ethics, it has a surprising number of defenders within 
Protestant circles. ' However, while critics have been sounding natural law's death 
knell for some years now, the sustained debate and interest in natural law 
demonstrates the enduring influence this ethical theory possesses in the field of 
Christian ethics and moral philosophy. 
There are various versions of natural law. One cannot talk of Me theory of 
natural law. Any core, however, will be composed of statements of basic moral 
principles that are in some sense accessible to reason, objective and based on 
human nature? Natural law makes four basic claims. ' The first is a claim of the 
existence of an objective moral order. Morality is grounded in reality. Some actions 
are right or wrong because there exist certain moral obligations that cannot be 
created at will. This objective moral order is not a fleeting thing. The acceptance of 
an objective moral order means that once the object of an act is determined to be 
immoral, then no circumstances or intentions can make it moral. This situates 
natural law in opposition to situation ethics or voluntarism where the will of the 
'For a good summary article of Catholic opinion, see G. J. Hughes, "Natural Law Ethics and 
Moral Theology", Month, v. 20,1987, pp. 100- 103. 
2 For a good summary of Protestant thinking on natural law, see James Gustafson, Protestant and 
Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospectsfor Rapprochement, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978), pp. 80-94, or see Carl F. H. Henry, "Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture", First Thing, 
v. 49,1995, pp-54-60. 
3 D. J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law, (London: MacMillan, 1967), p. 57. 
4 Richard Gula, "Natural Law Today", Natural Law and Theology, eds. Charles E. Curran, 
Richard A. McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), pp. 382-383, and Philip S. Keane, "The 
Objective Moral Order: Reflecting on Recent Research", Theological Studies, v. 43,1982, 
pp. 260-261. 
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legislator determines what is morally right or wrong. The second characteristic of 
natural law morality is that it is in principle accessible to everyone and is 
independent of religious conviction. Anyone who reflects critically on human 
experience is able to discover natural law. This facet of natural law allows a person 
to argue about the rightness of an action without resorting to religious insight. 
Without this characteristic, the existence of an objective moral order is meaningless. 
This claim does not assert that the person has moral knowledge and understands his 
or her obligation in every case. Rather, it claims that we have the ability to know the 
moral order and that our moral obligation is to act on this knowledge. This 
characteristic of natural law places it in opposition to a divine command morality as 
exemplified by Barth who insisted on access to divine revelation in order to 
understand the ethical thing to do. ' The third characteristic of natural law is that it 
can be universalised. Ethical teaching based on natural law can be addressed to any 
person of goodwill because natural law teaching is about humans in general. If an 
action is objectively morally evil, that very same action will always be objectively 
morally evil for all people. The fourth claim is that humans do not always actualise 
their fundamental ability to know the objective moral order. Sometimes, with or 
without culpability, people will fail to know the objective moral order on a given 
point or fail to be free enough to act on this knowledge. This failure does not allow 
the community to weaken its moral norms. 
Natural law is important to this dissertation because it is the foundation of 
the virtues. ' The virtues are important because they help form one's character. 
5 Karl Barth, "The Christian under the Universal Lordship of God the Father", Church 
Dogmatics, v. 3, sec. 49, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), pp. 239-288. 
6 Vernon Bourke, "Is Thomas Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist? ", The Monist, v. 58,1974, pp. 52- 
66. Bourke argues that Aquinas is not a natural law ethicist. Aquinas writes only a small amount 
on the natural law and this is placed only after much of the work on ethics 
had been written. 
Prior to the section on natural law, all Aquinas's ethics is based on the right use of reason. 
Aquinas is, therefore, an ethicist based in right reason. However, it can equally be argued that 
Aquinas's ethical theory is based in the natural law. All of Aquinas's ethics presupposes a 
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One's character is important because it plays a large role in determining if one is 
happy in one's fife. Through the habituation of making correct choices, the virtues 
transform the character of the moral agent. Natural law acts as a guide for 
determining which sorts of actions fulfil human nature. The virtues express natural 
law in human actions. Hence, in the context of chronic illness, the dissertation 
must examine natural law to ascertain what goods promote human flourishing. 
Then, when it is understood what basic goods are threatened by chronic Mness, the 
virtues which promote the specific basic goods affected by chronic Mness must be 
addressed, which wiU be done in chapter five. 
There are too many schools of thought in natural law theory to be discussed 
in this chapter. It is not the intent of this chapter to engage in a 'current state of 
the topic' discussion on natural law. After the introduction, a brief overview of 
natural law and its current state will be given at the beginning of this chapter. Only 
two schools of thought relevant to this dissertation will be addressed in depth; the 
natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas and; the basic goods theory of Grisez- 
Boyle-Finnis (GBF). ' The conclusion will highlight some of the relevance of 
natural law and basic goods for the fifth chapter, on applying the virtues to patients 
with chronic iRness. 
The third chapter dealt with the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas. Similarly, 
the first part of this fourth chapter will examine the natural law theory of Aquinas. 
As was stated above, a chapter on natural law is necessary because the dissertation 
argues that natural law is the foundation upon which the virtues rest. There must 
be some basis for deciding what makes an action virtuous and desirable and another 
natural law approach, because right reason is natural law. One can argue that this 
is why the 
section on natural law is so small, because natural law was presupposed as the 
basis and hence 
there was no necessity to fully develop what was already known. 
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action vicious and loathesome. As was shown in the previous chapter, this basis 
natural law. An action that promotes and is in line with the natural law is a virtuous 
action. One that deforms and destroys the natural law is a vicious action. However, 
as will be seen in sections on 'Momistic natural law, his theory suffers from a lack of 
specificity. Aquinas is quite clear on the primary precepts of natural law 
(la2ae. 94.2. ) but does not adequately address the secondary and tertiary precepts 
that give more content and specificity to the morality of human actions. The result 
is an interminable discussion in Thomistic studies over the secondary and tertiary 
precepts of natural law which makes it very confusing to apply to moral action. The 
lack of clarity and consensus over the issue makes it difficult to apply Thorýnistic 
natural law to this dissertation. Instead, I will use the basic goods theory of GBF. 
The basic goods theory is heavily indebted to Aquinas and offers two 
advantages over Thornistic theory of natural law. Firstly, it does not become 
bogged down in eternal debate over the content of secondary and tertiary precepts 
of natural law. Secondly, it is more 'user-friendly'in that it prescribes seven definite 
basic goods that are easy for most people to apply to moral evaluation! Criticism 
of the basic goods theory will be discussed in the section on basic goods. The 
discussion of criticism serves to highlight some of the weaknesses of the basic 
goods theory and at the same time allows a better understanding of important 
aspects of the theory. The basic goods theory will serve as the basis for 
' GBF will be used in referring to the basic goods theory when referring to the writings of only 
one or two of the authors because the three authors develop the same theory, writing either 
together, in pairs, or singly. 
8 This is not to say that the basic goods debate does not suffer from controversy of its own. A 
debate, at times very acrimonious, has been continuing for over three decades between supporters 
of a basic goods approach to moral analysis and those of the proportionalist school. 
Proportionalists, do not necessarily disagree with the basic goods themselves. This debate will be 
discussed later in the section on the basic goods. The dissertation recognises that the theory is 
not perfect, but valid enough for this thesis. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the 
basic goods theory is extremely helpful in that it provides an easy-to-understand criterion for 
comprehending how chronic illness affects people's pursuit of the good life. 
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understanding what aspects of a chronicaUy M patient's life are diminished and 
which virtues can serve to aid the person in pursuing happiness. 
NATURAL LAW BACKGROUND 
There are as many schools of natural law, such as intuitionism, legalism, 
physicalism, rationalism?, as there are objections to it, such as that only divine law is 
authentic, all law is positive law, all law is culture-conditioned tradition, 
evolutionary, the self-interest of the mighty, or the invention of the weak. " Some 
liberal theologians object to natural law on the grounds that it is static, 'essentialist', 
leading to idolatry of rules and principles when in fact a Christian should five in the 
freedom of the Spirit and the Gospel rather than in 'slavery'to the law. " Some 
conservative theologians are ill-at-ease with what they perceive as a creeping 
secularism that would hand Christian ethics over to moral philosophy, fearing that 
the foundations of modern moral philosophy are too vague and uncertain to 
provide security for the needs of Christianity's teaching. " Protestants tend to reject 
the concept of natural law because they view natural law as describing the original 
state of humanity before the Fall. Because they view sin as having brought about 
the total corruption of everything human, reason can no longer serve as a source of 
ethical knowledge. " The evangelical theologian Carl Henry writes that: 
Protestant critics contend that the derivation of natural law from what is 
inherent in human nature implies that God and the supernatural are 
irrelevant to moral knowledge, and moreover that the theory does not take 
sufficient cognizance of the episterrL impact of sin upon the life of man. " 
9 For a sunu-nary of these schools of thought, refer to Michael B. Crowe, "The Pursuit of 
Natural 
Law", Natural Law and Theology. eds. Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 199 1), pp. 299-233. 
10 Henry, "Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture", p. 54. 
11 Hughes, "Natural Law Ethics and Moral Theology", p. 100. 
12 Ibid, p. 100. 
13 David Bohr, Catholic Moral Traditions; In Christ, A New Creation, (Huntington, Indiana: 
Our 
Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 1990), p. 143. 
14 Henry, "Natural Law and a Nihilistic Culture", p. 54. 
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Evangelical criticism of the Thomistic doctrine of natural law states two main 
points: that it is independent of divine revelation and that it advances a belief in "a 
universally shared body or system of moral beliefs" that "human reasoning 
articulates despite the noetic consequences of the Adamic fall. "" Within 
Catholicism, there is tension between the order of nature (biological nature) versus 
the order of reason approaches to natural law. The order of nature emphasis is 
criticised for its physicalist tendencies. Physicalism identifies the human moral act 
with the physical structure of the act. " The order of nature approach tends to 
emphasise, or absolutise in the term of its critics, the physical and biological aspects 
of humans and their action and does not consider the function of human reason 
and freedom when performing moral analysis, suggesting what Gula calls a 
'blueprint' or 'maker's instructions' theory of natural law. " In the order of reason 
view of natural law, the human is not subject to the order of nature in the same 
manner as are animals. Humans do not have to conform to natural patterns as 
matters of fate. "The given physical and biological orders do not dictate moral 
obligations; rather, they provide the data and the possibilities for the human person 
to use in order to achieve human goals. "" While the natural order remains a factor 
to be considered in basing moral norms on reality, the natural order is not taken to 
be the moral order. Human beings are able to intervene to direct the natural order 
in a manner that is proportionate to fuH human development. 
Physicalism, the theory embraced by an order of nature approach to 
morality, does reveal truths about the human condition because part of what 
it is to 
" Ibid, p. 55. 
16 Richard McBrien, Catholicism, new ed., (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1994), p. 
963. 
17 Richard Gula, Reasoned Informed by Faith, (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), p. 
226. 
18 Ibid, p. 235. 
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be human is to have a body. " Physicalism's strength is that it recognises the 
giveness of human nature. Human efforts at morality must take into consideration 
the fixed character of human existence if it is to promote human well-being. Its 
weakness is that it equates the givens of human nature with the whole of human 
nature. Human nature is understood as fixed and closed, something beyond the 
control of human development. It derives its moral imperatives from bodily 
structure, excluding the totality of the person. " This critique of physicalism comes 
from a historically conscious worldview concerning natural law that claims that the 
old classicist worldview is no longer adequate. " Richard Gula, an advocate of 
proportionalism", writes that "Contemporary theology's uses of natural law is more 
19 In helping to describe physicalism, Gula cites Gerald Kelly, a leading pre-Vatican II moral 
theologian and natural law physicalist, who, in his book Medico-Moral Problems, (St. Louis: 
Catholic Hospital Association, 1958), pp. 28-29, used an analogy of a mechanic and car to better 
understand physicalism. An inventor-mechanic invents a new type of automobile and gives an 
instruction book to the owners of the new car. This book would be a list of 'do's and don'ts' 
based upon the inventor-mechanic's thorough knowledge of the machine. The inventor- 
mechanic had planned the car with a certain purpose in mind and had chosen certain materials 
and arranged them in a certain order to achieve this purpose. A second mechanic could examine 
the same car and through studying its material's arrangement and purpose, could write 
substantially the same book of instructions as the inventor-mechanic. Both inventor-mechanic 
and the second mechanic could know that the nature of the machine demands that it be operated 
in a certain way in order to accomplish its purpose. Hence, this is why Gula uses the terms 
'blueprint' or 'maker's instructions' for physicalism. Physicalism discovers moral norms 
through studying human structures and how they function in their natural state before 
intervention by human beings. Moral norms are written in human nature and can be read in 
physical properties, operations and goals of human faculties. The faculty of speech is for truth- 
telling, the reproductive organs are for the production of offspring. Human beings act morally 
when they conform their actions to the detailed patterns found in nature. An act is immoral when 
it runs contrary to nature, and frustrates a thing's natural end. Lying frustrates the final end of 
speech through not telling the truth, sterilisation frustrates the reproductive faculty that is meant 
to give life. (Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, pp. 226-227). Sexuality and medicine are the two 
areas where physicalism has been prominent. The most famous example may be Pope Paul VI's 
ban on contraception where the physical act of intercourse between husband and wife may never 
be interfered with to either avoid procreation through contraception or to promote procreation 
through artificial insemination. Any interference in the natural course of events in this act 
violates the order of nature established by God. 
20 Gula, "Natural Law Today", pp-369-372. 
21 For the best statement on this position, read Charles E. Curran, Directions in Fundamental 
Moral Theology, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp. 119-158. 
22 Proportionalism is a theory of moral analysis found within Roman Catholic moral theology that 
"refers to the relation between the specific value at stake and the premoral evils (the limitations, 
the harm, or the inconvenience) which will inevitably come about in trying to achieve that value. " 
(Gula, Reason Informed by Faith, p-273. ), Richard McCormick states that proportionate reason 
means three things: a value at least equal to that sacrificed is at stake; there is no less 
harmful 
way of protecting the value here and now; and the manner of its protection 
here and now will not 
undermine it in the long run. See Richard A McCormick, "Ambiguity 
in Moral Choice", Doing 
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historically conscious and taps into the second strand of interpretation of natural 
law, the order of reason. "" Catholic moral theology is developing the more rational 
aspect of natural law tradition. 
Prior to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, there was little over the 
validity of natural law, apart from Occam and voluntarism. However, from the 
Renaissance onward, modem philosophy has consistently moved away from the 
concept of an absolute, objective and eternal law. Instead, the concept of the 
autonomous individual gained prominence and rejected any norm of morality other 
than the prompting of one's own conscience. Liberal individualism was born. 
Following the new methods of the natural sciences, nature became viewed only as a 
matter in motion and devoid of all higher purposiveness and incapable of providing 
people with any ethical imperative. Auguste Comte proposed the theory of 
positivism in which the mature scientific position was only concerned with 
observable data. Positivism asserted three main principles: that all human thought is 
conditioned by history and therefore no norm is universally valid, that the domain 
of facts alone allows for objective certitude whereas values are only subjective, and 
that there are no objectively-founded moral values but only choices between 
adjustment to the environment or suicide. " 
Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations, eds. Richard McCormick, Paul 
Ramsey, (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978), p. 45. Proportionalism will be discussed 
further when proportionalist critiques of the basic goods theory are discussed. The use of surgery 
provides an uncomplicated example. A surgeon amputates the gangrenous arm that threatens the 
life of a patient. Losing an arm is a premoral evil that becomes a moral good when applied to its 
context of being a life-saving act. There existed proportionate reason to cause harm. The good 
resulting from the act was proportionate to or greater than the evil resulting from the act. Yet, if 
the arm could be saved through simply prescribing a course of antibiotics, then amputation 
becomes disproportionate and an act of mutilation because no proportionate reason exists for 
actualising this premoral evil. A greater proportion of evil over good occurs in this case. 
23 Gula, "Natural Law Today", p. 374. 
24 Bohr, Catholic Moral Traditions: In Christ, A New Creation, Huntington, IN: Our Sunday 
Visitor Publishing Division), p. 145. 
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This flew in the face of medieval Christian thinkers who had developed the 
scholastic theory of natural law within an Axistotelian framework. " Every natural 
individual substance possessed a nature, an essence composed of an active and 
passive principle; that being the essential form and matter. Its activity is always 
directed by its nature toward a goal that the agent need not necessarily apprehend 
consciously. This goal acted primarily to perfect the individual and the species to 
which the individual belonged. Aristotle's philosophy of nature was basically 
physicalist. In all cases there was an intelligible connection between structure and 
function, between activity and goal. The active principle through which an 
organism tends toward the perfect realisation of its specific norm is called the law of 
its nature. In general, medieval Christian thinkers took this principle of an ideal 
form for each species and placed it in a theistic setting. Each species was separately 
created by God and is a finite embodiment of an idea in the mind of God. The 
whole system, both living and inorganic substances, in all their complex unity and 
interaction, is simply the realisation in God's created order of an ideal of beauty and 
harmony known perfectly only by God. Because humans possess reason, they can 
participate in this process to a limited degree. The possession of reason makes the 
action of humans different from those of all living creation in that humans have 
freedom of choice. Any other organism acts according to its natural tendencies 
without reflection or deliberation. Humans enjoy the power to act in ways that 
correspond to the intrinsic orientation of their nature or whether to choose 
unnatural and inappropriate goals instead. Thus, for humans, natural law has a 
two-fold significance. First, it is an intrinsic ordering of our nature toward an 
ultimate goal and secondarily toward the various instrumental goals which are 
ordered to the ultimate goal themselves. Second, the natural law creates an 
25 joh-n Russell, "Teleology and the Natural Law", Month, v. 26,1993, pp. 108-111. 
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obhgation to five in such a manner as to respect this ordering and to order our Eves 
toward this goal. God's plan was not one where humans fived fives of purely 
natural perfection. Rather, human nature was meant to be raised to a higher order 
whose ultimate goal was the Beatific Vision. However, the Fall made it impossible 
of achievement unless God intervened. Adam's deliberate tum from God resulted 
in a radical disorder of human nature. 
Human nature had not been essentially changed by the Fall but had become 
so disordered that no possibility existed for living in accordance with the original 
archetype. While operating in an unredeemed humanity, the natural law could not 
achieve its purpose yet moral obligations were still imposed by natural law. Only 
God was able to undo the damage, which he did by becoming human, and in 
human nature, made atonement for human sins, thereby restoring the possibihty of 
the ultimate goal of human life, the Beatific Vision. " 
After the rise of positivism, this vision of natural law was challenged. 
Christianity was dominated by two opposing theories conceming how to 
understand the world. One was a theological interpretation based on Genesis and 
interpreted through a specifically Christian theological perspective. The other was 
based upon scientific evidence concerning the origin of humanity. " However, the 
influence of science and modem philosophy has challenged natural law for the 
better in that physicalism is less emphasised in natural law theory and the order of 
reason is now dominant. Current natural law theory tends to make use of the 
findings of philosophical anthropology, sociology, history and the rest of the social 
and behavioural sciences. Physicalism, with its belief that human nature is static and 
26 Russell, "Teleology and the Natural Law", pp. 108-111. 
27 Ibid, p. 108. 
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that moral norms are universal and timeless, has little need to avail itself of the 
findings of the modem sciences. 
THOMISTIC NATURAL LAW 
The return to reason and away from physicalism is evidence of a return to a 
truer interpretation of Thomistic theory. Aquinas's most mature statement of the 
philosophy of natural law is found in qq. 90-97 of 1a2ae of the Swrvu. Only q. 94 
deals specifically with natural law. Flis theory of natural law is simple - it states that I 
by using our reason and reflecting on our nature as human beings, general rules of 
action can be formulated. Natural law is based on principles that we grasp through 
synderesis. " By using these principles and reflecting on what fulfils people in 
general, we arrive at rules for action. Practical reason indicates how we should 
behave. Brian Davies explains it well: 
For Aquinas, the natural law is what reason tells us to do or to avoid in 
order to function well as people. It is not, he explains, a detailed Est of instructions for acting in the multitude of different circumstances in which 
people might find themselves. It is not a table of rules for acting in every 
situation. It is a framework within which people can make particular 
choices on particular occasions in particular circumstances. And for this 
reason it needs to be supplemented by sound practical reasoning, the 
working of conscience, and by what Aquinas calls 'human law', i. e. 
institutional legislation ('laws of the land) designed to promote the well- 
being of people in concrete situations. " 
Jacques Maritain identifies two basic elements in Aquinas in regard to 
natural law; the ontolo&al and the gnoseological. " The first element of natural 
law, the ontological, adxrýits that there is a human nature and that this nature is the 
28 "Synderesis is called the law of our understanding inasmuch as it is the habit of keeping the 
precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human activity. "(1 a2ae. 94.1.2. ) 
Synderesis is the name that Aquinas uses for "practical, directive, universal propositions which 
anyone is likely to have acquired in childhood, by such entirely ordinary and non-deductive 
insights. " See John Finnis, Aquinas. - Moral, Political and Legal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p. 87. 
29 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 246. 
30 Jacques Maritain, "Natural Law in Aquinas", Natural Law and Theology, eds. Charles Curran, 
Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 199 1), pp. 114-123. 
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same for all people. It is taken for granted that humans possess intelligence and can 
choose the ends that they pursue. Because humans have a nature, they have an 
ontology and, therefore, ends that of necessity correspond to their essential 
condition and are the same for all. Humans must put themselves in tune with the 
ends demanded by their human nature. There is a nature or order that human 
reason is able to discover and for which the will can order itself to act. This is 
natural law. Natural law is about discovering the normality of something's 
functioning, the proper way it should be used to achieve its fullness. We are able to 
know the primary and fundamental regulations of natural law but the remote 
conclusions we may not know and they will develop as new situations confront 
people later in history? ' This will be discussed in a later section dealing with 
primary and secondary precepts in Aquinas's natural law. 
The second element is gnoseological, about natural law as known. Tlýs 
concerns practical reason, which is the measure of human acts. All persons know 
the self-evident principle of do and pursue the good and avoid evil. Whether they 
choose to act in accordance with it is another matter. Maritain writes that this is 
"the preamble and the principle of natural law; it is not the law itself. "" Natural law 
is about the things which follow from this principle, about what to do and not to 
do. Law and knowledge of the law are two different things. Law has force only 
once it is promulgated and this comes through assertions of practical reason. 
Human reason does not discover the regulations of natural law as through 
arithmetical equations, such as geometric theorems. Nor does it discover them 
through a conceptual exercise of the intellect or by way of rational knowledge. 
Aquinas meant that the manner in which human reason comes to 
know natural law 
" lbid, pp. 115-118. 
32 lbid, p. 118. 
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is not through rational knowledge but through human inclination. It is not 
knowledge arrived at through concepts and conceptual knowledge. Rather, it is 
"obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge ... in which the intellect, in order to bear 
judgement, consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of 
abiding tendencies make present in the subject. "" Our inteRect listens to our 
inclinations, then we put practical reason to use to see if these inclinations wiU allow 
us to flourish. The precepts of natural law correspond exactly with our inclinations. 
However, natural law does not stand on its own, a law unto itself It is 
particularised by other laws. 
Aquinas's Four Types of Law 
Aquinas discusses four types of law - eternal, natural, human, and divine. 
The eternal law is how God designed the universe to operate. Aquinas states that 
God is like an artist with the things he has created in that they pre-existed in his 
mind before he made them. He is the one who governs their actions in that he 
created them to move to their ends. (la2ae. 93.1. ) The idea of the eternallawis 
imprinted on us. We know the sun exists even when we cannot see it directly but 
only perceive its fight. Likewise, with the eternal law. Only God and those around 
God in heaven know the eternal law directly but humans know it by its 
fight. (la2ae. 93.2. ) The eternal law governs the universe, so all governing ideas 
issuing from lower laws are derived from it. These laws are all part of the eternal 
law. Any law directing right reason shares to an extent in eternal law. (la2ae. 93.3. ) 
Divine law is different from eternal law. "Eternal law is the governing idea 
behind God's creation, whereas divine law arises from the Decalogue and the two 
great commandments of the New Testament ... 
divine law is ... God's way of 
33 Jbid, p. 119. 
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directing men to cling to him through love. "" Divine law aids humans in their 
conduct. Laws are meant to direct people to that for which they were made. If they 
were destined to an end not beyond their ability, they would have no need for 
anything other than natural and human law. However, eternal happiness is out of 
proportion with their ability and so divine law helps them achieve their final 
end. (la2ae. 91.4. ) 
Eternal law governs the entire universe and so natural law partakes of 
eternal law. Humans order their reason to be in harmony with the eternal law. 
Aquinas's most famous description of natural law is found in la2ae. 94.2. There he 
states that there are several precepts of natural law. Natural law is a kind of self- 
evident beginning. Practical reason first understands that every agent works for an 
end that is good. The first conunand of law is that "good is to be sought and done, 
evil to be avoided'; all other commands of natural law are based on 
this. " (la2ae. 94.2. ) Natural law conunands us to do or to avoid things that the 
practical reason recognises as being in line with or against human goods. It is a law 
of nature that all fife has a natural tendency to preserve its own being, so the natural 
law maintains and defends the basic requirements of human fife. Humans share in 
common with animals the natural tendency to mate and rear their offspring. As for 
humanity's rational nature, it is unique to humans alone. It is proper for humans to 
seek to know God, and to Eve in society. (la2ae. 94.2. ) 
As for answering the question of whether natural law is the same for all, 
Aquinas is quite definite in his answer. He states that in questions of theory, truth is 
the same for all people in regard to both general principles and specific conclusions. 
34 Peter Redpath, "Classifying the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas", The Medieval Tradition of 
Natural Law, ed. Harold Johnson, (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Medieval Institute Publication, 1987), 
p. 143. 
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However, concerning questions of action, things are different. Ever*dy is the 
same concerning general principles of truth. As for specific conclusions, the more 
we descend from the general principle, the more we adrnit of exceptions so we have 
to hedge things with qualifications and cautions. (la2ae. 94.4. ) This leads into a 
controversy in Aquinas that deserves further investigation and wifl ýe addressed in 
the following section on secondary and remote conclusions of natural law. 
Human law is designed to check human over-assertiveness, safeguard the 
innocent from the unruly by threat of punishment and help promote virtue and 
peace. (la2ae. 95.1. ) The natural law is the basis of human law. There is an abyss 
between the universal principles of natural law and the infinitely complex detail of 
particular acts. No individual reflection can cross it - the mission of human law is to 
close it. Human laws have no principle of their own to invoke, but merely apply 
natural law. The person who spontaneously follows natural law is predisposed to 
acknowledge human law and willingly receive it. The vicious person is embarrassed 
by human law while the just person follows it with such a spontaneity that it is as if 
the civil law did not exist for him or her. " 
Primary and Secondary Precepts 
The problem of the abyss between universal precepts of natural law and the 
complex detail of particular acts does not only refer to human law, but to the 
secondary and remote precepts of natural law itself. In the important work, Piinwy 
x7d Sxmdvy Pfiwoles in Thwukk Natural Law Tead)ing, R. A. Armstrong addresses 
three questions: what natural law precepts are self-evident, what are the 
relationships between prinuty, secondary, and tertiary precepts and what 
kind of 
35 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSt. Thomas Aquinas, (London: Victor Gallancz, 
Ltd., 1957), p. 267. 
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variability, if any, is involved in natural law? ' He surveys the scholarship in the field 
and writes that there are three basic positions that writers occupy concerning natural 
law. The first is that natural law is linýted to a few general and self-evident precepts 
that are unchangeable. Natural law does not provide a solution to questions but 
rather gives the foundation or direction to arrive at a particular solution. The 
responsibility then moves to positive law to find a concrete particular solution. The 
writers of this school, such as Viktor Cathrein and Louis Le Fur affirm that there 
are several precepts but never really specify what these precepts are. " 
The second position is that the natural law is composed of general precepts 
which also contain specific precepts that can be arrived at only after rational 
reflection. One has to expect that as society grows, it learns more about what 
actions are good or bad. Joseph Fuchs calls this process of development and 
adaptation 'historicity'. " Jacques LeClerq believed that there were a very few 
primary precepts of immediate evidence. " Yet, our moral experience when 
considered in the fight of these primary precepts, gives us secondary precepts that 
are part of natural law. These secondary precepts are few in number also. Natural 
law is seen as unchangeable while the content of natural law progresses. This 
progress occurs in two ways - we come to realise what is in natural law, then the 
natural law is diversified into positive laws. While peoples'knowledge of natural 
law develops and becomes more informed, natural law itself does not vary. Maritain 
holds that any precepts seen by natural law as being in accordance with human 
36 R. A. Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) p. 19. Armstrong's own thesis is that natural law is usually 
binding on most individuals but sometimes admits of exceptions and will undergo a 
form of 
change from age to age. Central to the discussion of changing norms concerning natural 
law is 
an understanding of primary and secondary precepts. 
37 Ibid, pp. 1-7. 
38 Ibid, p. 163. 
39 Ibid, p. 8. 
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nature belong to the content of natural law, whether it is general or specific, grasped 
easily or with much reflection. ' 
The final position is held by those writers who believe that while general 
principles are invariable, the more specific secondary principles admit of some 
exceptions. The general invariable and specific variable precepts school believes 
that natural law is invariable concerning its primary, fundamental principles. 
However, the application of the primary principles is not invariable. What satisfies 
an appetite in one circumstance may not satisfy that same appetite in another 
circumstance. The content of natural law is determined by circumstances. So 
secondary precepts change with a set of circumstances. The presence of a certain 
set of circumstances is enough to change the morality of a given action. " The more 
remote and further from the primary principle, the more variable the secondary 
principle can be. Dom Odon Lottin believes that we are to place in natural law all 
that natural reason states is in accord with human reason. Lottin held that all 
actions bad in themselves run counter to natural law whereas all actions good in 
themselves and necessary for maintaining the moral order are in accordance with 
natural law. It makes no difference whether it is a general or specific precept. 
Lottin insists on a link between the general and specific conclusion. " He 
understands there to be three grades of precept in Aquinas's theory - primary 
precepts, conclusions that are necessarily connected with these, and the more 
remote conclusions derived from these. He believes Aquinas was willing to admit 
conclusions that were very close to general precepts. Lottin states that we can 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, pp. 14-19. 
42 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
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consider these as more immediate references than as conclusions and he allows for 
the possibility that secondary precepts are variable. " 
An-nstrong believes that Lottin echoes Aquinas the most closely. The 
Thorrýistic distinction between primary and secondary natural law precepts is found 
in la2ae 94.4-6,100aal-3,11 of the Sunvm Aquinas believed that human reason 
proceeded from the general to the particular and this is echoed in the division of 
precepts. Knowledge of the more general is prior to knowledge of the more 
particular. We consider the concept animal before we consider classifying the animal 
into a specific species. We understand the concept of bird prior to fonnulating the 
concept of sparrow. We have indistinct knowledge before we have distinct 
knowledge. A hazy feeling of general un-wellness precedes coming down with a 
cold. Similarly, the intellect grasps first the more universal concepts of good before 
the less universal. So the self-evident propositions are first noticed. The first 
principle of practical reason is the universal and non-specific 'do and pursue good 
and avoid evil. ' Natural law deals with human actions in a very general way before 
becoming concerned with more specific precepts. These more specific precepts are 
derived from the more general precepts. " 
One may use the analogy of formal and material norms to understand how 
the intellect understands first the more universal concepts of good before the less 
universal. Formal norms point to moral values which must be pursued and which 
indicate attitudes that we should cultivate. They impart to one the 'form'that one's 
conduct should take, such as 'Do good and avoid evil'. Formal norms are vague 
and almost devoid of specific content and proclaim goals rather than tactics. They 
state that one should be honest, respectful of others, truthful, not to steal or 
43 lbid, pp. 19-20. 
44 lbid, pp. 81-91. 
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murder. These norms are absolute and universal. 45 Material norms tell one what 
one should do, offering infonnation and direction. More specificity is offered - do 
not take what does not belong to you, do not take the fife of an innocent person, be 
truthful in your dealings with others. " The general idea that it is desirable to be 
good and to avoid evil first occurs. This formal norm offers no real guidance in the 
daily life of the person except to act as an exhortation. What is needed is more 
specificity, so the intellect moves to the less universal concepts of the good, those 
more remote from the formal concept. The intellect wrestles with how to 
implement the formal principle to the context of fife lived in the present, when 
action must be taken. So 'do and pursue good and avoid evil'must be applied 
through material norms to a present circumstance. 
The first grade of natural law precept is the primary precepts which are 
composed of general, formal precepts such as do good, avoid evil, and act with 
reason. These precepts are very remote, abstract and divorced from the varying 
circumstances of everyday life. The general precepts are composed of conclusions 
that must necessarily follow from the primary precepts. Such is the Decalogue. 
These precepts deal with actions that are means for attaining our final end and are 
what Aquinas calls secondary precepts. The third division is the remote precept or 
what Aquinas calls remote conclusions. These are not known to all people nor are 
they the same for all people. They vary with the varying circumstances and person's 
intent and, therefore, these remote precepts cannot be uniformly legislated. 
45Richard Gula, What are They Saying about Moral Norms?, (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 
pp. 55-57. 46 lbid, p. 59. 
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Natural Inclinations 
The role of natural inclinations is important to Aquinas's precepts of natural 
law. All creatures seek something. They are all inclined to certain things. Aquinas 
believed that inclinations exist because of a need, a desire to fiH out something 
rnissing. A thing will move out of necessity toward what fulfils it. There exist 
several areas of necessity. Natural necessity is the necessity of a stone falling to the 
ground. Hypothetical necessity belongs to sensitive creatures. This necessity arises 
only when a creature recognises something as necessary, pleasing or useful. 
Rational necessity is experienced by humans and is entirely different. The will, 
being our principle of movement, has only one necessity and that is to move toward 
the good in general rather than any particular good. Through use of reason, the will 
can choose among the various particularities that appeal to the sensitive faculty. So 
we can say that there is a necessity for the good in general but there is not a- 
necessity for this or that particular good. Natural inclinations provide the 
foundation and direction for knowledge of self-evident principles of natural law. 
The problem then becomes enumerating the natural inclinations of humans and 
determining with which ethical principles such inclinations align themselves. " 
The first basic inclination of people is self-preservation, an inclination A 
livIng things share. Very few writers state the principle which corresponds with this 
inclination. It is usually said that it is simply a self-evident natural law precept or 
fundamental immediately known principle. Armstrong writes "white recognising 
that not all beings have equal value in the world of creation, one ought to respect 
and preserve not only human fife, but where possible, all fife. "" 
47 Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching, pp. 42-46. 
48 Ibid, p. 48. 
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The second principle is one that we also share with animals - sexual union 
and care of ensuing offspring. Again, very few authors name this principle. 
Maritain writes that the principle should be formulated as "sexual intercourse has to 
be contained within given firnitations" and that it is a self-evident principle which 
declares that people who are "aware that it is through sexual intercourse that 
children come into existence, cannot help but see that the action in question has a 
dignity and significance which renders it entirely different from other pleasures of 
fife which may without hann be casually indulged in. "" As for raising family, 
Maritain suggests that the family group has to align themselves with some 
established pattern. There needs to be some arrangement in the family for children 
to be nursed, cared for and educated. " 
Concerning God, Aquinas writes that "man has a natural inclination to 
know the truth about God, and to five in society. " (la2ae. 94.2. ) This is a 
controversial statement because it is not self-evident that God exists. Most 
contemporary natural law authors simply repeat Aquinas's words and reflect on this 
inclination no more. Maritain puts the principle as "We are bound to look at the 
Invisible. "" As for the inclination to five together in groups, it is in every rational 
person 5s capacity to see that we must live together in a group called society, if for no 
other reason than for health and well-being. From recognising that we need society, 
we recognise that we need rules for society. Maritain puts it "We are bound to five 
together under certain rules and prohibitions. 
1152 
However, concerning precepts of natural law, Aquinas never gets much 
clearer than these four statements. Hence the discussion over primary precepts, 
49 lbid, p. 48. 
so Ibid, p. 49. 
5' lbid, p. 50. 
52 ibid, p. 50. 
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secondary precepts and remote conclusions that has marked natural law discussion. 
A current natural law theory that does provide such specificity is the subject of 
much discussion. This is the basic goods theory of Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle 
and John Finnis. This theory offers a very clear picture of precepts of natural law, 
listing seven basic goods that fulfil people. This theoxy is heavily indebted to 
Aquinas and takes Aquinas one step further. The basic goods are listed and little 
room is left for doubt over the precepts of natural law. By utilising this theory in 
the dissertation, one may sidestep the interminable discussion over the primý, 
secondary and remote precepts of natural law. One is left with a clear view of what 
it is that fulfils a person and allows one then to apply this picture to those suffering 
from chronic illness to understand what areas of their fives are affected by their 
Mnesses. 
THE BASIC GOODS THEORY OF GRISEZ-BOYLE-FINNIS 
Practical reason was discussed throughout the section on Aquinas. It is 
Aquinas's treatment of practical reason in regard to natural law that is the genesis 
for the development of the Grisez-Boyle-Finnis (GBF) basic goods theory. " The 
theory originates in the early 1960's, when Grisez was reacting against ethical- 
political thought that does not believe that free choice exists. He was critical of 
theories that argued that human action was formed through the consideration of 
determinants of outward behaviour that analyses efficient means to bring about a 
desired state of affairs. He believed that these theories held two things. First, that 
moral judgements be made on a cost-benefit analysis and second, that psychological 
determinism was the guiding factor in making moral judgements. Psychological 
53 The basic goods will be discussed in its own section. To note them, they are human 
life, 
knowledge and appreciation of beauty and good fulfilling us as intelligent beings, playful 
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determinism held that people do make their own choices but they choose the option 
that they wiH beheve best serve their purposes. GBF write that: 
this sort of determinism is falsified by the experience of making any morally 
significant choice: no option appears unqualifiedly better or best; rather, interesting options offer and threaten diverse and incommensurable benefits 
and harms. And just as it falsifies psychological determinism, the 
incommensurability of benefits and harms precludes morally evaluating 
options for choice by comparing them with respect to prospective benefits 
and harms so as to determine which is likely to bring about the better or best (or less bad and least bad) overall results. " 
Psychological determinism is at great odds with the belief of GBF that: 
human knowledge about the natural order, the order that reason in no way 
makes, includes both the knowledge that there are irreducible starting points 
of morally practical knowledge, acts of the will specified by them, and free 
choices; and knowledge identifying these principles and elements of the 
moral order. " 
The First Principle of Practical Reason 
The article that continued the seeds of the basic goods theory was Grisez's "The 
16 First Principle of Practical Reason", published in Nabffal Law Fown in 1965. 
Grisez does not examine the whole of Aquinas's natural law theory, but only the 
first principle of practical reason, which Grisez understands to be that good is to 
be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. In la2ae. 94.2., Aquinas discusses 
the first principle of practical reason and asks if natural law is composed of one or 
of many precepts, a topic Grisez notes is overlooked by many authors. " He argues 
that Aquinas concludes that there are many precepts of natural law. There are 
many precepts because there are many objects of human inclinations, which are 
activities and skilful performances or work, self-integration (inner peace), peace of conscience, 
P eace with neighbours and friends, and peace with God. 
4' Ibid, p. 214. 
55 Ibid, p. 214. 
56 Germain G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason", Natural Law Forum, v. 10,1965, 
pp. 168-196. This is also republished in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony 
Kenny, (London: MacMillan, 1969), pp. 340-382. References to this article are taken from 
Kenny's collection. 
57 Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason", p. 341. 
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viewed by reason as ends for rational efforts. This leads to distinct nomis for 
action. This does not mean natural law is divided. It is one because each object of 
inclination obtains its role because it is subject to practical reason's action of 
prescribing how ends should be attained. The many precepts of natural law are 
unified in their relation to the primary principle. Aquinas regards practical reason 
as the mind performing a certain role or functioning in a certain capacity which is 
directed to action. "It is the mind charting what is to be, not merely recording 
what already is. "" 
Grisez affirms that we should understand that the object of practical reason 
is first to be understood as being an object of tendency. Practical reason's first step 
is to direct works in order to pursue an end. A sign of this first step is to be able to 
say that one acted on purpose, with intentionality. " The concept of end is key to 
understanding Aquinas and natural law. Using the primary principle of 'do and 
pursue the good and avoid evil', reason reflects on human experience where natural 
inclinations point to goods appropriate in themselves. Reason takes these as good 
not because they were given but because the good which appeals to reason is 
intelligible and contains inclinations to prospective ends. Reason directs us to 
possible actions, these possible patterns of human inclination are determined by 
natural indinations. " 
The first principle of practical reason directs toward ends which make 
human action possible; by virtue of the first principles are fon-ned precepts 
that represent every aspect of human nature. Together these principles 
open to man all the fields in which he can act; rational direction insures that 
action will be fruitful and that life will be as productive and satisfying as 
possible. Whatever man may achieve, his action requires at least a remote 
basis in the tendencies that arise from human nature. " 
58 Ibid, p. 350. 
59 lbid, pp. 354-355. 
60 lbid, pp. 356-358. 
61 lbid, p. 372. 
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Grisez concludes his article by clauning that Aquinas's position does not 
hold that certain kinds of action must be done because they fulfil our inclinations 
or fulfil divine commands. The true position of Aquinas is that humans are 
capable of thinking for themselves in the practical domain because humans 
naturally form a set of principles whose function is to make possible all of our 
actions. " One can see the basis of a basic goods theory present in this writing. 
'Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends' 
In 1987, the latest version of the basic goods theory, "Practical Principles, 
Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends" was published in A nxriam Joumal oflun4rudaim" 
The point of the article was that the basic goods are the reasons for which people 
act. The theory is that basic goods fulfil people. The authors do not believe that 
there is a single natural end of human fife. Basic goods are the reason for our 
acting. They serve as principles of action because they are the ultimate rational 
grounds which propose that we act in certain ways to achieve certain benefits. 'Me 
basic goods are diverse, because of the inherent complexities of human nature. 
Basic goods are reasons with no further reasons. They are primary principles and 
as prunary principles, basic goods of diverse categories are inconunensurable with 
one another. We are to act for the basic goods and avoid what opposes the basic 
goods. In this theory, virtues are character traits which organise the various aspects 
of the complex human personality. When these various aspects are properly 
ordered by the virtues, harmony is introduced and this harmony among feeling, 
performance, choice, etc., is the realisation of the basic goods. Obtaining the 
virtues leads us toward the ideal of integral human fulfilment, which is the 
62 Ibid, p. 381. 
63 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", pp. 99-15 1. 
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realisation, as far as is possible, of all the basic goods acting in complete harmony. 
This ideal is happiness. Although integral human fulfilment is not the reason we 
choose what we choose, the basic goods are the ultimate ends. No single reason 
exists for why we choose what we choose. The diverse basic goods allow us to 
express our diverse and complex human nature. Everyone should have an ultimate 
end by which they organise their lives, such as being a good parent or being the 
best possible teacher, nun, or physician that one can be. Such a conurýtment to 
this end falls short of integral human fulfilment, but it does offer the most 
realisable happiness in human life. GBF believe faith and conunitment to God is 
the best commitment in order to become happy. 
In order to understand the theory, one needs to distinguish between the first 
principles of practical reasoning and the first principles of morality. The first 
principle of practical reason is to do and pursue good and avoid evil. The first 
principle of morality, to love God and to love your neighbour as yourself, is 
derived from the first principle of practical reason and articulates its command to 
do and pursue the good and avoid evil. Practical reasoning has two phases - one 
that deals with what can be done and this is the principle of practical reasoning, the 
other phase is about what we should do and this is about the principles of morality. 
The first principles of practical reason are about doing and pursuing good and 
avoiding evil. It is a directive for action and not a description of good or evil. Ihe 
first principle of practical reasoning is specified through discovering the forms of 
human flourishing which are the goods that the first principle states we should 
pursue. GBF argue that there are seven goods that serve as starting points 
for 
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considering what may be done. " Elsewhere, Grisez writes that the basic principle 
of morality should be formulated as: 
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to 
them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those 
possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human 
fulfilment. " 
Integral human fulfilment is not a basic good along the side of the other basic 
goods, nor is it a super-basic good, nor a synthesis of goods. It is an ideal whose 
attractiveness derives from all the goods that appeal to humans and which serve as 
reasons for acting. Integral human fulfilment is an ideal that guides people in 
making choices by directing them to avoid unnecessarily limiting themselves and 
maintaining openness to A goods. It is the object of a good wiH and of unfettered 
human reason. " One may act immorally by not only willing that evil should be 
done but also by ignoring, slighting, or rejecting human goods. One does this by 
acting out of solely emotional reasons, disregarding reason or by acting in any way 
so as to arbitrarily liniit any person's participation in the basic goods. 
The Basic Goods 
GBF seek to identify all the basic goods of humans. What is of importance 
to this dissertation is the category of basic goods. James Hanink summarises the 
basic goods as: 
central components of the human person, especially the person as 
developing and flourishing. To be 'basic' in this context, means at least this 
much: the moral teleology of human agency is about the promotion and 
respect of these goods. It means, too, one cannot intentionally attack or 
demean such goods without attacking the human person whose flourishing 
64William May, "Germain Grisez on Moral Principles and Moral Norms: Natural and Christian", 
Natural Law and Moral Inquiry. - Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the 
Works of Germain 
Grisez, ed. Robert P. George, (Washington: Georgetown University 
Press, 1998), p. 8. 
65Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 186. 
66 William May, An Introduction ofMoral Theology, revised ed., (Huntington, Indiana: 
Our 
Sunday Visitor Publication Division, 1994), p. 76. 
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consists in their realisation. " 
William May writes that GBF "hold that these goods can be distinguished 
by noticing the assumptions implicit in the practical reasoning of ordinary people, 
by considering the 'ends' or 'purposes' for whose sake people ultimately engage in 
various activities. 
, 68 
GBF believe that there is no proof that a basic good is actuaUy a basic good, 
however, there are indicators for holding such a belief Any basic good is cross- 
culturally attractive to humans and plays a central role in their lives as humans. 
Basic goods are recognised through a fundamental moral insight. It is a conviction 
built into our moral understanding. While one cannot prove that friendship, work 
or play is a basic good, a reflective person will realise it as such. " 
Aquinas meant to be iflustrative rather than exhaustive, with his Est of 
goods. While Aquinas listed goods, such as self-preservation and procreation, 
living in conununity, or knowing God, he tended to use expressions such as "and 
the like' and 'things of this kind". " Hence the confusion and debate of secondary 
and tertiary precepts of natural law. The aim of GBF is to identify explicitly all of 
these goods, while realising that it is probably impossible. They write that the most 
direct way of discovering the basic goods is to consider actions and then ask why a 
person performs such an action and why would a person do such an action. 
Persistent questioning in this manner will uncover a small number of diverse basic 
goods: 
The diversity of the basic goods is neither a mere contingent fact about 
human psychology nor an accident of history ... Rather, being aspects of 
the fulfilment of persons, these goods correspond to the inherent 
67 James G. Hanink, "A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy", The Thomist, v. 52, 
1988, p. 225. 
68 May, An Introduction ofMoral Theology, p. 70. 
69 Hanink, "A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy", p. 226. 
70 May, An Introduction ofMoral Theology, p. 48. Refer to Aquinas, la2ae. 94.2. for examples of 
his list. 
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complexities of human nature, as it is manifested both in individuals and in 
various forms of community. " 
The basic goods provide basic reasons for acting in that they are 
foundational aspects of human flourishing. As such, the basic goods belong to 
humans as part of their very nature. The basic goods come to be understood 
through the mind working inductively from data of inclination and experience. 
They are not derived from a theoretically constructed anthropology of human 
beings, stating that this is what should fulfil human beings, given our concept of 
the human. The basic goods are not inferred by propositions concerning human 
nature but instead are self-evident. They are derived through reflection on what 
the human person is inclined to and what past experience has shown to fulfil the 
human person. " They are contained in seven categories which are divided into 
two types of good. People engage in these goods for no other reason than to 
engage in them. The goods themselves are the points of human activity. The 
activities are the ends for which humans act. Substantive goods are goods that 
provide reasons that can stand by themselves and are goods in which everyone 
shares. These are: 
1) Human life itself, including health, bodily integrity and the raising and 
education of children. 
2) Knowledge and appreciation of beauty and goods that fulfils us as 
intelligent beings. 
3) Playful activities and skilful work fulfilling us at the same time as both 
bodily and intelligent beings. " 
71 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", p. 107. 
72 Robert George, Making Men Moral: Civic Liberties and Public Morality, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), pp. 12-13. 
73 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", p. 107, and May, 
Introduction to Moral Theology, p. 70. The wording and understanding of these basic goods are a 
cross between GBF's list and May's summary listed in Introduction to 
Moral Theology, p. 70, 
which gives an easier to understand definition than GBF's work. 
For anyone looking for a good 
secondary description of GBF's theory, May and Hanink are the 
best favourable commentators. 
GBF have recently decided upon an eight basic good, which is marriage. 
However, this has yet 
to appear in print and will be considered under the 
basic good of human life and the transmission 
of life. (Discussion with Joseph Boyle, September 
11,1999) The reasoning which leads them to 
conclude that marriage is a separate 
basic good may be found in chapter nine, "Marriage, Sexual 
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The second set of basic goods have harmony as a common theme and are 
fisted as reflexive or existential goods. " These goods fulfil people in that they are 
human beings capable of making free choices and capable of good and evil. The 
four goods are: 
4) Self-integration or inner peace, which creates a harmony among one's judgements, feelings, and choices. 
5) Peace of conscience and consistency between one's thoughts and one's deeds. One externally acts out the harmony of one's inner peace. 6) Peace with neighbours, friendships and a harmony arising from justice 
among individuals and groups. 
7) Peace with God or some more-than-human source. 
75 
John Finnis gives a more extended account of the goods in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights. " Human fife corresponds with the drive for self-preservation and 
is concerned with all aspects of fife that puts a human being in the position to be 
self-determining. He writes that "fife here includes bodily (including cerebral) 
health, and freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or 
injury. ))77 It also includes organising society in such as way that people's safety is 
looked after: possessing medical facilities, public road comnýissions, food standards 
committees, etc., and the transmission of fife and its nurturing. The basic good of 
knowledge is concerned with acquiring knowledge for its own sake and not merely 
as an instrumental means. Finnis believes that 'speculative knowledge', in the sense 
of knowledge being sought for its own sake, would be a more descriptive term. 
Acts and Family Life" of Germain Grisez's The Way of Our Lord Jesus: Living a Christian Life, 
v. 2, (Quincy, Illinois: Franciscan Press, 1983), pp. 553-752. 
74 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", p. 107. 
75 Ibid, pp. 107-108. 
76 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 81-99. 
This book was first published in 1980, before the GBF account of the basic goods theory had 
reached its present form. Up to this point, the list of the basic goods varied slightly from author 
to author and year to year. Hence, Finnis lists 'play' and not 'work'; 'appreciation of beauty' is 
listed as 'aesthetic experience' and is separate from 'knowledge'; 'peace with neighbours, friends 
and community' is listed as 'friendship' and; 'peace between one's conscience and consistency 
between one's thoughts and deeds' appears to come under 'practicable reasonableness'. 
77 Ibid, p. 86. 
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There are things that we are curious about and which satisfy us when we find the 
answer, and for no other reason than we are curious beings. " Play is an irreducible 
part of human culture and is undertaken for its own sake. No further reason is 
needed to engage in play because play in and of itself is fulfilling for a human 
being. Appreciation of aesthetic experience does not necessarily involve an action 
of one's own but can constitute the inner appreciation of a beautiful fonn outside 
oneself. Oftentimes though, the experience sought involves the creation or active 
appreciation of some work of significant beauty. Friendship and sociability 
involves acting for the sakes of a friend's interests and well-being. This is not the 
type of friendship which involves instrumental means, where one is friends with 
someone because it is to one's advantage, but is the type of friendship where one 
likes the other for the other's personality. Practicable reasonableness involves 
bringing one's intelligence to bear on problems involving one's actions, lifestyle, 
and personality. This involves both an internal aspect where one strives to brings 
one 9s emotions and habits into harmony with an inner peace of mind and an 
external aspect where one attempts to make one's external action realise one's 
internal character. The final good is religion, where one tries to order one's fife 
into a harmony with the origin of the universal order of creation. " 
There is no hierarchy among the basic goods. The goods are good in 
irreducibly different senses and it cannot be said that one is meaningfully better 
than another. Whenever a basic good is at stake, it takes priority in moral 
consideration. In this sense the basic goods are part of a hierarchy. They stand 
over instrumental goods which do not perfect the person, over sensible goods that 
fulfil only the sentient nature of people, and over any morafly wrong action 
in that 
78 lbid, pp. 60-61. 
79 lbid, pp. 86-90. 
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a right action perfects the individual and community. " However, while there is no 
hierarchy among the basic goods themselves, this does not mean that there is 
disorder among them. "Prior to anyone's choice, unfettered practical reason, 
together with the conditions which human nature inevitably sets for moral life, 
establish certain natural priorities among a good person's basic interests. "" Life 
presents a person with choices that help shape his or her commitments. A married 
couple raising children have many of their objectives, conmitments and actions 
already determined. Living according to the plan of fife they have chosen and 
enjoying the benefits of doing so is a significant part of the happiness which the 
couple have chosen to pursue. 
Modes of Responsibility 
In attaining the basic goods, there are what Grisez caUs 'modes of 
responsibihty'. Hanink summarises these modes: 
(1) We should promote the basic goods, even if we do not feel inclined to 
do so. 
(2) We should promote the basic goods, when reasonable, in a cooperative 
way. 
(3) We should promote the basic goods rather than merely satisfying our 
own desires. 
(4) We should not be blocked by our emotions from promoting the basic 
goods. 
(5) We should promote the basic goods fairly. 
(6) We should not be blocked by emotions from pursuing a more perfect 
realisation of the basic goods. 
(7) We should not, out of hostility, attack a basic good. 
(8) We should not, out of a greater desire for one good, attack another basic 81 
good. 
80 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", pp. 137-139. 
81 Ibid, p. 139. 
82 Hanink, "A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy", p. 228. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I am not interested in the modes of responsibility, which I consider to be the second 
part of the basic goods theory. I am simply interested in the list of the 
basic goods themselves. It 
is this second part of the basic goods theory that causes bitter debate among 
Catholic moral 
theologians. However, the list of the basic goods themselves do not appear to cause much 
controversy. 
140 
These modes of response to the basic goods order our pursuit of attaining 
integral human fulfilment. They act as intermediate principles flowing from the 
first Principle of morality. These modes of responsibility allow one to achieve 
specific moral norms. GBF believe it necessary to clarify Aquinas's thought on 
natural law, to make explicit what he held implicitly. They state that Aquinas 
included modes 5,6,8 in his injunctions. The modes of responsibility allow one 
more accuracy in showing how precepts become more specific. The modes of 
responsibility are normative principles that have more specificity than the first 
principle of morality. Yet they are more general than specific moral norms that 
identify types of human choices as morally good or bad. Specific moral norms are 
discovered through consideration of the ways that a proposed action relates a 
person's will to basic goods, and by considering such proposed human action in 
light of the first principle of morality. " The specific moral norm of not 
intentiona. Hy kiUing the innocent protects the basic good of innocent human life in 
light of the first moral principle of loving God and one's neighbour as oneself, and 
it respects the modes of responsibility of not damaging, impeding, or destroying 
basic goods in oneself or others, either out of hostility or out of destroying that 
good as instrumental to achieving another good. 
The Importance of Religion 
The final part of the basic goods theory is concerned with morality, religion 
and God. GBF ask how the good of religion comes to be such an important stake 
that it becomes a distinct reason for acting. Their reply is that only "a religious 
83 May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, p. 79. 
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cornnutment can integrate the whole of a morally good life" so we need to 
understand God's relations with us. " 
Joseph Boyle deals with this issue in detail in a separate article. " The paper 
discusses religion's place within practical reason. Boyle describes a popular 
misconception of practical reason: that it is thought of as a person's thinking about 
how best to achieve the goals he or she wants. Therefore, based on this definition, 
institutions and practices are derived from human initiatives that seek to serve 
certain purposes or secure beliefs for an individual or group. So, if religion is 
thought of as bringing benefit, it gets included in practical thinking and becomes an 
instrument to achieve desired benefits. Reli&n is the most preferable mean to 
achieve these benefits. If these benefits are not desired, religion wifl not have a 
place in practical reasoning. " 
However, Boyle asserts that reliýon is an end, not a means to an end. " To 
establish the claim of religion as an end, Boyle excludes two possibilities. The first 
is that although people seek religious benefits, they seek them not as benefits in the 
strict sense but only as instnunental means to other benefits. The second is that 
people seek the good of harmony where the divine is nothing more than a 
redescription of other benefits sought by people and therefore it is not an 
irreducible reason for action. " Within practical reason, its place is not that of an 
ideal which some groups happen to desire and other groups ignore. Rather, it is an 
objective human good making normative demands on all people. The goodness of 
religion establishes priorities among goods. The influence of practical reason in the 
84 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends", p. 14 1. 
85 Joseph Boyle, "The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups", 
American Journal ofJurisprudence, v. 43,1998, pp. 1-24. 
86 Ibid, p. 1. 
87 Ibid, p. 2. 
" Ibid, p. 5. 
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reasoning of individuals should be reflected in the practical thinking and choice of 
communities. " Religion is not a set of theoretical beliefs about reality, but it is a 
human response to what is ultimate in reality. The underlying reason for the 
practical response to the divine is an interest in being in harmony with the divine. 
Boyle writes that "I propose that a religious benefit is a harmony between person 
or persons and the divine, that is, God or the gods or whatever is understood to be 
the ultimate principle of reality and meaning in the universe. "" 
The idea of harmony or disharmony between the person and the divine is 
based on common human experience. We can judge ourselves as alienated from 
the divine through sinful acts. We can perceive success as a sign of divine 
approval. People seek various methods to remove this disharmony and achieve a 
state of reconciliation as a benefit. Boyle believes that it is easier to understand if 
one thinks of the divine as a person and perceives the reconciliation/alienation of 
the human/divine relationship as similar to what happens between human beings. 
One tries to do something to remove the alienation between oneself and the divine 
or to maintain a proper, established relationship and seek a benefit. Boyle believes 
that "harmony with the divine, the ultimate source of reality and meaning, has the 
capacity to provide a conceptual and motivational framework for organizing one's 
personal life and relationships with people. "" Religion can do more to unify the 
morally good fife in a manner in a way that no other good is able. In this sense, 
harmony with the divine has a moral priority. This is not to say that all other 
goods are to be pursued as means to religious benefits. All human activities should 
be ordered to God in that religion provides a supervenient motive for performing 
what are otherwise beneficial actions. Goods such as exercise and friendship are 
89 Ibid, p. 2. 
90 lbid, p. 3. 
91 fbid, p. 6. 
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not anti-religious and can be religious if done with a certain frame of mind. This 
can be as minimal as saying that one would not exercise if it interfered in one's 
relationship with God or that an action can include a conurýitment that one will do 
non-religious actions in such a manner that it contributes with one's relationship 
with the divine. In this manner, religion provides a basis for organising one's fife 
with a common, uni*g motive for the entirety of a person's actions. " 
As for the varying views of different religions, false views about the divine 
are impossible to correct altogether without the assistance of God, and false views 
will make harmony with the divine less satisfactory. Boyle never explicitly states a 
definition of "false views". However, in the same paragraph where he makes this 
assertion, he mentions exploitative attitudes towards others, unfounded prejudices, 
and refusal to acknowledge guilt as being skewed views of han-nony which some 
people pursue. " False views, when used to rationalise individual or social 
immorality, will not result in a righteous friendship with God. There is a need to 
realise that the good of harmony with the divine must be pursued in an appropriate 
way. Also, there is a need to recognise that religions are not devoid of human 
problems affecting every human organisation. By affirming mistakes and 
distortions of religion, there is a human good that does not endorse the mistakes of 
religion but gives reason for getting such practice right. " 
As for those without a specific religious belief or who are atheists, these 
people can believe in the existence of an objective good and seek to promote a 
proper relationship with an impersonal principle. Those who do not believe in a 
personal divinity often see merit in the natural world that is irreducible to service to 
human interests and an almost religious piety towards such service is witnessed. 
92 Ibid, pp. I 1- 12. 
93 lbid, pp. 10- 11 - 94 Ibid, p. II- 
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Harmony is possible not only through interpersonal relationships with the divine 
but also in the attempt to show allegiance to and five in accordance with an 
impersonal principle. " This idea that the benefits of religion can be extended to 
agnostics or atheists expands the coverage of the dissertation to include all people 
of good will who try to Eve a moral fife. The commitment to an impersonal 
ideology acts as: the organisational principle by which they lead their lives; the 'life- 
template' through which they measure their successes; and the hermeneutic by 
which they interpret events. 
Criticisms 
Tlýs dissertation, in order to examine the basic goods theory more 
thoroughly, will study the four dominant criticisms of the theory that come from 
two ethical schools of thought. First, the proportionalists believe that the basic 
goods theory is too rigid in the way it defines how one may pursue the good. The 
proportionalists argue that one may morally act against a basic good. They also 
believe that too much stress is placed by GBF on the will and intention and not 
enough on the results on one's actions. Second, parts of the traditional Thomistic 
natural law school believe that GBF adds nothing of value by departing from 
Thomistic theory. They claim that the basic goods theory is not a natural law 
theory and that virtue ethics is not given the prominence it merits. 
It is not the intent of this dissertation to resolve the imperfections of the 
basic goods theory, which is still being developed and refined. Nor is its intent to 
become bogged down in the debate between the basic goods theory and its critics. 
This is the subject for another dissertation. The intent of the following section is 
to provide a more detailed knowledge of the basic goods theory, its assertions and 
" ibid, p. 4. 
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weaknesses, and to determine how this influences the application of the basic 
goods to patients with chronic illnesses. While the criticisms do possess some 
validity, the theory is fundamentally sound and provides a stable base from which 
to understand how illness impacts a person's life. 
The Proportionalists" Critique of Grisez-Boyle-Finnis 
1) One can act agamst a basic good 
The first point of conflict between proportionalism and the basic goods 
theory comes from the basic goods assertion that acts made against the basic goods 
can never be moraUy good. " The model of natural law proposed by the 
proportionalists, including people such as McCorrnick", Fuchs", Knauer" 
janssensloo, Hoose'01, and Vacek"', is that we five in a finite and sinful world where 
infinite goodness cannot be achieved in a single action. All of our actions contain 
96 Richard A McCormick, "Ambiguity in Moral Choice", Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral 
Choice in Conflict Situations, eds. Richard McCormick, Paul Ramsey, (Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1978), p. 38. It is interesting to note that in the annual Robert Cardinal 
Bellarmine lecture at St. Louis University in 1981, McCormick, citing Grisez and Finnis and 
others, gave a list of basic inclinations which are very close to the basic goods of GBF. 
McCormick's basic inclinations are "the tendency to preserve life; the tendency to mate and raise 
children; the tendency to seek out other persons and seek their approval (friendship); the 
tendency to use intelligence in guiding action; the tendency to establish good relations with 
unknown higher powers (religion); the tendency to develop skills and exercise them in play and 
the fine arts. " Richard McCormick, "Bioethics and Method: Where Do We Start? ", Theological 
Digest, v. 29,198 1, p. 305. 
97 Richard A McCormick, "Ambiguity in Moral Choice", pp. 7-53. McCormick, along with 
Charles Curran, edited a volume of important essays concerning proportionalism, from which 
come many of the articles listed. See Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, eds. Charles Curran, 
Richard McCormick, (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979). 
98 Joseph Fuchs, "The Absoluteness of Moral Terms", Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, eds. 
Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), pp-94-154- 
99 Peter Knauer, "The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect", Moral Norms 
and Catholic Tradition, eds. Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), 
pp. 1-39. 
100 Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil", Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, eds. 
Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, (Toronto: Paulist Press, 1979), pp-40-93. 
101 Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its European Roots, 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1987). 
102 Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate", Theological Studies, v. 46,1985, 
pp. 287-314. 
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features which open up or enhance our humanity and features which close or 
restrict it. These open-oriented and closure-oriented features are used by 
proportionalists as a basis for a morally complete approach to moral objectivity. 
In such a world, one's best hope is to do as much good as is possible and achieve 
as little evil as possible. "' They reject the belief that no premoral evil effect must 
be directly intended. " 
Proportionalists may agree with the GBF theory up to the point where the 
theory states that any action that would involve a direct attack on a basic good can 
never be morally justified. "' Proportionalists do not reject outright the main ideas 
of GBF's practical reasonableness and the theory over basic goods. However, they 
vehemently disagree with GBF's belief that a direct attack on a basic good can 
never be morally justified. This, proportionalists claim, is an arbitrary absolutising 
of finite human goods. "' Whereas GBF believe that it is self-evident that a person 
can never act against a basic good, proportionalists counter with a self-evident 
principle of their own: One can act against a premoral good if it brings about the 
greatest possible balance of benefits over goods. "' In other words, it is sometimes 
103 Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil", pp. 85-87. 
104 See McCon-nick, "Ambiguity in Moral Choice, pp. 35-40. Proportionalists are not 
consequentialists, as GBF portray them. See Joseph Boyle, Germain Grisez, John Finnis, 
"Incoherence and Consequentialism (or Proportionalism) -A Rejoinder", American Catholic 
Philosophical Association, v. 64,1990, pp. 271-277. Proportionalists would not agree with the 
statement that one could accede to a terrorist's demand to kill an innocent person in order to save 
two innocent hostages. They hold that virtually exceptionless norms exist. While they could 
never envision a situation where one could kill a person in such a situation, they hold that future 
discoveries about human nature from the social sciences could unveil information that changes 
our ethical norms. Edward Vacek points out that theoretically, one can never be sure that one has 
properly seen all the values resident in an act. Hence, one can never be theoretically certain that a 
given act is always wrong. An absolute value would have to be formulated in such a way that it 
ensures in advance that the uniqueness and development of individuals, the variations of cultures, 
the changes of history, and the involvement of God in the world will never introduce significant 
changes. (Vacek, "Proportionalism", p. 294. ) 
105 Bernard Hoose, "Proportionalists, Deontologists and the Human Good", Heythrop Journal, 
v. 33,1992, P. 176. 
106 Jean Porter, The Rediscovery of Virtue, pp. 19-20. 
107 Richard McCormick, "A Commentary on the Commentaries", Doing Evil to Achieve Good. - 
Moral Choice in Conflict Situations, eds. Richard McCormick, Paul Ramsey, (Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1978), pp. 234,261-264. 
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morally appropriate to embrace the lesser evil. GBF would look at the sentence 
'Choose the lesser evil' and only see "Choose ... evil" and disagree. jean Porter 
describes the proportionalists first principle of morality as "Always act in such a 
way as to bring about the greatest possible balance of premoral goods over 
premoral evils, given that you can do so without directly bringing about moral evil" 
and its corollary would be "Never act in such a way as to bring about a premoral 
evil, unless such an action is necessary to bring about or preserve proportionately 
greater premoral goods. ""' 
Bernard Hoose addresses the question of lying as a common example in the 
proportionalist-basic goods debate. "' Hoose, as a proportionalist, does not 
understand why self-alienation must necessarily occur from an act of justified lying. 
When a crazed murderer asks if you know the whereabouts of your neighbour and 
you he and direct him to the police station which results in his being arrested and 
no one being injured, how does this cause tension and alienation within the self? 
Hoose asks where is the evil that has occurred from this act of lying. 
Hoose is responding to an article published by Robert George in wlýich 
George attacks Hoose's critique of the GBF basic goods theory. "' George states 
that instead of lying to the murderer, one can either remain silent, say something 
true and appropriate but which fails to give the potential murderer the necessary 
information, or do something to divert the question or prevent him from carrying 
out the intended harm. "' Hoose agrees with George, provided that one of these 
three options produces a similar or better outcome than lying. However, there will 
be situations where these three options are not feasible. Remaining silent in the 
108 Jean Porter, The Rediscovery of Virtue, p. 20. 
109 Bernard Hoose, "Basic Goods: Continuing the Debate", Heythrop Journal, v. 35,1994, p. 62. 
110 Robert George, "Liberty Under the Moral Law: B. Hoose's Critique of the Grisez-Finnis 
Theory of Human Goods", Heythrop Journal, v. 34,1993, pp. 175-182. 
111 Ibid, p. 177. 
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face of a question can often answer the question, stating that one's neighbour is 
somewhere in the western hemisphere will most likely not always satisfy the would- 
be murderer, and the murderer can only be diverted so many times by 
complimenting him on the fine craftsmanship of his large knife. Therefore, one is 
left with either directing the potential murderer to the intended victim or lying 
about the victim's whereabouts. He states that the GBF belief that telling a he will 
damage someone in their personhood when the three alternatives are not feasible is 
too large a claim. To hold to telling the truth in all situations is to place a reverence 
for ideas over a reverence for persons. "' George, in the role of advocate for the 
basic goods theory, writes that lying even in a good cause corrupts individual 
integrity and destroys the common good that is served by a complete fidelity to the 
truth. A slippery slope emerges from 4ing to the murderer to disinformation and 
insincerity in all other forms of communication. Protecting the truth is not an 
abstraction, an idea held more sacred than human fife, but it is a basic good of 
persons necessary to their flotnishing. "' However, the proportionalist's point is 
well-made. Tl-ýs is a situation where the lesser of the two evils must be, reluctantly, 
embraced. Hoose follows the proportionalist belief that the world, infected with 
sin, will sometimes produce circumstances in which the lesser evil must be done to 
avoid bringing a greater evil into the world. Lying to the murderer will produce 
some internal discord, as the basic goods theory holds. How it damages the 
common good is something of which George does not provide proof. Yet, it 
appears better to five with having lied to a potential murderer to save the life of 
oneýs neighbour than to five with having provided the murderer with the necessary 
information to carry out his deed. 
112 Hoose, "Basic Goods: Continuing the Debate", pp. 61-62. 
113 George, "Liberty Under the Moral Law: B. Hoose's Critique of the Grisez-Finnis Theory of 
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A second proportionalist criticism in the area concerning sin is that the basic 
goods theory is unable to maintain that one sin is worse than another. If one 
cannot rank the basic goods, then one cannot say that some sins are more grave 
than others. In this case then, ýing to the murderer is as grave as 4ring to a jury in 
order to provide an alibi for the murderer. Hoose rejects the belief that if one 
understands the moral fife as a coherent response to basic goods, then a disordered 
response to any basic good will disorder the moral fife. Will telling a he to a 
murderer to save the fife of a neighbour reaUy create discord in the person? It 
seems a bit extreme. However, the basic goods do not admit of a ranking that 
would make one basic good a mere instrument for another and thus deny the unity 
of the person. "' Therefore, GBF hold that it is irrational to allow for a violation 
of one basic good in hopes of enhancing the whole moral project because of the 
disorder that sets in. One could not violate the basic good of self-integration or 
inner peace in order to promote the basic good of harmony among neighbours and 
conununity. 
2) Too nvich anpbasis is placed on mtmt x2d wX and too liak on results, 
A second complaint is that GBF focus their ethics on operations of the will, 
not on outward performances. Edward Vacek is critical of the basic goods 
supporters' tendency to look only at intent and not at the effectiveness of the 
resulting behaviour. "' In the case of the murderer does it not make sense to say 
that it was morally good not to he, given the consequences of telling the truth? 
Will not the burden of having to five with the knowledge that one directed a 
114 Hanink, "A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and Hierarchy", p. 237. 
115 Edward Vacek, "Contraception Again -A Conclusion in Search of Convincing Arguments: 
One Proportionalist's (Mis? )Understanding of a Text", Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, 
Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez, ed. Robert George, (Washington, D. C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998), p. 5 1. 
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murderer to one's neighbour's location and hence provided the murderer with 
necessary information create more inner discord than the teRing of the he? Grisez 
and Boyle argue the proportionalists hold that there is a hierarchy of value, that we 
can commensurate premoral goods and premoral evils and that people are capable 
of making a reasonable choice between alternatives that offer diverse goods and 
can threaten harms. "' This claim of proportionalism is one of its most criticised. 
The most damaging response made upon the proportionalist school is that they 
lack the ability to commensurate and compare premoral goods and evils. When 
proportionalists are asked how to calculate benefits and harms, their critics claim 
that they faH back on spontaneous and instinctive judgements. The morafly good 
person desires to do the greater good. The proportionalists believe that one can 
determine prior to choosing which, among countless alternatives, is the morally 
good one through balancing, measuring, or commensurating in some manner the 
different ontic goods and evils present in these alternatives. The problem is that 
there exists no unambiguous measure by which to compare the goods in question. 
One asks where is the common denominator among the goods in question. "' 
How does one compare the good of human existence versus the good of 
truthtefling, as in the case of the crazed murderer? There is no common 
denominator for comparing the goods of human fife, health, appreciation of 
beauty, friendship, knowledge of truth, peace of conscience and peace with God. 
Therefore, there is no way to assess a moral action in proportionalist methodology. 
The basic goods theory holds: that we can only say that some good is better than 
another in a certain respect; that we can grade various values in various ways 
but 
still cannot conunensurate different concrete values and; that people make choices 
116 Grisez, Boyle, "Response to Our Critics and Collaborators", p. 215. 
"' May, An Introduction to Moral Theology, p. 120. 
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between alternatives offering various goods and harms by not estimating possible ii 
benefit versus harm but "in fight of moral truths, including the Golden Rule and 
exceptionless norms that protect the fundamental goods of persons. ""' The moral 
order cannot be reduced to other orders of reality. Free choice is important to the 
basic goods theory. The theory focuses on what is chosen, not on outward 
behaviour or results. What the person intends to do defines the action. Intention 
always matters in objective morality. One who intends to commit adultery and fails 
in that act still conunits it to some degree. Morality comes from the heart, and 
therefore, our intention matters. "' You cannot remove choice from action. One 
chooses to do something and then carries out that choice. This constitutes a 
human act. Choices endure as part of one's character, are spiritual and have lasting 
effects. They are part of one's character until one makes a choice that is 
inconsistent with them. "' The virtues are relevant to this because they help mould 
one )s character into the correct disposition to habitually make the right moral 
decision. They are the vehicles for pursuing the basic goods in our actions. 
The debate between the basic goods theory and proportionalism appears at 
present to have no resolution. jean Porter, in commenting on the continued 
debate between the basic goods supporters and the proportionalists, believes that 
the debate will be interminable until moved from arguing over self-evident truths 
to debating over accounts of the human good. Then one will arrive at the topic's 
proper philosophical and theological arena, which is philosophical and theological 
anthropology. This is the true argument that will bring about some resolution. 
"' 
Until then, the basic goods school will accuse the proportionalists of having no 
118 Grisez, Boyle, "Response to Our Critics and Collaborators", p. 216. 
119 Ibid, pp. 219,221,230. 
120 Ibid, pp. 217-218. 
121 Jean Porter, "Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral Theology", The 
Thomist, v. 57,1993, p. 48. 
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criteria by which to assess a moral action and the proportionalists will argue that 
there is no proof that one cannot act moraRy against a basic good. The dissertation 
recognises the imperfections of both theories of moral analysis. Proportionalism 
as yet cannot adequately state how one can weigh the various goods at stake in 
making a moral decision. 'Me basic goods theory is too rigid in its belief that one 
can never act against a basic good, focuses too much on intentionality and is not 
concerned enough with the results of one's behaviour. However, both theories 
agree about the existence of the basic goods and the human need to pursue them. 
The importance of examining the proportionalist charges fies in uncovering 
critical aspects of the basic goods theory. One's intentions and will are critical in 
living a moral fife and trying to attain some fulfilment. These points are of 
relevance to the chapter on applying the virtues to patients with chronic illness. 
will be argued that even though patients may be limited in their ability to achieve 
results in certain areas of their life, they must still be open to these goods and 
desire to attain them. 
Criticisms from Thomists 
1) 7he Basic G; oo& Amy is not a natured law Amy. 
Some Thornists hold that the basic goods theory is not a natural law theory 
at all. Russell FEttinger believes that any natural law theory needs a comrnitment to 
a law which is in some sense natural and nature must be normative 
in this way. "' 
Critics believe that GBF place a deontological understanding of natural law in place 
for the original understanding of natural law. Deontological theories 
dispense with 
any idea of a nonnative natural order. These theories are theories without nature. 
They pretend to identify principles of nature without 
deriving them from nature. 
122 Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law 
Theory, (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1987), p. 8. 
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No metaphysical or ontological grounds are given for the principles they assert. 
Ralph Madnemy accuses GBF of holding a Humean view of practical reasoning 
because they regard knowledge of the world as irrelevant to practical reason. 
McInerny's point is that how can GBF claim that their theory is based in natural 
law if they do not derive their beliefs through an examination of human nature, but 
predominantly involves the use of reason? One gets the sense that the natural law 
of GBF is derived solely from intellectual reflection while the state of human 
nature as existing in a physical world is ignored. Does not human nature deserve a 
prime place in consideration of natural law theory rather than abstract speculation 
as to what acts are reasonable and what logically promote human flourishing? The 
basic goods theory, McInemy claims, is too deontological and removed from 
consideration of human nature. Robert George, a supporter of GBF, writes that in 
the view of GBF's critics: 
a sound natural law ethics derives moral norms from methodological1y 
antecedent knowledge of the nature of man and man's place in nature. 
According to this approach, metaphysics - in particular that branch of 
metaphysics that studies man - precedes ethics. Metaphysical anthropology 
reveals the facts about human nature; ethics then prescribes or prohibits 
possible acts (or classes of acts) on the basis of their conformity, or lack of 
conformity to these facts. "' 
This leads to the last major point to make about the basic goods theory. GBF 
reject this approach because they believe it contains a naturalistic fallacy which 
means to infer moral norms from facts about human nature. To discover what 
is a 
true human good, one should not look at metaphysical theoty concerning 
goodness, or a specific anthropology. They discuss the 'is-ought' philosophical 
dictum. "' McInerny accuses them of having an excessive distinction between 
facts 
123 Robert George, "Natural Law and Human Nature", Natural Law 
Theory. - Contemporary 
Essays, ed. Robert George, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), p. 32 
124 Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and 
Ultimate Ends", pp. 121-122. 
The is-ought distinction basically states that there should 
be no moral conclusions derived from 
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and value. Grisez, he believes, insists that the first principles of practical reason are 
underived and make no reference to human nature but refer only to human good. 
This leads to an unusual sense of practical reason. "' Finnis and Grisez reply to this 
charge by stating that "there can be no valid deduction of a normative conclusion 
without a normative principle, and thus that first practical principles cannot be 
derived from metaphysical speculations. ""' It is impossible to derive conclusions 
about what is good or the way something should be done from a premise that 
contains empirical or metaphysical claims about the way things are. Therefore, 
observing the world around us will not tell us what we should do. We learn what 
we should do by looking at practical reason and learning what will fulfil us as 
human beings. 
McInerny raises two strong points. For a theory based in the tradition of 
natural law and in Aquinas, GBF appear heavily deontological and removed from 
considering human nature in the natural world. Deontological theories are not 
known for being based in a normative natural order. Abstract rules and laws are 
created through reasonable reflection. However, GBF simply state that the first 
rules of practical reason cannot be derived from an 'is-ought' dictum. The 
statement 'do and pursue good and avoid evil' cannot be found by looking in 
human nature. Rather, it occurs to humans as true, without supportive proofs. 
While McInerny makes a reasonable point in stating that GBF rely too heavily on 
deontology and abstract reasoning to determine human good rather than through 
merely factual premises alone. One cannot derive 'ought' from 'is'. A statement about the way a 
thing is does not yield a conclusion about the way a thing ought to be. 
125 Ralph McInerny, "The Principles of Natural Law", Natural Law and Theology, eds. Charles 
Curran, Richard McCormick, (New York: Paulist Press, 199 1), pp. 146-147. 
126 John Finnis, Germain Grisez, "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph 
McInerny", Natural Law and Theology, eds. Charles Curran, Richard McCormick, (New York: 
Paulist Press, 199 1), p. 159. 
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exanuiniing human nature, GBF are in line with natural law when they examine the 
world to derive the Est of basic goods, as Finnis demonstrates: 
All human societies show a concern for the value of human fife; in all, self- 
preservation is generally accepted as a proper motive for action, and in none is the killing of other human beings permitted without some fairly definite justification. All human societies regard the procreation of a new human fife 
as in itself a good thing unless there are special circumstances. No human 
society fOs to restrict sexual activity-, in all societies there is some 
prohibition of incest, some opposition to boundless promiscuity and to 
rape, some favour for stability and permanence in sexual relations. All human societies display a concern for truth, through education of the young in matters not only practical (e. g. avoidance of dangers) but also speculative 
or theoretical (e. g. religion). "' 
The basic goods are based in the natural law theory which examines the nature of 
humans and their interaction with the natural world in order to deduce what 
actions appear to promote human flourishing. 
2) Too link anpbasis is gtzxn to vnim ethks 
Benedict Ashley criticises the basic goods theory for paying little attention to 
the virtues. "' Granted that this is not a widespread criticism of Thomists toward 
the basic goods theory, it is of relevance to this dissertation. Ashley, himself a 
virtue ethicist and an admirer of the basic goods theory, raises issue with the 
subordinate role of the virtues. Whereas virtue ethics believes the virtues are 
important for viewing life as a whole, the basic goods theory instead chooses to 
focus on personal vocation. Ashley holds that the moral virtues of Aquinas 
should be central to moral theology. "' Grisez and Boyle disagree. Both Ashley 
and GBF believe that the moral virtues are essential to being morally good, so one 
wonders why GBF do not give the virtues a more important place. Christians 
127 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 83. 
128Benedict M. Ashley, "The Scriptural Basis of Grisez's Revision of Moral Theology", Natural 
Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Politics in the Work of Germain 
Grisez, ed. 
Robert George, (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), p. 37. 
129 ibid, p. 37. 
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acquire the virtues as they begin to discern God's will in their Eves. The other 
virtues are necessary conditions for prudence, for without prudence, one cannot 
shape the good and moral fife. However, GBF do not believe that "detailed 
analyses of the moral virtues, in general and/or in particular deserve an important 
place in moral theology. ""' They are not aware of any evidence that such analyses 
of the moral virtues and prudence help people to be good and holy, claiming that 
many saints knew nothing of the virtues. In addition, analyses of the virtues are of 
no assistance to people who lack them and to children. However, Grisez and 
Boyle may be mistaken on this point. Their rejection of virtue ethics reflects their 
heavily deontological sympathies. The whole point of virtue ethics is to train 
people to become good and moral. Training does make an ethical difference. 
Besides, asking people to observe the modes of responsibility while they seek out 
their reflexive and substantive goods does not appear to be more 'user-friendly' 
than telling people not to have a third dessert because it smacks of gluttony. 
A second objection Grisez and Boyle have concerning the virtues is that 
they cannot serve as premises for normative judgements. They state that "the 
general theory of virtues and the treatises on the various virtues have virtually 
nothing to do with the nonns articWated in" the Swnnu. "' Rather, there are 
general propositional moral principles used to ground and clat* specific moral 
norms. They ask one to compare what Aquinas says about the virtues in general 
and in particular with what he says about specific acts such as killing and 
adultery. "' It is true that Aquinas did believe in objective moral norms. Yet, it is 
not as if a virtuous act could violate such a norm. There is no contradiction 
between the virtues and objective moral norms. In fact, the virtues tell us how to 
130 Grisez, Boyle, "Response to Our Critics and Collaborators", p. 235. 
131 Ibid, P. 236. 
132 Ibid, P. 236. 
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five a fife that is in line with an objective norm-based morality. The virtues have 
the benefit of suggesting what a fife Eved in line with an objective nonn-based 
moralitY looks like. 
The third objection to virtue ethics made by GBF is that it represents a 
singularly bleak framework for a renewed moral theology drawing heavily on 
scripture, a challenge issued at Vatican II. Ashley adrnits that Aquinas derives his 
Est of virtues from Aristotle, as well as pagan sources, rather than from the Bible. 
Ashley claims that the moral virtues are central to how Aquinas reformulated the 
revealed data of moral life contained in the New Testament. "' Grisez and Boyle 
say Ashley may be right in his assertion concerning Aquinas, but that does not 
mean Aquinas was correct. Rather than imposing a theoretical construct from 
nonbiblical sources on the revealed data from scripture concerning the moral life, 
the basic goods theory explains their moral implications in terms of cooperating 
with Jesus, imitating his life and teachings and making one's personal vocation the 
exemplification of the Beatitudes. "' Grisez and Boyle make a good point. 
However, the beatitudes are not specific in themselves and they would soon find 
themselves forced to turn to non-biblical examples and sources to expound on the 
gospel message, as did Aquinas. 
The main concern that GBF have about employing the virtues is that they 
worry about societies reflecting the virtues of that particular society which are in 
reality violations of norms. "' Virtues cannot create basic moral principles for 
society. Virtues are dependent upon character traits, and when society is 
promoting character traits that endorse violating the natural law, then the virtues 
become a way of creating evil in the world. Hence, the Nazi physician who 
133 Ashley, "The Scriptural Basis of Grisez's Revision of Moral Theology", p. 48. 
134 Grisez, Boyle, "Response to Our Critics and Collaborators", p. 236. 
135 Discussion with Joseph Boyle, September 11,1999. 
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conducts dangerous experiments on concentration camp inmates is held up by 
Nazi society as possessing a virtuous character. For GBF, to employ a strong 
virtue ethics approach, which holds that the dominant method of moral analysis be 
limited to the virtues, is to ask for trouble that need not be. The basic goods 
theory offers seven goods that should be striven for and never acted against. The 
modes of responsibility list appropriate moral conduct. So a Nazi physician, in 
their theory of moral analysis cannot act against the basic goods of human life itself 
and of peace with neighbours. The physician has violated the modes of 
responsibility in performing his experiments. GBF appear fearful that without 
definite rules, society has become so incapable of reading the natural law that 
specific laws must be spelled out and modes of responsibility enunciated. Aqýuinas, 
in la2ae. 94.4., writes that the natural law is known to all; however, there will always 
be a portion of the population and whole societies who through perverted passion, 
evil habit or an evil disposition of nature fail in recognising natural law precepts. 
Perhaps this is GBF's reason for moving toward a moral theory with heavy 
deontological sympathies. In theory this makes the basic goods theory easier to 
apply for moral analysis in that the goods are universal and not contextualised by a 
particular society. However) in practical terms, one wonders if a society that does 
not recognises the virtue of truthtelling, compassion, or mercy would recognise or 
be influenced by the basic goods account of the moral life. Where the virtues are 
not recognised it is doubtful that an account of the basic goods would retain any 
forcefulness. A society that recognises the basic goods would probably recognise 
an account of the virtues. 
The concerns that GBF have with virtue ethics are not insurmountable. It 
is 
not as if GBF are opposed to the moral virtues. This would 
be far from the truth. 
While Grisez and Boyle may be guilty of an under-appreciation of virtue ethics, 
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even they adrnit that to dwell on the differences would be a rnistake because the 
problems are of minor significance. 
The criticisms of some Thomists, concerning the is-ought distinction and 
the significance of virtue ethics, do not sidetrack the dissertation in its use of the 
basic goods. The is-ought distinction could aid patients somewhat in recognising 
that they are to rely upon their own intellectual powers of reflection to determine 
what path of fife will lead to fulfilment and not rely on what society perceives the 
role of the chronically ill to be. As for virtue ethics, this dissertation is already 
committed to taking a virtue approach to chronic iflness. The criticisms of GBF 
are not of major significance and can be successfufly countered. 
CONCLUSION 
The natural law theory of Aquinas leaves room for confusion. Aquinas 
never meant his list concerning the precepts of the natural law to be exhaustive. 
There is no clear answer as to the content of natural law. While one does not 
expect a precise code-like book full of statutes concerning Thornistic natural law, 
current discussion over Thoýnistic natural law theory is somewhat confusing and 
lacking in clarity. This confusion makes it difficult to apply Thornistic natural law 
to the concrete details of a person's life. This is where the basic goods theory 
holds one advantage over Thonýstic natural law. It has taken Aquinas's approach 
to thinking about natural law, emphasising practical reason, and expanded on what 
Aquinas, for whatever reason, left obscure. 
The basic goods theory, in its basic form, is fairly easy to understand. The 
first principle of practical reason, 'do and pursue the good and avoid evil', holds 
that the intellect reflects on human experience where human natural inclinations 
point toward goods that are reasonable in themselves. The 
intellect then decides 
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that these goods should be pursued because they promote human integral 
fulfilment. According to Grisez, the first principle of morality is derived from the 
first principle of practical reason. It states that a person should will and choose 
only the possibilities that are compatible with integral human fulfilment. The basic 
goods are those goods that the intellect perceives as reasonable in themselves and 
which have, upon reflection, promoted human flourishing. The modes of 
responsibility are intermediate principles flowing from the first principle of 
morality and tell us how to act toward the basic goods. 
The seven basic goods offer an encompassing picture of what a fife well- 
lived looks like. They represent seven spokes of a wheel, which to function well, 
must A be in good repair. Hence, when exanining the Eves of chronicaUy M 
patients, a sort of template is available to understand where their concerns fit into 
the pattern of a fife well-lived. Complaints by patients about alienation from other 
people is the lack of the existential good of peace with friends, family and harmony 
among individuals and groups. The chronic illness may keep patients from 
developing any one of the seven basic goods. The goods allow one to identify 
where a patient is suffering in their Eves. The importance of the basic good theory 
is that it believes that while one must pursue a basic good, it says that one should 
not ignore the other basic goods while striving for a certain good. Hence, the 
concern raised earlier in the dissertation of a patient focusing too much on the 
goods that have been affected by the illness at the cost of ignoring other goods. 
Theoretically, this theoxy should be able to be applied across cultures, with 
variations attributable to specific beliefs of that culture. No matter in which culture 
a person fives, the same basic human instincts apply. If one uses the virtue theory 
based in natural law and expressed through the basic goods, many of the worries 
discussed in chapter two concerning applying virtue ethics to medical ethics 
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disappear. Max Wartofsky's belief is that if culture does define virtue, that this 
means that virtues change from period to period. "' Expressions of virtue change to 
fit the new circumstances, but the basic need of people stays constant throughout 
history. People are still oriented toward self-preservation, pro-creation, gaining 
knowledge, and living in community. This has not changed, only the context in 
which the virtues must adapt to be expressed in new situations. If viewed from the 
perspective of the basic goods, MacIntyre is perhaps too pessimistic in his belief 
that dialogue can no longer work between patient and physician. A physician knows 
that when a patient comes to see him/her, that the patient desires a return to health; 
one can assume that when asked a question, the questioner is seeking the truth and 
not lies; one can guess that most people desire peace with their neighbours and in 
society. Human beings are not as alienated from each other as the picture 
MacIntyre paints. One finds it difficult to believe that people as a general rule 
would not be oriented toward the basic goods, and would find it irrational when 
observing other people pursuing them. While a culture may express its values 
somewhat differently from its neighbours or its descendants, these values are still 
oriented toward attaining and preserving the basic goods. The basic goods motivate 
all people and provide a basis for a conunon understanding of the other's good. 
Natural law and the basic goods are not culture bound and can be applied to the 
whole human race. 
As was discussed in the Peflegrino critique, virtue is linited in its abihty to 
decide medical etlýical questions in a pluralistic culture. Virtue is better focused on a 
patient-centred ethics, while noting, as Pellegrino, Drane, and May state, that there 
is an important need for role-virtues in professional ethics. Patients who are aware 
136 Please refer to the section "General Accounts of Virtue in Medical Ethics Literature" in 
chapter two. 
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of the basic goods theory and understand how virtues function as conduits of the 
basic goods will be able to resolve for themselves many of the ethical dilemmas 
facing them. They are aware of the goods which go into making a happy fife and 
how iHness affects these goods and they can best decide on the course of lives. 
The virtue ethics/basic goods theory also provides a way of dealing with the 
problem of pluralism. The second chapter made reference to the lack of current 
articles dealing with happiness, stating that this was symptomatic of a principle- 
based ethics that left the individual space to define a happy fife, but gave no 
assistance in defining what such a life looked like or how to go about achieving it. 
This is a contribution that patient-oriented virtue ethics has to offer medical ethics. 
No real rule changes concerning happiness when a patient is afflicted with chronic 
Mness. The person is stiH a human being, and as such, wiU flourish through 
pursuing and attaining the basic goods through virtuous activity. Being in does not 
exempt one from attempting to attain the basic goods: it simply changes how the 
goods are pursued. Karen Lebacqz began to develop this idea in her article. 
However, she did not take her idea far enough. Rather, she stopped by looking at 
the virtues needed by a person to make it through an ordeal as a patient. Perhaps 
for someone in the hospital for a broken leg which will mend, this is an appropriate 
approach to take because the person will resume a normal level of health. Yet, for 
the person with chronic illness, his or her state of health is a permanent state, and 
the virtues cited by Lebacqz will not promote happiness, merely how to survive an 
illness. However, these beliefs are all conjectures that must be applied in the fifth 
chapter to case studies of patients with chronic illness. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 





A brief surnmary reiterating the prominent features of Thomistic virtue 
theory is necessary before the results of the pilot study are analysed. In chapters 
three and four I argued that the natural law is the basis by which Aquinas 
determined what is a virtue and a vice. An action which promotes the natural law, 
and hence leads to one's flourishing, is a virtue. An action which violates the 
natural law, and leads to one's floundering, is a vice. A closer examination of 
Aquinas's text reveals that he wrote about the natural law only on the primary 
precepts. His writings concerning secondary and tertiary precepts are vague, leading 
to confusion and debate in secondary literature on Thomistic natural law. ' I argued 
that his lack of specificity and the lack of consensus in the secondary literature made 
it untenable to utilise Aquinas's natural law in this dissertation. Rather, I suggested 
that a new natural law theory, the basic goods theory which is heavily indebted to 
Aquinas, offers the specificity lacking in Thoniistic literature. 
Natural law is important to the dissertation because without it, there is no 
way of determining what is or is not a virtue. The dissertation can drift in any 
direction without a firm anchor as to what constitutes a virtue. In regards to the 
pilot study, the new natural law theory allows one to understand how the chronic 
illness affects the fives of the patients through its impact on the basic goods. If one 
understands how the basic goods are affected, then one will understand what virtues 
will become important to the person because natural law is the foundation of the 
virtues. If the basic good of health becomes affected, one can expect that 
temperance and its allied virtues wiR become important to the patient. If one's 
social and familial relationships are altered because of the disease, one can 
look at 
I Please refer back to the section "Primary and Secondary Precepts" in chapter 
4, pp. 1 22-126. 
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justice and the allied virtues under social justice in order to find the virtues that the 
patient will employ. 
A key point to stress is the link between natural law and the virtues. In 
regard to the dissertation, it is best not to think of the natural law as a separate 
theory. The dissertation employs one theory, Thomistic virtue theory, of which 
natural law plays a key conceptual role. An analogy is that of a wheel. Without a 
hub, the wheel cannot function. It is the foundation of the wheel, around which 
everything revolves. The natural law, or the basic goods, is the hub. The basic 
goods represent the core reasons for why people act. They are at the nub of 
peoples' existence. The spokes are the virtues. just as spokes emanate from the 
hub, virtues derive from the natural law and are actions which promote the natural 
law. When one is worried that the basic good of human life and health is becoming 
adversely affected, one takes actions to rectify the situation, usually through the 
virtues of temperance, be it refraining from excess food, getting more sleep or 
exercising more often. The rim of the wheel can be considered happiness or human 
flourishing. For it to function as a wheel, it must be supported by enough spokes 
for the wheel to be operable. If it lacks the requisite number of spokes for it to 
function, it crumples and is no longer a wheel. It is the same with happiness: 
remove enough virtues from one's fife, and one is no longer happy. 
This analogy will help one to understand the link between basic goods and 
the virtues, which becomes important in analysing the data from the pilot study. 
The pilot study was focussed on determining how patients go about living well with 
osteoarthritis. It looked for traits of the patients which helped them to achieve a 
level of happiness that was acceptable to them. Five themes emerged: the necessity 
of possessing a realistic perception concerning the illness; an enhanced awareness of 
their feelings of gratitude to those around them; marshalling the strength to cope 
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with the illness; maintaining self-identity in the face of threat; and understanding 
what factors maintain their quality of fife. ' The study does allow one to identity 
virtues. It also allows one to understand which basic goods were affected which in 
turn allows one to explain why certain virtues can be found in the pilot study. From 
the five themes, one can look forward to understand which virtues are relevant to 
the fives of the patients, or one can look back to the basic goods which are the 
grounding from which the themes arise. The basic goods make sense of actions and 
help to understand what motivates the patients to act: one acts so as to pursue the 
basic goods. So the five themes are not merely indications of the virtues, they lead 
us back to the basic goods themselves. From the five themes we can infer that the 
patients manifested such actions for a reason, because it is unreasonable to think 
that five osteoarthritic patients showed signs of gratitude by sheer coincidence. The 
reason the theme of gratitude is present is that it helped to fulfA a need, or a basic 
good(s). The patients were not showing the virtues of courage and gratitude 
without a reason. These virtues operated in the patients' lives as a response to 
fulfilling a basic good threatened by the illness. The five themes are expressions of 
an attempt to fulfil the basic goods. Once one understands which basic goods were 
affected, it aids in placing the virtues in context. One can now understand why 
certain virtues are important to the Eves of the chronicaUy M. The virtues serve an 
explicit purpose of securing the basic goods. 
The study was geared toward seeking out how patients fived weU with 
osteoarthritis. It did not specifically examine the issue of basic goods in the fives of 
the patients. This raises a methodological concern: how can one say, with a level of 
certainty appropriate to a sociological study, that certain basic goods are affected 
by 
the presence of osteoarthritis in one's fife? 
2 Swift, Living Well Through Chronic Illness, p. 1. 
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The answer is that one cannot say so with the surety of a sociological study 
because the pilot study was not directed at determuiuing the presence of the basic 
goods in the patients' lives. The EC pilot study was aimed in the general area of 
finding if one could locate the indications of virtues through patients' narratives. 
The patients were interviewed and the analysis done by a healthcare researcher. I 
choose to include the basic goods because I think it makes for a more complete and 
satisfying understanding of how the virtues operate in the fives of the patients. I 
analysed the narratives and the pilot study analysis to determine the presence of the 
basic goods and I believe that there is a basis for saying that the five themes indicate 
the presence of the basic goods as an operative force guiding the patients' actions. 
The five themes are attempts by the patients to respond to basic goods 
which have been affected by the illness. As was stated earlier, these themes do not 
evolve out of thin air, but are responses to something. I argue that they are 
attempts to seek out the basic goods. The basic goods will be linked to the themes 
in a more comprehensive manner in a f6flowing section; however I want to give a 
brief outline of how the two are connected in this section. I think that the theme of 
developing a realistic perception over their illness results from the basic good of 
human fife and health being adversely affected. The patients developed a clear 
picture of the medical condition and treatment, listened to the body and read its 
signs, and tried to maintain a balanced perspective on life with the condition. They 
also stressed being pragmatic about other people's (mis)understanding of the 
disease. Through developing these four techniques, the patients felt that the disease 
did not overwhelm them and that they could cope with the disease, in other words, 
the basic good of human life and health was maintained to a degree. 
The second theme to emerge from the patients' narratives was gratitude. 
This is Faiked to the basic good of peace with neighbours and friends. The patients 
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remarked at how their illness resulted in both a reaffirmation of the importance of 
family and good friends in one's happiness and how a lack of understanding among 
other members of society concerning the effects of their illness caused them to feel 
alienated from parts of society and how this adversely affected their lives. Certain 
virtuous action was witnessed in an attempt to further the basic good and limit any 
damage done to it: i. e., they expressed the virtue of gratitude itself to those who 
drew closer to them through the disease and forgiveness towards who acted with 
ignorance toward them through a lack of understanding concerning the disease. 
The third theme mentioned was having the strength to cope. The patients 
understood themselves to be in a fight with the disease and for this they needed 
courage, determination, patience, and perseverance. A main role of strength to 
cope was to allow them to endure the worst moments of the pain and to continue 
hving a life they wanted to five. If one asks why they wanted the strength to cope, it 
was because they valued the basic good of human life and health. In their most dire 
moments of despair, they choose to continue hving rather than give into the disease 
because they believed that there was no alternative but to cope. They wished to 
attain the basic good of human fife and health and the virtues that allowed them to 
achieve it were courage, patience and perseverance. 
The fourth theme was maintaining self-identity in the face of threat. 
Osteoarthritis appears to have consequences in regard to self-identity and self- 
worth. The patients speculated about the traits that others might attribute to them 
because of the illness. They did not want undesirable characteristics attributed to 
them. The sense of self-worth is the capacity to perceive and understand one's 
worth and an awareness of things that threaten it or maintain and 
increase it. 
Implicit in this is being able to recognise that having worth matters to one. There is 
a link between self-identity and self-respect. One respects one's self through 
living 
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in accordance with one's belief's and standard, meaning that one acts out one's 
values and so maintains a sense of integrity? This theme is tied to the basic good of 
self-integration or inner peace which creates a harmony among one's judgements, 
feelings, and choices and the basic good of peace of conscience and consistency 
between one's thoughts and deeds. The patients could not externally act out their 
inner values or characteristics. While they wished to present themselves as a certain 
type of person, the illness did not always allow them to. The illness frustrated the 
realisation of these basic goods and the patients then focussed on the many of the 
allied virtues of social justice in an attempt to compensate for the damage done to 
this good. 
The final theme emerging from the pilot study was that of understanding 
what maintains one's quality of life. Patients cited factors that contributed to their 
quality of fife and which gave them some measure of happiness, such as being in 
relationships with others (the basic good of peace with neighbours and society), 
cultivation of interests and past-times, and being able to maintain activities which 
were important to them. Under these themes, the basic good of playful activities 
and skilful work is found. The patients spoke of how putting their mind to 
activities and hobbies aided them in their quality of fife, let them feel as if they were 
in control of their disease and not just drifting through life. The virtues associated 
with this were the allied social virtues of justice and a rise in the appreciation of the 
inteRectual virtues. 
3 Robin Dillon, "Introduction" Dignity, Character and Seýf-Respect, ed. Robin Dillon, (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 29. 
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Odxr Medxdobga Cona-m 
Because this is a first attempt to understand how the virtues operate in the 
lives of these people with their circumstances of having a chronic illness, certain 
methodological concerns arise. This section will examine the extent to which one 
can generalise concerning the chronically ill as a group. 
Can the d)nrdca4 ill be gazeralised as a gmup? 
Is it plausible to say that if a group of five osteoarthritic females, all between 
63 - 89 years old, bom and living in England, displayed certain patterns of 
behaviour in response to a specific disease, we can than generalise these findings to 
other groups of patients? Will a group of Italian male patients in their twenties with 
testicular cancer demonstrate the exact same virtues represented by the pilot study 
patients? It is imprudent to hazard a guess at such an early stage of research. More 
studies are needed to confirm any pattern. There does emerge an overarching 
pattern of virtuous activity by these five women that I think will basically hold for 
all people, but this is only surnýse based on the theory that all people strive to 
achieve the basic goods and that chronic illness will impact these goods in certain 
patterns. The women first demonstrated courage in facing the Mness, prudence in 
finding out how to five with the disease, temperance in adjusting to new demands 
on lifestyle and justice in terms of meeting new social demands. They react to 
concerns common to A humans. What one cannot generalise is how a twenty year- 
old Italian male would react in his use of the allied virtues. As an example, the pilot 
study patients all felt damage had been done to the basic good of peace with 
neighbours and society because of their illness and they reacted by stressing certain 
allied virtues of justice, namely allied virtues dealing with social justice. I would 
anticipate that a twenty year-old Italian male diagnosed with testicular cancer would 
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feel damage done to this same basic goods and that his reaction would be based in 
the virtues or vices of justice. The question is whether differences of age, sex, 
culture and disease make a difference in which virtues he utilised. Given that only 
one pilot study has been done, it is imprudent to hazard a guess. The methodology 
of the project demands that we can only state that in the study of these five women 
with osteoarthritis, this pattern of virtuous and vicious activity was witnessed. So, 
the claims of my dissertation are very limited, given the very initial stages of research 
done into the area. As similar studies emerge, then one can begin to see patterns 
through chronic illness as a whole rather than the specific patient population of 
elderly English females with osteoarthritis. 
There is one more concern which should be addressed before moving to the 
analysis of the pilot project. Coping strategies can appear deceptively like virtues, 
and the distinction between the two must be clarified. 
COPING STRATEGIES 
Coping is defined as: 
the process of managing demands (external or internal) that are appraised as 
taxing or exceeding the resources of the person ... Coping consists of 
efforts, both action-oriented and intrapsychic, to manage (i. e., master, 
tolerate, reduce, minimize) environmental and internal demands and 
conflicts among them. 5" 
Coping efforts centre on five main tasks: to reduce harmful environment 
conditions and enhance prospect of recovery, to tolerate or adjust to negative 
events, to maintain a positive self-image, to maintain emotional equilibrium and to 
continue satisfying relationships with others. There are several coping strategies 
used by patients for dealing with the effects of chronic illness. In many cases they 
4Taylor, Health Psychology, p. 258. 
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cannot continue with the lifestyle to which they are accustomed. The pace of 
modem life is too fast even for many healthy people. Modem society is built "on 
an unacknowledged assumption that everyone is healthy, non-disabled, young but 
adult, shaped according to cultural ideals, and often, male". ' Life is structured 
around what the young, healthy, adult male can do. To accommodate the stress of 
an iflness and to adjust to a new lifestyle, coping strategies have been divided into 
two categories: problem-solving efforts and emotion-focused coping. Emotion- 
focused coping tries to regulate by cognitive methods the emotional consequences 
of the stressful event rather than changing the actual situation whereas problem- 
solving efforts attempt to reduce stress by actively confronting the problem to try to 
reduce it to manageable sizes. For example, stress in the work environment might 
best be reduced by problem-solving efforts to reduce the workload whereas certain 
health problems may be best managed by an emotion-focused coping strategy. ' 
For a threat repeated over time, as a general rule, an emotion-focused 
coping strategy such as avoidance is not very successful. However, there are certain 
chronic Mnesses such as cancer that have few direct action factors such as problem- 
solving or confrontative coping. These illnesses raise uncontrollable factors and 
therefore, other emotion-focused coping strategies that utilise distraction and 
emotional regulation do appear to work better. In the aftermath of other illnesses, 
such as myocardial infarction, confrontative coping and planful problem-solving 
strategies help to modify lifestyle habits in the hope of reducing further risk. As was 
mentioned above, there is evidence that using avoidant coping strategies, such as 
forgetting the disease, fatalism, passive acceptance, withdrawal from others, blaming 
others and self-blame leads to poor adjustment and higher psychological 
distress, 
5 Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability, (London: 
Routlege, 1996), p. 39. 
6 Taylor, Health Psychology, pp. 231-236. 
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whereas lower psychological distress is found among people who use positive, 
confrontative responses to stress, such as maintaining a feeling of internal control, 
belief that one can control one's illness, and seeing illness as a challenge to be met 
and overcome! 
In a study of 172 Dutch patients who belong to patient organisations, a 
preference was shown by the patients for active ways of coping with their illness. 
They believed that perceiving illness as a challenge that involved a balanced attitude 
aflowed for active as weH as passive coping strategies. It was best neither to fight 
the illness at A costs nor to foster the illness. ' This theme of having an active and 
problem-solving style of coping with illness appears prominently among studies and 
literature on chronic illness. In a survey of 153 people with disabilities in Chicago, 
54.3% of the respondents with moderate to serious disabilities reported having an 
excellent to good quality of life. The report found that one's quality of life depends 
upon having a balance between body, mind, and spirit in oneself and creating a 
harmonious set of relationships within the individual's external environment and 
social context. ' 
This report echoes a common theme in its surprise at the high percentage of 
patients with chronic illness and disability that report a good to high quality of life. 
Healthy, non-disabled people assume that because the ill are limited in some of their 
physical or mental abilities, then their quality of life must be severely reduced. 
However, such estimations occur from the perspective of a healthy person who has 
the ability to pursue the values and goals that he/she wants, and hence to be 
7 Ibid, p. 375. 
8 Denise De Ridder, et al, "Beliefs on Coping with Illness: A Consumer's Perspective", Social 
Science & Medicine, v. 44,1997, pp. 555-558. 
9 Gary Albrecht, Patrick Devlieger, "The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life against All 
Odds", Social Science & Medicine, v. 39,1999, p. 977. The study compares this to a variety of 
national surveys on people with no disability in America in the 1990's which cite that 
80-85% 
report being satisfied or very satisfied with their quality of 
life. (p. 98 1) 
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successful in his/her own evaluation. Disability and chronic illness change people's 
attitudes toward success. Success is not seen as wealth, status, or prestige. 
"Disability becomes a job where persons must marshal their entire resources and 
give their best efforts to succeed. Satisfaction is derived from doing a good job with 
one2s fife. "" Hence, the good life comes from meeting the chaUenge that chronic 
illness imposes on one, redefining one's goals and meeting them despite the illness. 
On the surface, this appears to pose a challenge to the dissertation's 
argument that those with chronic illness should not let it define their fife by 
focusing on the iflness to the detriment of pursuing the basic goods. However, the 
iRness acts as a chaUenge to overcome in the attempt to pursue the basic goods. To 
achieve the basic goods, patients must focus on their Mness and take it into account. 
Achieving the basic goods despite any disabifity is the goal of one's fife, not the 
disability itself. The disability simply provides the context in which the basic goods 
are achieved. Chronic illness appears to provide an orienting factor in one's fife, the 
basic good which GBF state is required to give meaning to one's life and which they 
suggest should be religion. 
However, religion is not displaced in the chronicaUy M person's fife. In fact, 
it appears to have a more important role than in the fife of healthy, nondisabled 
people. Patients report the need for more faith, believing that it made people 
stronger and pain easier to bear. Faith has been found to have supportive effects on 
the immune system. " Studies have shown a relationship between aspects of 
spirituality and enhanced ability to cope with stress and illness, loneliness, increased 
depression and anxiety. " Patients with a religious orientation report less fear about 
'0 Ibid, p. 983. 
11 Ina Alewell, "What Do Patients Think? " Health Promotion and Chronic Illness, ed. Annette 
Kaplun, (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 1992), p. 408. 
12 Debra O'Neil, Elaine Kenny, "Spirituality and Chronic Illness", Image: Journal of 
Nursing 
Scholarship, v. 30,1998, p. 276. 
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the future, felt more optimistic, felt more peaceful, productive and purposeful than 
those with existential beliefs regarding refigion or those who were non-spiritual. " 
The two most frequent spiritual exercises mentioned are prayer and reading 
scripture, with the ritualistic practices of prayer offering the greatest comfort. " In 
regard to the basic goods, it appears that religion is one of the basic goods that the 
chronically ill pursue with greater diligence than other groups of people. It seems to 
act as an anchor in their life which provides some direction, unity and security in 
their lives. 
This is not to say that all the reports are unanimous over the beneficial 
effects of religion on the ill. Findings are varied. A survey article asking the 
question if being religious helps or hinders coping with chronic illness stated that 
although there are a "limited number of studies looking at religion and coping with 
chronic iUness, those which have been conducted suggest that religion is a common 
coping mechanism which may have positive effects in relation to adjustment. " 15 
The chronically ill state that their high quality of life comes not from denial 
of the consequences of iflness, but rather they: 
explain their well-being in terms of acknowledging their impairment, being 
in control of their minds and bodies; being able to perform expected roles; 
having a 'can do' approach to life; having a spiritual foundation and outlook, 
constructing and fiving in a reciprocal social world, including emotional give 
and take; and, feeling satisfied when comparing one's self to one's 
capabilities and the conditions of others in similar situations. " 16 
In this summary, one can see an expression of some of the basic goods: 
having a spiritual foundation links to peace with God, being able to control rnind 
13 Barth Riley, et al, "Types of Spiritual Well-Being among Persons with Chronic Illness: Their 
Relation to Various Forms of Quality of Life", Archives ofPhysical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 
v. 79,1998, pp. 261-262. 
14 Cathy Young, "Spirituality and the Chronically III Elderly", Geriatric Nursing, v. 14,1993, 
P; 300. 
S. Dein, J. Stygall, "Does Being Religious Help or Hinder Coping with Chronic Illness? A 
Critical Literature Review", Palliative Medicine, v. 11,1997, p. 294. 
16 Albrecht, Devlieger, "The Disability Paradox", p. 984. 
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and body appears to relate to human fife, health, and bodily integrity-, being able to 
perform expected roles links to playful activity and skilful work; and constructing 
and living in a reciprocal social world including emotional give and take conforms to 
having peace harmony with neighbours and living in a just society. A lack of basic 
goods may be found in the factors involved in a poor quality of fife: 
In the words of Persons with disabilities, poor to fair quality of fife is due to 
the disorganizing experience of pain; being de-energized by continual fatigue 
and a sense of hopelessness; the loss of control of corporal or mental 
activities; and/or having no clear purpose or spiritual outlook in fife. " 
The presence of pain causes one to lose control over one's body, social fife 
and environment. The body becomes the dominant centre of attention in one's fife. 
It isolates the individual and makes suffering a lonely experience. The basic goods 
of human fife, health and bochly integrity and peace with one's neighbour and 
society are damaged. Fatigue robs the person of the ability to plan, perform roles, 
and five a full life, sapping the fife force from one. Self-integration, the ability to 
lead the life one wants to lead, is impaired. Peace of conscience, where one is able 
to act out one's inner values, is hindered by the discrepancy between what one 
wants to do and what one can actuaUy do. The basic goods wifl be returned to laer, 
in the section 'Examining the Results in Light of the Basic Goods Theory', when 
the results of the pilot study are examined. 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VIRTUES AND COPING 
STRATEGIES 
As was discussed in the above section, coping strategies are ways in which 
patients reduce stress and learn to adapt to a new situation involving major 
lifestyle 
17 Ibid, p. 985. 
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changes. Two elements go into determining which coping strategies are utilised: the 
external factors and the character of one's personality. The external situation is 
something which cannot always be controlled by the patient. A person usually 
cannot choose to come down with osteoarthritis, endometriosis, or most other 
chronic illnesses. They are events that happen to the human body and involve little 
or no control by the sufferer. Some situations favour avoidant coping strategies, as 
in the case where little can be done to influence the cause of stress, such as a trip to 
the dentist. Other situations favour active problem-solving coping strategies, such 
as how best to resolve an over-loaded work schedule, or how best to avoid suffering 
a second myocardial infarction. 
It is argued that what the patient does control is the development of his/her 
personality. This is the internal factor concerned with which coping strategy is 
employed by a person. Some people will have such a personality that they would 
rather find out all the information possible about a situation causing stress in order 
to determine how to confront the problem, whereas others prefer to ignore the 
problem. These characteristics of their personalities that detem-iine how they prefer 
to deal with a problem do not appear by chance. Personalities are fon-ned and 
moulded. Characteristics are either promoted or submerged. The virtues help to 
form the personality. Whether a person has the type of personality to 'attack' a 
problem in hopes of eliminating it as a source of stress depends on whether the 
virtues of prudence, courage and perseverance are present. If they are, then a 
person will be able to understand if the situation favours a problem-solving or an 
avoidant coping strategy, and then have the courage to carry out the plan of action 
and persevere until the situation is resolved. The virtues or vices 
form or deform 
the personality of the person, and the personality 
determines how the person 
responds to a situation. The virtues or vices exist ontologicaUy prior to the 
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character traits of the person, as was discussed in the section on natural law in the 
chapter on Aquinas's virtue ethics. They therefore eyist prior to coping strategies. 
A person who obeys the virtues will have a 'good' personality and be able to achieve 
some happiness through responding appropriately to specific situations. The 
person with a vicious personality will not be able to respond in a manner that is 
appropriate to human flourishing and therefore suffer accordingly. 
Therefore, coping strategies and the virtues are not the same thing. The 
virtues determine which coping strategy is employed. The presence or lack of 
courage, prudence, understanding, patient, perseverance, etc., win decide the 
character of the agent and it is the agent's characteristics which then decide which 
coping strategy best suits the situation. 
EXAMINING THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY USING THE BASIC 
GOODS 
At this point I think it is necessary to examine how the basic goods were 
present in the pilot study narratives. When analysing the narratives and the themes 
which emerged from the narrative against the basic goods, one can see which areas 
of these patients' fives are adversely affected and which areas gain in flourishing. By 
studying the areas adversely affected, it is hoped that then specific virtues may be 
identified that can promote some flourishing or satisfaction in the patients'lives. 
Through studying the basic goods which seem to be positively impacted by chronic 
iUness, specific virtues can be identified and reinforced to aid happiness. 
The results from the study show that six out of the seven basic goods are 
affected through the introduction of osteo-arthritis into the patients' lives: human 
fife and health; playful activities and skilful work, self-integration or inner peace; 
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peace of conscience; peace with neighbours and society, and religion. " While these 
five were negatively impacted, however, peace with neighbours and society and 
playful activities and skilful work were also positively affected in that an 
appreciation of the value of these goods was enhanced and efforts made to cultivate 
them. A third basic good, peace with God or some more-than-human source, was 
mentioned in reference to feelings of gratitude toward abstract concepts such as fife 
or good health, however the evidence for this conclusion is somewhat vague and 
my conclusion is open to reconsideration. 
The basic good of human life and health was, not surprisingly, one of the 
more mentioned themes. At points in their illness, the good of human fife seemed 
to pale in comparison to the cost of maintaining life in terms of pain. Patients 
mentioned that in their worst moments, usually occurring when they were alone in 
the middle of the night, they thought of wishing to escape human life through 
death. They reluctantly accepted the need to recognise the deterioration of their 
body and health and to accept the negative emotions about coping with the body's 
limitation. Feelings of frustration, resentment and regret over the loss of bodily 
health had to be integrated into their self-image. They viewed themselves as if in a 
fight against the pain which isolated them from pursuing other goods in fife. It may 
be considered the core basic good whose damage leads to the further harming of 
other basic goods. Had the patients' health not been impaired, they would not have 
experienced the loss of ability to pursue valued pastimes, meaningful work, the 
withering of friendships, or the internal disharmony concerning their limited ability 
to express their inner nature. Their life would not have had such a radical 
disruption: 
18 Please refer to the section "The Basic Goods" in chapter four 'Natural Law and Basic Goods" 
for a review of the basic goods. 
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I never thought Id end up like this ... It changes your fife completely. Patient C" 
Inoviýaý; I uwzmd to ask )vu Výaff adook on life bz Gbo? ged SM'X)VU got iu? 
Well, it's had to change in some ways because of the fact that I'm stuck here 
must change the outlook on things but there again I try to be philosophical 
about that ... but it does change your outlook in that I was used to having 
so many different points of view, so many very interesting points of view 
when I travelled all over to these different countries and I do miss that and I 
regret that it's come to and end because I'm still interested in everything. 
In&w)iý-. - Has it cb=gpd)ourpimý at all? 
Yes. Without doubt. They change enormously. Oh God yes, and how they 
do. 
Patient D" 
The patients mentioned that to limit the damage done to their life by 
chronic illness, it was necessary that they come to a realistic perception of their 
iflness, an important theme brought out in their interviews. Much of the energy in 
their fives as people with osteoarthritis was focussed on fiving with the disease and 
moderating its impact on their health: 
I mean now, my feet and my hands and throbbing, burning, with the 
arthritis. I'm aware of it, but I don't take no notice of it. And this is how I 
cope with going round the house. I don't sit feeling sorry for myself, that 
doesn't get you anywhere. 
Patient E" 
I mean the pain is there all the time, pulling ... To have it all the time, and I 
mean I can go to bed and I take pillows and I used to he back but I can't do 
that now and I get sore sometimes. I can't even roll around and I've got to 
get out and bring myself round to ... I mean the last I turned to myself "I don't want to go through that again" ... they've got to give me something for the pain because the more I go on, the pain gets worse. 
Patient Cý' 
--- but I 
don't know, it's just too awU for words. I don't wish anybody ... 
I know when I had my cancer thing, it was nothing compared to this pain 
Patient Aý' 
19 Patient C, P. 1. 
20 Patient D, pp-7-8. 
21 Patient E, p. II- 
22 Patient C, pp. 6,16. 
23 Patient A, p. 2. 
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Certain types of acti* had to be limited, the amount of physical activity had to be 
monitored, diets changed, social schedules had to altered to fit in with their level of 
ability. The disease appears to have to be taken into consideration in most of their 
deliberations. They had to learn to understand the ebb and flow of the disease 
within their body, how to moderate activities and to come to accept the permanence 
of their condition. 
The second basic good negatively affected by the osteo-arthritis was playful 
activities and skilful work. The disease lirrýited the ability of the patients to exercise 
and partake in activities in which they formerly found satisfaction and relaxation. 
Extended vacations become day-trips, physical activities such as walking or 
gardening had to be parcelled out in small doses and a price in pain expected to be 
paid for it. Nonnal day-to-day activities of keeping up with household chores such 
as shopping or cleaning became very difficult and needed much planning to carry 
out. Expressions of frustration were noted at the lack of freedom to be able to 
continue on with activities that previously had brought them stimulation and 
enjoyment: 
I mean at one stage I wasn't anywhere near as sedentaty as I am now, I'm a 
doer 
... 
it isn't easy to sit around. I don't like to I look out in the garden 
and it's a mess, it really is ... 
I can't get down on the floor and polish it like I 
used to. I just can't do it. And it affects you. And usually when I've had an 
upset or ... 
I do something, I turn the cupboards out or go for a walk, or 
dig the garden or get rid of your frustrations in a physical way, but I can't 
now. 24 
Patient B 
The cessation or reduction of participation in these activities also had the impact of 
making the patients feel that their self-identity was threatened, one of the five 
themes emerging from the interviews. Habitual patterns of behaviour were now 
greatly curtailed. However, this is a basic good which also received positive 
24 Patient B, p. I- 
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reinforcement. The reduction of the more physical activities was replaced by mental 
activities, such as crosswords puzzles, reading, or watching quiz shows and sporting 
events. The absorption into mental activities had the effects of: getting the mind off 
of pain; making them feel they were in control of the disease; raising the quality of 
fife; and increasing abstract appreciation for existing physical and mental abilities. 
These points fall into the themes of knowing what maintains one's quality of fife 
and gratitude for existing qualities of health and mind: 
And when you read of course, you gather knowledge and all sorts of things 
and when you listen to quizzes you think 'Oh, I know that. Like Tifteen to 
One' or those tea time quizzes and you think I'm not so thick after all! ' And 
it sort of keeps your mind active. 
Patient B" 
Peace with neighbours and society was a second basic good that was both 
negatively and positively impacted by the disease. The illness caused alienation 
from neighbours and the rest of society in that the patients felt frustration at the 
misconceptions of others relating to the effects of the disease. The patients 
expressed anger when people doubted their accounts of the affects of the illness, 
such as the intensity of pain or the limitations imposed. Alienation and anger 
appeared to occur from segments of society when the patients decided that to know 
what fife was Eke with the disease, one had to have the disease: 
... pain 
is a funny thing, unless you can see it, you know, people don't seem 
to feel sympathy for you ... and that's another thing 
I found, people do not 
listen to what you say. They listen but they don't hear, do you know what I 
mean? 
Patient Aý' 
You know nobody cares because people are like this. We ought not to be 
here anymore, you know, after you're sixty, nobody's bothered ... Not that I 
want people to roll out the red carpet for you and clear the pavement 
for 
you, but people walk straight at you! They'll see you trying to get 
in a door, 
and they'll walk through the door and let it swing back 
in your face. That 
25 Ibid, p. 3. 
26 Patient A, p. 4. 
183 
can affect you ... (the Sms) goes right into your social fife as well, right 
across the board really. 
Patient B 27 
And I got the stage really where Id cry because Id feel no-one was helping 
me, and I often used to say, you know, 'Please, can somebody help me? 'you know, moaning to myself and crying and carrying on and rocking backwards 
and forwards. 
Patient Aý' 
They worried that the effects of the disease on their actions would lead others to 
think that they were unfriendly, antisocial, ungrateful and exaggerators. A result of 
the belief that their own experience of the disease was not believed was that they 
had some difficulty maintaining their self-identity. They worried that perhaps the 
others were correct in their assessment that the patients were over-reacting to the 
situation and they themselves were mistaken: 
They think I've exaggerated. But that's the sort of thing that's very 
aggravating when you're in pain. You really do you feel 'Oh come on, what 
I'm telling you is what they've told me. ' But I find people say 'You're 
repeating it wrong. 'Or 'You're imagining part of it. ' They don't mean to be 
unkind but they just don't listen. 
Patient Aý' 
However, in certain respects, peace with neighbours and society was promoted. 
The themes of gratitude and maintaining a balanced perspective on fife with the 
disease are relevant to this area. The illness served to bring into clarity the 
importance of social relationships and institutions to humans concerning their 
ability to flourish. The help of neighbours, good friends and family helped the 
patients maintain a balanced perspective on life with their condition and appeared to 
lessen their sense of isolation from other parts of society. They appreciated better 
the social aspects of fife, gaining an heightened enjoyment for the pleasure that 
27 Patient B, pp. 4-5. Italics placed by author. 
28 Patient A, p. I 
29 Ibid, p. 4. 
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family and friends bring to life. This was one where the theme of gratitude was 
most noticeable remarked upon: 
My next door neighbour, she's absolutely marvellous. She's seventy-seven 
and been helping me! Shell call in on me and (ýwkinct) shops and then calls in and asks if I'm all right. 
Patient Cý' 
I've got loads of people who help me ... I've got some very good women friends 
... But I 
do get a lot of help from my friends and I get a lot of help 
from my daughter. Untold moral support" 
Patient B" 
The most important thing in my fife in the moment -I think it's got to be 
the kindness of my girls, the fact that they are so supportive is really very 
important to me. 
Patient D" 
just as the good of peace with neighbours and society was damaged through 
the lack of understanding of the part of others, so too does this lack of 
understanding damage the patients' sense of self-integration or inner peace. They 
questioned their self-worth in that the attitudes of others caused them to believe 
that they themselves were to blame for their limitations. The impatience of others 
with the patients due to the effects of the disease caused the patients to create a 
poor self-image, causing them to isolate themselves from society. Whereas the basic 
good of peace with neighbours and society caused them to worry that the iUness 
forced them to act in ways that others might take to be antisocial, unfriendly and 
ungrateful, this in turn appeared to affect the patients in that they felt bad about 
themselves for presenting such an image to the public. Their self-worth was also 
damaged through a decline in social invitations due to others believing that it would 
cause the patient too much pain to go out. The patients stated that they forced 
Patient C, P-3. 
Patient B, pp. 4,1 1. 
32 Patient D, p-9. 
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themselves to be pragmatic about other's understanding of the their illness and 
realise that the misconceptions lay with these others and not themselves. They 
expressed feelings that the disease may have had the effect of producing unwelcome 
changes in their personalities: 
In some ways it's made me more vindictive. Sort of saying -I know 
nobody else ... what's worried me most of all was that people thought I was 
not telling the truth. I felt people thought I was exaggerating and thought I 
was making a fuss about, well not nothing exactly but making a lot of fuss. 
Patient Aý' 
I must adrnit I'm quite envious of the people doing the kind of things I like 
to do and can't do ... I think it has altered me in some way, you 
know. I 
don't think anything like this doesn't alter you. Something does alter you no 
matter what - when you got something like, well it's quite a hill to climb 
this... 
Patient Aý' 
In&wwu-er. - ... 
bz havhV bad the db7ess cbopi the uay youfiel abw ymmy? 
It disgusted me ... I was absolutely 
disgusted. I felt dirty. 
Patient Aý' 
The fifth basic good that emerged from the interviews was that of peace of 
conscience and harmony between one's thoughts and deeds. The illness forced the 
patients to act in ways they did not want to and this upset the patients because it 
represented an image of them which was not true. This goes back again to the basic 
good of peace with neighbours and society in that the patients worried that other's 
had negative opinions of them because they could be seen as sources of 
inconvenience, fussy, unfriendly, and exaggerators of problems. They wanted to 
partake fully in activities with others, being able to stand at length at parties and chat 
with others rather than have to be seated most of the time and appear aloof or to 
not ask for special considerations when they went out with others, such as 
having a 
33 Patient A, p. 4. 
34 Ibid, p. 5. 
35 lbid, p. 8. 
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certain type of seat, special handling in getting out of cars, slowing the pace of 
walking of others, etc.: 
I used to help the old people and different things, going around selling raffle 
tickets and doing baking and I don't do that now ... Look after them, have 
outings with them, dinner, I used to help with that. 
Patient C' 
What breaks my heart is not being able to pick my granddaughter up. And 
play with her. And I used to play with them, dance with them, and pick her 
up. I never thought the day would come that that would happen. That is 
sad ... I mean it has turned my fife around and if (grandd=gbter) comes in 
now I'd want to be messing around, you see, and all of a sudden you could 
some place take her for a walk and all of a sudden shell swing around and 
want to be picked up and you have to explain again, and I don't know ... I 
mean I didn't realise I was going to be like this, when I look back when my 
mum was widowed she loved to go on holiday and I thought I was going to 
be the same and as I say it's just completely turned my life upside down ... it's frustrating if you've got to ask somebody for what I call simple things, or 
should be simple things. 
Patient C' 
I think it's hard for me ... because I've 
been on my own for so many years 
and I've had to do things. And all of a sudden I'm not able to do these 
things and it is hard, it just completely turned my life around. 
Patient Cý' 
They believed that these were not core traits that were representative of their 
personality and they did not want them associated with themselves. They saw 
themselves as being realistic about their condition and having to act in certain ways 
with reluctance. However, they worried that others would misinterpret their 
actions. 
The last basic good mentioned was that of religion. The patients mentioned 
abstract qualities that were indicative of a relationship with a more-than-human 
source. They expressed gratitude toward the abstract qualities of good 
health and 
the pleasant experiences associated with human existence, such as meaningful 
36 Patient C, p. 6. 
31 lbid, pp. 7,11,14. 
38 lbid, p. 16. 
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relationships, the beauty of nature, or the little things that make life worth living. 
Because empirical studies report the beneficial effects of religion, religion itself shall 
also be examined in addition to the more-than-human aspect of this basic good. 
These six basic goods are all somewhat interrelated in regard to how they 
are affected by chronic iHness. As was mentioned earlier, the lynchpin is human fife 
and health. Once this basic good was adversely affected, other basic goods were 
damaged. The lack of health forced the patients to curtail their activities in regard 
to play and work, which affected their sense of self-identity. Their self-identity was 
also threatened in regard to peace with neighbours and society. Friends who were 
unaware of the implications of the disease did not understand how it affected the 
patients, and the patients felt their own accounts of pain or the extent of linýtations 
imposed by the illness were doubted by friends, neighbours and relatives. The 
patients resented this and felt socially isolated because no one understood what they 
were going through. They also were invited out less often because of the beliefs of 
others that the patients did not want to be asked out because it would cause them 
pain or that they were too much of an inconvenience. Self-integration or inner 
peace was similarly affected by the patients' self-identity being challenged. Patients 
reported that their self-integration was challenged through the attitudes of others. 
The negative thoughts or impatience of others made the patients feel negative about 
themselves, and doubt their own self-worth. This in turn lead to peace of 
conscience and harmony between ones'thoughts and deeds being damaged. In 
order to avoid pain or worsening the condition, the iflness demanded that the 
patients act in certain ways. The patients did not believe that their actions reflected 
their real character, but worried that others would see them as unfriendly, fussy or 
exaggerators. This did not reflect their true selves yet they 
had to act in that way in 
order to five with the disease. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE VIRTUES39 
What happened in the lives of the patients was that they understood certain 
aspects of their fives, the basic goods, to be threatened or impaired through the 
illness and they automatically sought out certain actions to help repair this damage. 
The fact that the patients did not use the language of virtues is not surprising 
because it is not in general use today. The language of rights and principles is more 
familiar to the public. However, that the patients acted virtuously without labelling 
it so is a testimony of the insight of virtue theory into understanding human nature 
and how happiness is achieved. The actions of the patients, whether they labefled 
them in virtue terminology or not, were virtuous actions. 
The virtues which were relevant to patients with chronic illness will be 
examined through analysing the basic goods that were affected. In their interviews, 
the patients' narratives revolved around the five themes mentioned above. These 
themes in which they discussed how the iUness affected aspects of their fives were 
analysed to see how the basic goods were affected. In the interviews the patients 
discussed the effect the iHness had on their Eves and the actions that they took in 
response to the effects. Their responses to the illness were either virtuous or 
vicious actions. What appears to have happened in the patientsEves was that an 
illness intruded, five basic goods categories were adversely affected, three were 
positively impacted, and the patients performed virtuous or vicious actions in an 
attempt to still pursue the basic goods and work towards flourishing. 
To understand specificaUy which virtues and vices were pursued, the 
statements of the patients were placed into the themes and these statements 
39 Please refer to Appendix A, which has charts that correlate the affected basic goods and the 
virtues that attempt to promote or 
limit damage to that specific basic good. 
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examined to see if any of the virtues were relevant. A brief overview of how the 
virtues operated is that courage is first needed to face the illness; prudence is utifised 
to understand the nature of the task of fiving with chronic illness, temperance then 
makes use of the findings of prudence and takes the necessary steps to moderate the 
effects of the illness; and justice enters when the patients interact with others in 
daily fife. The results are somewhat what one would expect. The response to the 
basic good of human fife and health being adversely affected was that the allied 
virtues of prudence and temperance, as weH as the inteUectual virtues were often 
described as ways of promoting this basic good. Courage was necessary because in 
their worst moments the patients thought of death and needed the strength to 
continue. There were some surprises however. The basic good of self-integration 
or inner peace did not have much to do with other virtues except those related to 
the cardinal virtue of justice, which is primarily concerned with giving others there 
due. This relates to another surprising theme: that much of the happiness derived 
by the patients comes from other people's exercising virtues. If other people acted 
virtuously towards them, their happiness increased, when others acted viciously 
toward them, their self-esteem and self-worth was damaged and so feelings of inner 
peace were marred. This section of the chapter will look at the effects of the basic 
goods and determine which virtues were predominately associated with attempts to 
secure or promote the basic goods. 
7he Passions 
The passions were also relevant to an understanding of how the virtues 
operated in the patients' fives. The concupiscent passions were of less relevance 
than the irascible. Concupiscible passions are oriented to objects perceived as good 
by the appetite. With the iDness, many of the goods had to be moderated in their 
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use or avoided altogether and this was the function of temperance. The irascible 
passions were the more dominant passions relevant to the circumstances of the 
chronically ill patient. These passions deal with the intense and fiery emotions that 
occur when a patient is Presented with an obstacle to overcome in achieving a good 
or avoiding an evil. The patients perceived that a great obstacle had been placed 
into their fives and which could have very adverse affects if not countered 
somehow. The irascible emotions are divided by Aquinas into three groups: hope 
and despair; fear and daring; and anger which has no counterpart. Hope is focussed 
on a future good that can be achieved only through overcoming some difficulties. 
The patients maintained hope that they would be able to five a reasonably happy fife 
with the illness if they endured the hardships imposed by the illness and maintained 
a careful lifestyle through avoiding activities which aggravated their illness. The 
activities which aggravated the illness were held in check by temperance. While the 
patients had moments of true despair, these were fleeting and despair never became 
an entrenched emotion. 'Me pain caused by the iUness caused the patients the 
emotion of fear, which is a reaction to a future evil that the person perceives as 
present. In other words, the patient could imagine all of their future fife with the 
pain as present and experienced fear. The opposite of fear is daring, which is an 
attack on the evil, and can be impulsive and rash. The patients did not show this 
emotion. Rather, their methods of dealing with the illness exhibited forethought 
and calculation, and so used the virtues of prudence and courage. Anger is a 
reaction to a present evil that is affecting the person, and implies either hope of 
revenge or sadness. It does not wiU evil but wishes to be avenged of evil. The 
patients recognised that the suffering that they are undergoing is an evil, which they 
can nummise but never remove, and so anger denotes a sadness of the evil in their 
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Eves that robs them of some measure of happiness. 
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Him= Life and Health 
Three cardinal virtues and their allied virtues were utilised by the patients in 
an attempt to restore or minirnise the damage done to human life and health: 
courage; prudence; and temperance. As was mentioned in the first chapter, there is 
a unity to the virtues in that where there is one, there wM be others. The virtues are 
interconnected and mutuafly supportive, and this fact is demonstrated in this and 
the following analyses of the basic goods. Courage was needed to face up to the 
unpleasant and painful effects of the chronic illness. The patients saw themselves in 
a battle against the illness, and to prepare themselves for this battle, they needed 
prudence. Prudence gave them the ability to think rationally about the disease and 
to come to have a realistic understanding of it, which in turn gave them the courage 
to face it. In order to face the illness, they needed a 'game plan' that would allow 
them to five with it. This is where temperance was important. Temperance allowed 
them to learn to live with the disease by understanding how to moderate the impact 
of the disease through controlling their actions. In order to understand which 
actions needed to be moderated, they needed the virtue of prudence. So there is an 
interconnection between all three virtues. Take one away, and the 'game plan' falls 
apart. 
Courage was one of the most prominent virtues mentioned in regard to this 
basic good. The patients understood themselves to be confronted with a situation 
where their basic good of health was severely compromised and 
death entered their 
thoughts. Courage was needed to face up to the task of continued living and 
its 
allied virtues of patience and perseverance were of particular 
importance to their 
chronic illness because, unlike the virtue of courage 
itself which faces a mortal 
danger and then returns to a normal level of anxiety, chronic 
illness is a daily 
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confrontation with hardship and special virtues are needed to face this long-term 
fight. In the darkest moments of the illness, when they were in intense pain and felt 
isolated from all others and the life that they once knew, the patients thought of 
death: 
I mean there were times ... when I just wanted to die myself because the pain was so extortionate and the headaches and I was going round in a 
whirl, I felt as though I was on heroin, or whatever they call it, and I 
thought I'm not in this world any more, there was so much going on and 
what with the pain, and I used to virtual1y ask God to take me. Patient E" 
And I've often said - I'm not all that religious but I often say'Please, look, 
take me home'. I don't want, you know, to five through it ... If it had been a dog I would have put it to sleep ... But because I am human I have to go through it. 
Patient Aý' 
Life is viewed as a strugee, a fight whose goal is not to give into despair. 
Courage, usually associated with the danger of death incurred in warfare, is shown 
by the patients. Chiefly concerned with the dangers of death, courage: 
has the task of protecting the human wiH so that it is not turned back 
through fear of bodily harm from the good proposed by reason. Now we 
hold steadfastly, in the face of any evil whatsoever, to the good proposed by 
reason, with which no mere bodily good can compare. (2a2ae. 123.4. ) 
The patients were confronted with an evil, a painful chronic illness, and had 
to steel their wills to continue to pursue the good proposed by reason: human life. 
An allied virtue of courage, magnanimýty or enterprise, seems to be a part of 
the patients' mindset. Magnanimity implies a certain aspiration of spirit to great 
things and is about having a certain greatness of spirit. TechnicaUy, it "estabhshes 
the mean of reason with regard to ... public recognition ... recognition in itself is a 
special good and so magnanirnity considered in itself is a special 
virtue. " (2a2ae. 129-4. ) While it is concerned onlywith great distinction, it is 
40 Patient E, p. 12. 
41 Patient A, p. 2. 
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applicable to the patients in the sense that "it coincides -with courage inasmuch as it 
strengthens the mind for a strenuous task; but it falls short of courage in 
strengthening the mind for the task in which it is easier to remain 
steadfast. " (2a2ae. 129.5. ) Once the initial despair has passed and thoughts of death 
have receded until the next low period, the patients are still left with a battle on their 
hands to try to maintain a certain level of happiness in their fives. This is an 
ongoing effort requiring more exertion than those in good physical health and so 
magnanimity, while not technically a perfect application to the patient's situation, 
does grasp the sense of the patients' circumstances: 
It's quite a hill to climb this ... 
it's a fight to get better actually. 
Patient Aý' 
I fight against feeling sorry for myself 
Patient B 43 
I think it probably helps with this (poin& to leg) because I think 'I won't be 
beaten' 
Patient B" 
The patients learned to be patient and persevere, both allied virtues of 
courage, through the bad times of their Mness. Aquinas saw endurance as part of 
courage: "endurance involves being physically affected, but it also involves the 
action of the soul clinging most bravely to some good, so that it does not give way 
under pressure of physical duress. " (2a2ae. 123.6. r4. ) Patience is about enduring 
hardships and helps to shield the person from feelings of sorrow or dejection and it 
perseveres in continuing on toward a good end. It fights against suffering and does 
not let it overwhelm the reason. (2a2ae. 136.1. ) Perseverance is concerned with 
42 lbid, p. 5. 
43 Patient B, p. 4. 
44 Jbid, p. 2. 
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helping other virtues achieve long-term goals and endures as long as is necessary so 
that other acts of virtue can be achieved: (2a2ae. 137.1. ) 
What can you do? You've got to get through. WeR, wha do you do? How do you not get through? 
Patient B 45 
With a lot of determination actually, yes. It's taken me sometimes three or four hours to dress myself because I can't bear to pull down there and pull it 
up ... but it's just a matter of sort of you've got to do it really, haven't you, 
otherwise you just don't, you might as well die ... you've got to get on with it haven't you? 
Patient Aý' 
There are some times in the mornings when I get up and haven't had the 
injections for eight or ten weeks and oh God, I really want out of it, I can't 
walk and it is so painful, it's horrible, and I think Vhat am I living for? No, 
come on, walk around, have a cup of coffee, do something. 
Patient D" 
This ability to rely on courage and persevere through the worst times also 
meant the virtue of prudence was necessary. One of the five themes discovered in 
the pilot study analysis was the realistic perception of the illness in order to learn 
how to Eve with it. The patients needed to learn the ebb and flow of the disease, 
realise that there are good and bad days, accept the permanence of the condition, 
and that there would probably be no nýracle cure in the near future. Prudence 
involves knowing which things to seek after and which things to avoid. It resides in 
the reason and means looking ahead. ' The prudent person is one who is keen- 
sighted and can see how uncertainties wiH play out. It "learns from the past and 
present about the future: this is the special office of reason, since it involves a 
process of comparison. " (2a2ae. 47.1. ) The allied virtue of prudence which was most 
relevant to the patients was sound judgement, which deals with questions 
concerning every day fife. Sound judgement has three stages: taking counsel; 
45 lbid, p-9. 
46 Patient A, p. 3. 
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forming a judgement on what has been discovered, and commanding action to 
bring about what has been thought out. (2a2ae-47.1. ) This process can be seen to be 
performed in the patients who were grappling to comes to terms with how to cope 
with the osteoarthritis: 
I'm always hunting out doctors. 
Patient Aý' 
You hear it from other people you see, and they're tight. I find these things 
out for myself 
Patient C' 
... and then I've bought endless books on osteoarthtitis and so you give up (certainfoods) -I have not eaten an orange since my knees went, no tomatoes, 
and I don't know whether its worked or not because I could have been 
worse if I'd eaten all these oranges that I used to, but you don't know, do 
you? ... I could have been worse, I could have been better, who knows? Patient D" 
Prudence was also needed in order that the third major virtue, temperance, 
could be utilised when the basic good of human life and health was challenged. 
Various allied virtues were found in the patients' reaction to their health being 
affected: humility-, abstinence; fasting, gluttony-, and sobriety. Temperance controls 
the concupiscible passions in their pursuit of bodily goods and avoidance of bodily 
evils. People rebel against reason in regard to pursuging bodily goods which serve 
reason9s purpose because they try to seek enjoyment of them but they do so out of 
bounds of reason and go to excess. Whereas courage controls our fear of bodily 
pain and controls our boldness to strike out at it, temperance controls our affections 
for goods and controls the grief or sadness when these goods or pleasures are not 
present, because we grieve when what pleases us is absent. (2a2ae. 141.3. ) The 
patients learned to limit the activities which caused them pain and made the iUness 
worse. They had to have the humility to accept the eidsting physical capacities of 
48 Patient A, p. 8. 
49 Patient C, p. 2. 
50 Patient D, p. 7. 
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their bodies and learn to accept these limitations. They daily monitored the amount 
of physical activity they undertook, were sensible in eating and learned not to 
overdo things or fail to judge physical capability correctly: 
just make the most of it, and look after yourself and be sensible with your 
eating, be sensible with your activities and just say to yourself, 'I may be a lot better tomorrow. 
Patient E" 
when I go up to the (shoppk amm) there's no way I could walk the length of it. I've got to go and park outside a specific shop and I use what I call my 
walking ration up. 
Patient B" 
But that's what it is with this complaint, I always say you've got to be half 
and half - active and rest. Active and rest. 
Patient E" 
I think what you've got to do is rest quite a bit. And pace yourself I mean 
I go bull mad at things sometimes. It's Eke this lecture I went to on Monday 
evening. And I enjoyed it. But I realised I'd done too much the next day. 
But you've got to adjust your fife to what you can do. I'm not saying it's 
easy to do. 
Patient B" 
They expressed some negative feelings toward having to rein in their 
activities, which is only natural. Desire lead us to have an appetite for what is 
pleasurable and temperance checks this desire. Pleasure arises from congenial 
activity and the more natural the activity, the stronger the pleasure. Aquinas writes 
that "most natural for animal fife are the activities that preserve the individual, by 
eating, drinking, and the species, by coupling of male and female. " (2a2ae. 141.4. ) 
Temperance extends secondarily to the pleasures of sight, sound, smell and taste in 
that these add to our pleasure gained through using the tangible necessities of life. 
The patients had to curb many of these appetites and found this difficult to bear: 
Not being fi=y, but I'm still in the angry stages at the moment, not being 
able to do things. 
51 Patient E, p. 12. 
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Patient C' 
I'd like to go to (h-ý), Id like to do this or that but I can't. And that's 
annoying. " 
Patient B" 
I feel as though I've been cheated. I'm not active. 
Patient E 57 
As was mentioned earlier, the basic good of human fife and health was the 
lynchpin from which the other basic goods started to be adversely affected. This 
resentment at the necessity to curtail activities crosses over into another basic good. 
Playfid A awdia and A ilfid Work 
The patients experienced frustration at the limitations imposed on them by 
the illness in regard to not being able to pursue former activities and employment 
which brought satisfaction and enjoyment. The above section on human life and 
health mentioned the need to act with moderation in certain activities to avoid 
further deterioration of health. Some patients had to quit work, could not travel as 
much, could not socialise in their accustomed manner, or get around to do 
shopping as they once did. This meant that physical activities became less 
prominent in their daily existence and mental activities gained more prominence. 
Intellectual virtue deals with two things: through consideration of the truth, they 
make us capable of knowing what goods to pursue; and let us appreciate more and 
fulfil our rational nature, which is what differentiates humans from animal and 
vegetative life. Because the ability to reason and reflect are the traits marking one as 
human, when the patients turned toward more intellectual activities, they embraced 
what constitutes themselves specifically as human. Aquinas directs several 
55 Patient C, p. 16. 
56 Patient B, p. 2. 
57 Patient E, p. 13. 
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questions to the topic of the active and contemplative fife. (2a2ae. 179-182. ) By 
contemplative life, he refers to a fife contemplating God, meaning the virtue of 
wisdom, but included in this is the use of the other intellectual virtues. He writes 
that "all men naturally desire to know, and therefore they delight in the knowledge 
of truth" (2a2ae. 179.7. ) He lists several reasons why the contemplative fife is more 
noble than the active fife: it suits what is most excellent in humans, their intellect; its 
delights surpasses that of the active fife; and it is lived by what is most proper to 
humans, their mind, whereas the activities of the active fife involve the lower 
powers common to humans and animals. (2a2ae. 182.1. ) The patients would not 
necessarily agree with Aquinas that they should be feeling happy that their new 
lifestyle exercises their intelIectual. virtues more than when they were in better 
health. They appreciate the benefits of mental activity, but miss the active lifestyle 
they had when they had better health: 
When I have a bad day I am sensible, I don't try and do housework then, I 
sit down. I take my tablets, put my feet up, I'm not interested in any of that 
when I'm in a lot, a lot of pain. I'll just sit there all on my own and then I'll 
struggle out of there and make a cup of tea. 
Patient E" 
it's no pleasure to me sitting in a chair just watching television when I like to 
go out ... it restricts you of course. You're not as 
happy and free as you 
rnight be, are you? 
Patient V' 
usually when I've had an upset ... I do something. I turn the cupboards out 
or go for a walk, or dig the garden or get rid of your frustrations in a 
physical way, but I can't now. 
Patient B" 
In this sense, the virtue of good manners (the moden sense of the virtue 
would be rendered 'play), an allied virtue of temperance, suffered. According to 
58 Ibid, p. 8. 
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Aquinas, moral virtue includes play. We need to rest and restore our bodies because 
we cannot work without a break. Pleasure is rest for the soul and the body. Too 
little play is a vice just as is anything that conflicts with reason in human actions is a 
vice. (2a2ae. 168.1-4. ) The illness limited their abilities to cultivate the intellectual 
virtues in some senses. Wl@e the patients were oriented toward them before the 
illness, the reduction in physical activity caused the intellectual virtues to acquire a 
new stature and prominence in their daily life. The speculative intellectual virtue of 
inteflect seems to be affected. The virtue of inteRect is concerned with a truth 
known through another by means of an inquiry of reason. (la2ae. 57.2. ) The intense 
level of pain sometimes drove other thoughts from the mind or it decreased the 
ability to seek out new activities stimulating to the intellect: 
It's difficult to hold onto something when you're in real pain. I'm thinking 
of a time when I'm sitting on the edge of the bed and sort of rock myself 
backwards and forwards and your brain goes real]y quit void in a sense, I 
think, it has to I think, to relieve you of the pain in a funny sort of way 
because while you're thinking about it, it's getting worse and worse but 
somehow if you can get it out of the brain ... Patient Aý' 
I used to travel a hell of a lot, and that I can't do any more and there comes 
the same thing back again, that I take my memories out, but it does change 
your outlook in that I was used to having so many different points of view, 
so many very interesting points of view when I travelled all over to these 
different countries ... I do miss that and I regret that its come to an end because I'm still interested in everything. 
Patient D" 
you start off (on a tro) and think, oh lovely, but the more pressure you put 
on your legs, it's bad ... It gets worse and worse and worse and you can't 
stand up very long ... so I know not to go on 
long journeys. And it's 
restricted quite a lot of what I can do. 
Patient 0' 
In the interviews the patients acknowledge that they miss the activities that 
they used to be able to perform, but they do not dwell on the topic. Rather, they Est 
61 Patient A, p. 15. 
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the measures that they have taken to replace the loss of favourite pastimes. 
Whereas being ill may have robbed them of opportunities that they had previously 
found to be intellectually stimulating, such as travelling, it is the intellectual virtues 
that appear to 'pick up the slack'when patients perform less physical activities and 
are restricted to the home. Both the speculative intellectual virtues of 
understanding, intellect and wisdom, and the practical intellectual virtues of craft 
and prudence appeared to undergo a renaissance. Concerning the speculative 
virtues, mental activities such as reading, doing crosswords, or watching quiz shows 
were mentioned as the patients main source of relaxation and enjoyment: 
... so you think, 'What can I do now? ' So you get a book out, and I've got, 
what, five book cases full, to the floor. I've got this theory that because you 
can't get outside I have to do something in here ... I do a lot more reading, or listening to the radio, or crosswords or quizzes, or anything you can do 
sitting down. So in that sense I've changed. But I've done a lot of these 
things before. But obviously I've adapted and I do a lot more of it than 
before. 
Patient B" 
I do a bit of reading, books and magazines, and I was sitting here a couple 
of weeks ago and I was so bored and I said to myself, for God's sake, do 
something, take your mind off of it and I picked up my puzzle book and I 
was doing that, and I won a little prize in it. 
Patient C" 
Reading is my best friend, without doubt, yes. I'm always reading ... You've 
got to (rwzain nxntaUy aaiz, -). If you don't, you become a cabbage and that 
won't do at all. 
Patient D 66 
This appetite for inteRectual pursuits also covered the virtue of wisdom, 
which considers the highest and deepest causes and goes back to first causes and 
which will be discussed more thoroughly in the section on refigion. (Ia2ae. 57.2. ) 
The reduction in physical activity led to more time to reflect on abstract 
appreciation on human existence and its attendant physical and cognitive abilities 
64Patient B, p. I- 
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and denoted an awareness in the inherently fulfilling aspect of using the human 
inteRect: 
I'm not religious by any means but I do think that you have to respect the fact that you are here and that somebody got you here. I mean you're not 
... I mean, look at the birth of a baby for one thing. It's the most 
marvellous thing that anyone can think of really, isn't it? ... I don't know what the answers are to some of these awful things that are happening to 
people, I don't know what's (ýý) to that, don't know, fife is very 
complicated really, but it's fascinating ... I think there must be a power of some description that holds us together somehow, unless you're going to fall 
that other way and think we're just like animals ... There are all sorts of weird things that go on in life that fascinate me to death actually. Patient Aý' 
Peace uith Neobours and Sodety 
Peace with neighbours and society was attacked by the illness causing social 
isolation through the attitudes of others who have no idea what fife with the disease 
is like. The 'others' tended to be people who had little personal bonds with the 
patients and did not know them as persons. However, the basic good was also 
given an oppommity to flourish. A renewed appreciation for those close to the 
patients -family, good friends and neighbours - helped the patient maintain a 
balanced perspective on life with the condition through still possessing important 
personal relationships and being part of a community. The illness brought into 
clarity how reliant humans are on social relationships and institutions to flourish as 
individuals. 
It is not surprising that the cardinal virtue of justice and its allied virtues play 
a large role in supporting this basic good. The thoughtless treatment that the 
patients experienced at the hands of others made them much more aware of the i 
vices of social injustice such as defamation or whispering. They believed that they 
67 Patient A, p. 13. 
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were victims of others acting with injustice when it came to passing judgement. " It 
also draws awareness to the point of how much of the individual's happiness comes 
from other people's exercising the virtues. The patient's self-worth was damaged 
when people treated them poorly. Besides the virtues of temperance noted in the 
section on human fife and health, which occur time and again in the patient's 
narratives, the social justice virtues stand out as most prominent. The virtue of 
gratitude occurred frequently throughout the narratives as the patients discussed 
how they coped with the disease. The virtue serves to support what Aquinas would 
consider a primary natural law precept of living in community and what the basic 
goods theory calls peace with neighbours and society. The vices undem-dned this 
precept so as to wear down the patients' desire to interact with society because they 
were made to feel bad about themselves: 
It (society) does not cater for someone who is not one hundred per cent 
perfect. Especially someone with disabilities. And when I go walking, there 
is a zebra crossing right on the roundabout in (toun) so a car comes - 
varoom- and stops and driver is drunu-ning his fingers and waiting for you 
to get out of the way and you think 'Oh dear. ' 
Patient B" 
... people 
don't like other people's pain an awful lot you know. Do they? 
Not really ... generally talking, people aren't really 
interested in when 
somebody's got a pain that's continuously a pain anyway are they? 
Patient A7 
I've had all sorts of funny remarks passed to me ... I 
find sometimes I shy 
away if I've got a really bad day but I know if I'm going to say'Oh, its awful 
today', people are going to say 'Oh, is it? ' sort of just like that, you know, 
without really being concerned. 
Patient Aý' 
68 Aquinas writes about passing judgement in 2a2ae. 60. He treats it in the introductory section on 
justice and describes it as an act of justice. It is not placed in the sections on the virtues and vices 
of justice, and appears to be a necessary condition which 
decides if certain acts are virtuous or 
vicious. Passing judgement seems to summarise the 
feelings of the patients about how they were 
unjustly treated by others. 
If others had not passed judgement on them, the rest of the vices, such 
as defamation or whispering would not 
be present. The purpose of an act of justice is to give 
what is due to another, allowing people 
to live companionably in connnon. )"a2ae. 58.2. ) 
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The patients responded to the situation by showing the virtue of clemency 
and gentleness toward the vice of defamation, or an unjust act of passing 
judgement. Defamation is the taking away of another person's character in one of 
two ways: through defaming the honour of a person or drawing attention to 
character flaws which detract from a person. (2a2ae. 72.1. ) People detracted from the 
dignity of the person in the first sense through acting callously. Drumming one's 
fingers on the steering wheel is meant to harm the person and make them feel 
inadequate, just as giving a thoughtless reply to a person in pain shows a lack of 
respect for the person which diminishes that person in stature. Passing judgement 
is concerned with what is tight and promotes justice. It demands that the benefit of 
the doubt should be given to a person and that doubt should be considered 
favourable, "unless we have evident indications of another's wickedness, we ought 
to stick to a good opinion of him. " (2a2ae. 60.4. ) When a person thinks ill of another 
person, he or she despises the person and does that person injury for no good 
reason, which is an act of injustice. The patients were judged because of their iflness 
and felt slighted as a result. How they choose to respond was not with hatred but 
with the virtue of clemency and gentleness, an allied virtue of temperance. " More 
technically, they responded with gentleness, which abates the feelings of anger 
towards anyone whereas clemency is about being lenient to an 
inferior. (2a2ae. 157.1. ) Both imply restraint over the passions, which places them 
under the cardinal virtue of temperance. The patients accepted that others wM not 
always understand what it is like to have a chronic illness and will not always be 
understanding. Other people would only understand what it was like until it 
happened to them: 
72 Aquinas lists clemency and gentleness as one virtue although he describes them as distinct 
virtues. 
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Put it this way, my brother's girlfriend is on -she broke her foot - and not being funny, she's on crutches and she says 'Oh nly goodness'you know. And I've got them all the time now... Patient C' 
The patients mentioned several times that they were envious of those with 
good health. Envy is a capital sin which is vice discussed coming under the 
theological virtue of charity. It is discontent or sorrow at another's good. It is 
difficult to determine whether the patients' envy is to be categorised as a vice 
because Aquinas fists four ways that envy comes about, and the one that most 
closely represents the circumstance of the patients is one which he says may not be 
a sin. He states that when we grieve over the good that another has and which we 
do not have, that this is rivalry, and it may or may not be a sin. If the rivalry is over 
virtuous goods it is to be praised, if it is over temporal goods, it is a sin. (2a2ae. 36.2. ) 
Being able to walk without pain and perform daily activities is a temporal good but 
is it difficult to classify the patients' statements as envy. The patients indicated a 
desire to be removed from an evil and did not indicate any M wiU toward those in 
good health: 
I'm quite envious of the people doing the kinds of things that Id like to and 
can't. 
Patient Aý' 
You envy people walking up and down the road. 
Patient C' 
There is no spite or hatred of the other's good in these statements. Envy is 
a capital sin because it is grief over the good of the neighbour and incites a person 
to do certain things for the purpose of avoiding sorrow or satis4ring sorrows 
demands. The patients were simply wishing an evil to be removed from their fives. 
In fact, they demonstrated the virtue of gratitude towards those in good health who 
73 Patient C, P. II- 
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showed them the virtues of piety and friendliness. There is a reciprocal relationship 
between gratitude and the virtues of piety and friendliness. Piety is directed towards 
family (and those with interests in running the country). It involves indebtedness 
and states that one's Parents should be shown respect and deference because they 
are the source of one's life. Piety shows itself in duty and homage in honouring a 
debt towards someone. (2a2ae. 10 1.1-3. ) The patients spoke of gratitude towards the 
actions of their family: 
The most important thing in my life in the moment: I think its got to be the kindness of my girls, the fact that they are so supportive is really very important to me. I hear a lot of stories of -I call them children, I mean my 
eldest daughter is fifty - and I feel that I'm so lucky because mine are such first class people: nice, helpful, funny, all the right things. 
Patient D" 
I'm very, very lucky. I've got a lot of good friends, I've got a good, 
supportive family and so I've not seen things at their very, very worst and I 
realise they help me out a lot. Not everybody has got the people I do. And 
the trouble (iiý) you find out who your friends are. 
Patient B"' 
Well I think well start with my two daughters. My youngest daughter is in 
(7ocation). Shell phone up and say, 'Hello Mumbo, how are you? ' I'll say 
'Fine, thank you. ' She'll sayyou've got that voice when you've got pain. ' 
and I'll get all this lovely sympathy and support and not too much so that, 
you know, both of them are absolutely wonderful. 
Patient D" 
The patients also mentioned the support of friends and neighbours as vital. 
The patients refer to the type of friendship which comes under the virtue of charity. 
The friendship Aquinas talks about in the social virtues of justice is more along the 
nature of arniableness and agreeableness wlýich allows society to function in a 
harmonious way. (2a2ae. 114. ) The friendship referred to by the patients is one of 
love for a good friend. Closeness to a person affects our degree of love for that 
76 Patient D, p. 9. 
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person. Aquinas quotes Augustine: "SLw yw wm do good to aeo&dy, benzi44fim 
of Ase, ubo by ream oftlax, tme, or any other mumtxwes, are by a kind ofdvw, so to 
speak, mom clbseý wuý%d toyom ""(2a2ae-31.3. ) Hence we should love blood relations 
more specially than other people, followed by close friends and those with whom 
we have special relationships. We should love some neighbours more than others 
because love is more intense for those who have shown us the most 
kindness: (2a2ae. 26.6. ) The patients were reacting to the virtue of kindness shown to 
them by friends and family. Kindness itself is a virtue fisted under charity because it 
has friendship as its subject matter: 
Kindness means doing good to another ... being an act of friendship, it follows that this kindness is an act of charity, for loving includes goodwill, 
which as we have said, means willing our friend's good. But willing is such 
that, if power is present, it carries itself into effect. Hence kindness to our friends follows from our loving them. (2a2ae. 3 1.1. ) 
I've very bad blood pressure at times, if I fall down I get the phone and ring 
my neighbour and she and her husband will come and pick me up and shell 
make me a cup of tea and things like that, so I've got good neighbours. 
Patient E" 
... 
it may not sound very exciting, but they Oiends) make the effort to do 
that, rather than not invite me 'because I don't like to walk. ' You see what I 
mean? ... they're stifl 
bothered enough to think you might want taking out" 
Patient B" 
I don't need to join clubs. I've got so many neighbours all around me. And 
we've known each other so many years. I feel more comfortable in their 
houses that I would going off to some ruddy club. 
Patient E" 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, it was surptising to see 
how much the virtues of other people affect the happiness of the individual. While 
the ignorant attitude of some people towards the patients did cause some pain to 
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the patients, they spent much more energy extolling how they felt lucky to be part 
of such a good and supportive community. Those close to the patients reached out 
to them with love and piety. In return they were greeted with gratitude on the part 
of the patients. The effects of the illness served to highlight the social aspects of 
life, heightening appreciation for the importance of family and friends for human 
flourishing. On the whole, it appears that this basic good was positively impacted 
by the illness. This cannot be said for the following section on peace of conscience 
and harmony between one's thoughts and deeds. 
Peace of Conscince: Hammy Betwm 7houghts and Deeds 
This basic good suffered as a direct result of the basic good of human fife 
and health being attacked. The patients expressed deep-seated worry about 
appearing to others to possess certain vices, such as ingratitude, lying and 
quarrelling. They did not believe that they possessed these vices, but the illness 
made them act in certain ways which they had no desire to do. When the patients 
accepted that there would be no quick cure for their condition, they started to 
change their fives to acconunodate the condition, as was discussed in the section on 
human fife and health. While it can be said that they willed to act in such a manner, 
it is along the same lines of will that mariners toss cargo overboard in order to avoid 
capsizing in a vicious storrn. The patients maintained realism about their condition 
and pragmatism over the lack of ability of others to understand life with a chronic 
illness; however the worry remained with them about others viewing them 
negatively. Their thoughts and desires could not match their deeds because of the 
illness. They are friendly people and wanted to appear that way, but the 
osteoarthritis made certain demands of them which they could not ignore: 
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I used to go up to the university for graduation days, and you socialise after 
and there's the garden party - well, there's nowhere to sit, you're walking 
about. And I've tried going to these things but you sit apart and people - 
you look physically well - and people think you're being aloof probably. Patient B" 
We'll walk round there and well go to a couple of shops, but you start to feel like a bit uncomfortable, sitting in somebody's car, and you start to feel inadequate and a burden, to that extent, and a wet blanket! 
Patient B" 
The patients were sensitive of appearing to possess the vice of quarrelling, 
which is the opposite of friendliness. It is about being disagreeable to people and 
runs counter to what is necessary for good relations among humans. (2a2ae. 116.1-2. ) 
They felt that they couldn't express their true feelings about the seriousness of the 
condition and the level of pain because others believed that they exaggerated. It 
was as if the patients believed that people thought that they were suffering from the 
vice of boasting. Boasting opposes the truth and occurs when someone claims to 
be more of something than he/she is. It happens when someone speaks in a way 
which overdoes him/herself and exceeds the actual fact: (2a2ae. 112.1. ) 
What's worried me most of all was that people thought I was not telling the 
truth. I felt people thought I was exaggerating and thought I was making a 
fuss ... The physio ... sat on the 
bed and she really read the riot act to me, 
you know, 'You must not do this and you must not do that. 'And I was 
telling (tbefxndy) in plain words what she said to me and they thought I was 
exaggerating - even nly own family did you know -I repeated her words 
and they don't believe it you see. They think I've exaggerated. 
Patient Aý' 
(at a cbarity "wedie I must sit on one particular seat for nly problem ... if I sit 
on a seat that's got a sharp edge or is not curved down a bit it's right there 
(poin& to undem& qf4 and if I get there and I alter them round because I 
want a particular one, they don't really like that terribly, they think I'm being 
fussy on a particular seat, you see what I mean. 
Patient A! ' 
82 Patient B, p. 5. 
83 Patient B, p-1- 
84 Patient A, p. 4. 
85 lbid, p. 6. 
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Ingratitude was a second vice that the patients worried over appearing to 
possess. This was particularly aimed at the medical conu-nunity. There are three 
degrees of gratitude and ingratitude. Gratitude first admits a favour was done to 
one, secondly it praises it and expresses thanks, and thirdly, it repays it in the proper 
circumstances and according to one's means. Ingratitude fads to offer any thanks to 
the person who has done the favour, secondly, it lets pass unnoticed and thirdly, it 
may deny the favour outright by either forgetting it or in some other 
manner. (2a2ae. 107.2. ) The patients were worried about the third degree of 
ingratitude. They are generous in their praise of what the medical community had 
done for them and they would tell people of how well they had been treated. 
However, like many people who undergo medical treatment, especially the elderly, 
they were afraid to voice criticism or disagree with the advice of medical 
professionals: 
I've got to say I would never have got this far if it hadn't been for the BRI 
... And I 
don't think I would have had the will Eke I've got now had it not 
been for them. And I've always said that. I could never repay them back 
for what they have done to me. They've always been there for me, 
wonderful, I could never fault the BRI, never, they've been marvellous. I 
can5t fault them. I know they've got their problems but I couldn't fault 
them. 
Patient E" 
I know they say they'll do all they can for me here but ... I sound ungrateful I know because they've worked very hard on me to get me fit for this 
operation, but I really felt Eke throwing it all in yesterday. 
Patient V" 
if you go to a professional for advice and you don't take it, you can't expect 
them to be pleased with you, you can hardly approach them again, so you 
have to take what a doctor says. 
Patient B" 
86 Patient E, p. 12. 
87 Patient A, p. 10. 
8' Patient B, p. 12. 
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The basic good of peace of conscience suffered in the sense that the illness 
came between the patients' thoughts and deeds. There were internal tensions in the 
patients themselves concerning their desire to act one way and their limited physical 
capacity for acting in that manner. While they wanted to act in accord with their 
personality and values, the disease introduced new factors that had to be taken into 
account when they acted. Often they felt that their true personalities could not 
show and a false presentation of themselves was given to others. They began to 
worry over being associated with vices, as was demonstrated with quarrelling and 
ingratitude. 
A point to consider, which the patients did not appear to do, is that perhaps 
the people were correct in their assessments that the patients were more 
quarrelsome and ungrateful. It is difficult to know. In an interview, especially a 
first meeting where one is being recorded, there is a tendency to paint oneself in the 
best possible light. Narratives are edited versions of reality. They are not impartial 
or objective. The interviewee makes a choice about what to reveal. A person will 
construct a narrative in an interview that reveals what is important to him/her. 
Often times, bad character traits are interpreted as positive or not mentioned at a. U. " 
While virtues are evident in the narratives, although unnamed by the patients, vices 
are absent. This could be overcome in future studies by having several interviews 
with the subject, thereby allowing the subject to feel safer in revealing some negative 
traits. It is difficult to state whether these patients possessed these vices. They give 
no real evidence of it but perhaps the disease did change their personalities or bring 
to the fore vices already e2dsting. Perhaps their refusal to consider that they may 
have vices is itself a vice: the defect of humility, which is usually considered to mean 
89 Catherine Riessman, "Strategic Uses of Narrative in the Presentation of Self and Illness: A 
Research Note", Social Science & Medicine, v. 30,1990, p. 1197. 
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Pride. Humihty acts "to temper and restrain the mind lest it press forward 
immoderately to high things.,, (2a2a. 161.1. ) Its properrole is to aid the person in 
restraining him/herself from being swept away from reason and pursuing things 
that are above him/her. 'Merefore, it is knowledge of one's own deficiency and 
helps moderate one's appetite. (2a2ae. 161.2. ) Pride is most directly opposed to 
humility and occurs when a person reaches out to what is not proportionate to 
hini/her. Hunility- 
observes the rule of right reason and ensures that a person has a true 
opinion of himself, whereas pride does not observe this rule, and thereby a 
person thinks himself more important than he really is. This springs from 
an inordinate desire for his own superiority, for what people want very 
much they easily believe to be their due, and consequently they fix on 
something higher than becomes them. (2a2ae. 162.3.6. ) 
As was stated in the above paragraph, the patients did not dweH on vices. 
One can only infer that they do possess some, with the absence of discussion about 
them suggesting pride. 
Unlike the basic goods of play and work and peace with neighbours and 
society which both experienced adverse affects as weR as positive ones, this basic 
good appears to suffer only adverse affects. There is not much that the patients can 
do to relieve the tension occurring as long as the illness remains and inhibits them 
from acting as they wish. The misconceptions of those without the disease mean 
that the patients feel unable to talk fratikly about fife with the condition because 
they tend to be judged as being fussy, unfriendly, or exaggerators. So the patients 
must hide the illness and are unable to act as they wish. This means that they 
cannot exercise virtues because virtues deal with action: they can only avoid vices. 
While avoidance can be seen as a form of action, it is more in line with inaction, and 
in this context the patients could only resort to inaction, or avoiding vices. 
To 
avoid being unjustly labelled they chose to 
keep silent on certain issues. This 
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inability to act how they wish, to line up thoughts and desires with deeds, leads to 
another basic good suffering adverse affects. 
Se4F-Integration or Imer Peace 
Although it may sound strange, self-integration was not as much damaged 
by the actions of the patients themselves, but rather the vicious actions of others. 
The virtues that came out in the interviews in regard to this basic good had to do 
with social justice. Self-integration was damaged through the attitudes of others, 
causing the patients to question their self-worth. Maintaining self-identity became 
difficult because of the lack of understanding of others. Having others 
acknowledge that one is ill and understanding the effects of that illness play an 
important role in how a person copes with the illness. In a study done on patients 
with lower back pain, it was found that patients shared an inability to explain the 
persistent pain and to recreate a contemporary self-regard. They were unable to 
establish a sense of legitimacy with their chronic pain and in uncertain situations 
they felt a need to appear ill in order to acconunodate the expectations of others. 
They treated their pain as a stigma and withdrew from social interaction. They 
suffered from feelings of confusion, fear over their future and felt shameful. " The 
patients in this study suffered from similar effects. Through a lack of understanding 
of friends, the impatience of others, through being asked out socially less often, and 
through being made to feel to blame for limitations, the patients started to have 
negative self-images and to isolate themselves: 
If a person's nice, or affable or is friendly, it enhances your feeling of self- 
worth. Whereas if they let the door swing in your face, You think - It makes 
you feel like something the dog drags in, it gives you a feeling of inadequacy, 
it enhances your inadequacy. But if somebody is friendly and polite, a 
90 Mike Osburn, John Smith, "The Personal Experience of Chronic Benign Lower Back Pain: An 




friendly face, rather than being belligerent: 'why are you in my way' sort of 
thing... 
Patient B" 
You do get people who say Ve went to so and so the other day, but we didn't ask you because we know that you don't like to walk. ' They don't say 
'can't walk' but 'don't like to walk'. As if you've made the choice. You see 
what I mean? ... And the consequence is, I think: 'Oh, IT remember you 
said that' (ýýina) Or they fall away. And that's what I mean when I say 
youll know who your friends are. 
Patient B" 
The patients did not do much, in terms of utilising the virtues, to counter these 
judgements by others. judgement had been passed on them unjustly and this had 
adverse affects on them. The vices of others, such as detraction or whispering, 
could only be countered with patience and perseverance. Patience and perseverance 
only allow one to endure a situation until a good outcome is achieved. They do not 
really bring one happiness but are only conditions that can possibly lead to a future 
happiness. The patients appeared somewhat passive, and the only sign of 
countering the negative judgements of others was to remove themselves from 
situations where they felt judged and had their feelings hurt: 
It's not that you don't want to but that you can't. It affects you 
psychologically. Self-worth again. And being wanted. Because you start to 
get the message that it's for your self-preservation, that you"re not meant to, 
and you think 'Well I won't be put in that situation again, IT say I won't go. 
Patient B" 
This in tum isolates them and damages the basic good of peace with 
neighbours and society. As was mentioned in the analysis of that basic good, the 
patients did harbour feelings of alienation from segments of society. However, they 
also had a renewed appreciation for the efforts made by family and 
friends to assist 
91 Patient B, p. 4. 
92 Jbid, pp. 6-7. 
93 Patient B, p. 6. 
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them in their illness, although they still felt judged by these people, who tended to 
doubt the veracity of the patients' statements concerning the effects of the illness, as 
the statement by Patient A whose family doubted the patient's account of the 
fimitations placed on her activities by the physio-therapist. However, there is no 
upside to the damage done to self-integration or inner peace. It simply functions to 
demonstrate the need for a just society composed of virtuous people in order to 
allow the individual to flourish. 
Peace uith God or sam More 7hm Hwnan Soune 
There is simply not enough information available in the interviews to form 
an in-depth analysis on how this basic good was affected by the illness. The patients 
are not explicit in their beliefs in or relationships with God in the open-ended 
interview technique that allowed them to introduce topics important to themselves. 
They mentioned God in reference to their suffering and asking for relief from it. 
But they do not discuss their explicit religious beliefs. In fact, some of them state 
that they are not particularly religious, but then will go on to describe theological 
beliefs. However, religion did play a role in their fives. Absent were the explicit 
religious doctrines but present was the virtue of gratitude for abstract goods such as 
health and the past pleasures associated with human existence: 
I was writing to someone the other day and ... I said 'I'm so lucky because I'Ve got so many good memories and literally, I could take that and I can 
walk with my eyes closed, walk places in the Alps or wherever and 
thoroughly enjoy it again. 
Patient D 94 
I'm not religious by any means but I do think that you have to respect the 
fact that you are here and that somebody has got you here ... I mean, look 
at the birth of a baby for one thing. It's the most marvellous thing anybody 
can think of really, isn't it? And when you think that it starts off so tiny you 
can't see it and it ends up as a human being, its fantastic... I do think religion 
94 Patient D, p. 5. 
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comes into it, a bit anyway, if not entirely ... I think there must be a power of some description that holds us together somehow, unless you're going to faU the other way and think we're just animals ... It's amazing. There are all sorts of weird things that go on in life that fascinate me to death actual1y. Patient A? ' 
It is difficult to state whether the patients demonstrate any of the virtues 
of religion and worship, which are allied virtues of justice. Religion implies an 
explicit relationship with God: we are bound "to God as to our unfailing principle, 
we must unceasingly choose him as our last end. " (2a2ae. 8 1.1. ) Theobjectofthe 
activity of the virtue of religion is to reverence God, under the aspect of the first 
principle of creation and govemment. (2a2ae. 81.2. ) VA@e God is recognised under 
the aspect of being the principle of creation, it is a rather weak and vague 
acknowledgement. The virtue of devotion serves as a good example of the 
difficulties in applying the virtues of religion to the patients. "Devotion ... 
is 
nothing other than the will to give oneself promptly to those things that pertain to 
the service of God. "(2a2ae. 82.1. ) A person can give service to God in two ways. 
First, by considering God's kindness and goodness, which some of the patients do, 
but Aquýinas adds that it shotAd then awaken in the person a love that wants to cling 
to God, which the patients do not express. The patients do reflect on creation and 
the joys of human fife, but do not then explicitly mention a relationship with God. 
The second way occurs when a person reflects on his or her weakness, and realises 
the he or she cannot trust in his or her own strength but must trust in God's 
strength. (2a2ae. 82.3. ) The patients did not express this sentiment. It appears that 
one of the weaknesses of applying Thoýnistic virtue ethics to modem society is that 
Aquinas was writing for a society with relatively monolithic views on religion and in 
whose culture religion played an important role. The religious beliefs of people 
95 Patient A, p. 13. 
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today is more pluralistic and less in line with traditional views of structured reli6on. 
In this instance, the basic goods theory of GBF offers an advantage as it allows for 
people without specific reli0ous beliefs to express a belief either in some 
impersonal principle that governs the world or for unarticulated theological beliefs. 
To benefit from this basic good, not every person will have to know catechism, 
scripture or sacred laws by heart. The basic good theoxy appears to be flexible 
enough to accommodate vaguely defined religious beliefs. Indeed, harmony is 
possible not only through explicit interpersonal relationships with a deity but also 
through allegiance to or appreciation of impersonal principles that govern the 
world. A conunitted Marxist could find harmony occurring from his or her belief in 
the ideology and how that belief integrates his/her actions and gives some meaning 
to his/her fife. In their expressions of what they enjoyed about fife, the patients did 
show appreciation of the created world and demonstrated an expression of 
thanksgiving. They appeared almost shy about stating anything explicit about any 
dogma they might hold to, but they did show an awareness of a created universe in 
which some supreme creator existed, and they were grateful for the opportunity to 
have partaken in creation. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
I have tried in this chapter to argue that 'Mornistic virtue theory is relevant 
to the lives of patients with osteoarthritis. This should not come as a surprise 
because his virtue theory was designed to embrace the whole of fife, both in times 
of health and of illness. Because the virtues deal explicitly with happiness, the 
virtues cover each area of life in order to maximise human flourishing. In the study, 
it was seen that when people suffer from osteoarthritis, certain areas of their life are 
adversely affected. Determining which areas suffered was achieved through 
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analysing the Patients' narratives in the pilot study to understand which basic goods 
were affected. It appeared self-evident that some goods were affected by the 
osteoarthritis, i. e., the basic good of human life and health. However, it seems that 
other disruptions occurred in certain areas of life, e. g., peace with neighbours and 
society. The patients spoke at length about how they felt unjustly treated by people 
that they did not know and how well treated they were by those close to them. This 
summary section will outline how the patients demonstrated virtuous actions which 
acted to instanstiate the basic goods damaged through being chronically ill. It will 
also suggest if any further virtues could be of benefit in pursuing the basic goods 
which lead to flourishing. 
When one looked at which basic goods were negatively impacted and why 
that was so, one could see how the virtues operated to compensate to make good 
the loss and attempt to orient the person towards happiness. As was said earlier, 
the patients did not use virtue language, but when the virtues are applied to their 
actions, one can make a claim at perceiving some pattern of virtuous activity. A 
brief summary of how the virtues were applied would be: first, courage is needed to 
deal with the threat of Ulness; then prudence tries to assess the new situation in 
order to come to terms with what is needed to effectively deal with the situation; 
followed by temperance in order to implement the mandates of prudence; followed 
by justice, mainly the social virtues, in order to meet the new demands placed on 
relationships caused by the illness. 
When health was damaged, courage was needed in order to face the threat. 
ying to learn about the disease and the After this, the patients entered a phase of tr 
best manner to go about living with it. This was the virtue of prudence, more 
precisely the allied virtue of sound judgement. In effect, the patients were 
evaluating their new situation 
in fife and trying to determine how to achieve the 
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results that they desired, namely, to let the illness interfere with their pursuit of the 
other basic goods as little as possible. In order to achieve the minimising of the 
adverse effects of the illness, the patients realised that their prudent reflections were 
leading them to the virtue of temperance. Humility in accepting their new, lower 
level of health, sobriety, abstinence, fasting, gluttony were the virtues and vices of 
importance if they wanted to attain a maximum level of health. Throughout this 
whole endeavour, courage's allied virtues of patient and perseverance were needed 
to orient the patience towards keeping to the 'programme' established by 
temperance. 
As for suggesting what virtues could be added to help support this basic 
good, I think that the virtue of continence can be added. Continence is about 
resisting passions that lead us away from reason. It is about self-restraint in accord 
with right reason, a holding back which restrains the person from getting carried 
away by passion. (2a2ae. 155.1. ) Ina sense, the painful chronic illness itself is the 
best motivator for acting with continence concerning one's health. The patients 
know that there is a price to be paid when they act in ways which wiH aggravate the 
illness, so for the most part they obey what their reason tells them to in regard to 
maintaining health. The patients mention that they occasionally over-exert 
themselves, and this appears to be something like the vice of incontinence. There 
are worse vices to posses than incontinence because only a temperate person can be 
incontinent. Incontinence is about a rnistake in one field of action whereas an 
intemperate person is mistaken in his/her whole approach to life. (2.2ae. 156.2. ) The 
patients know their limits and for whatever reason, be it dancing at a wedding or 
taking too long a walk, they will ignore them on selected occasions, willing to put up 
with the pain the next 
day. 
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The reordering of a lifestyle was not only limited to physical actions but 
also mental activities. The basic good of play and work led to a new stress on the 
intellectual virtues. Gone was the ability to pursue many of the activities of play and 
work that demand physical exertion. While the virtue of play or good manners 
suffered in this manner, the intellectual virtues found a new prominence because of 
the illness. Activities which utilised one's ability to think critically, exercise the 
imagination, or learn new facts, such as reading, doing puzzles, reflecting over the 
nature of human existence became an important part of life. So when the basic 
good of play and work was damaged by limiting the ability of the patients to 
perform physical activities, thereby damaging the virtue of play, the basic good 
found expression through the intellectual virtues 'picking up the slack' and making 
compensation. 
As for suggesting virtues for ftmher improving this basic good, it does 
appear to be a good opportunity to note what Aquinas said on the superiority of the 
contemplative life as compared to the active life, which was discussed in the section 
"Playful activities and skilful work" earlier in the chapter. I am not suggesting that 
those with osteoarthritis become acadernic ascetics: I want to examine the 
advantages contemplative pursuits bring to the person. The prime distinction of 
human beings is that they possess reason and the good use of this wiU bring rich 
satisfaction. The patients already moved toward more intellectual activities; 
however, it could be a benefit to further stress to them the rewards which come 
from pursuing the speculative intellectual virtues of understanding, intellect and 
wisdom. 
Like play and work, the basic good of peace with neighbours and society 
experienced both damage and enhancement. The patients expressed 
feelings of 
alienation from certain segments of society. People could often act toward them 
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with the vice of defamation and the unjust act of passing judgement. Defamation is 
concerned with taking away someone's character in some way, and the patients felt 
belittled and humiliated by the intolerance of their illness by some of the public. 
'Me patients also were aware that people unjustly passed judgement on them in 
regard to disbelieving their own interpretations of fife with the illness. To these 
injustices the patients reacted with the virtue of clemency and gentleness by 
acknowledging that people without the disease are ignorant of what fife is like with 
chronic illness. They distinctly perceived a defect in the virtue of friendliness in 
those who reacted with impatience towards them. While their relationship with the 
segments of society who did not personally know the patients deteriorated in this 
aspect, the meaningful relationships with those close to them grew. The love 
exPressed by family and friends, the type of love with which charity is concerned, 
and their wiHingness to aid the patients in various aspects of fife, represented by 
piety, was returned by the virtue of gratitude. It remains unclear whether the 
patients when discussing envy possessed it as a vice or if was simply a means of 
expressing their sorrow at the presence of evil in their Eves while wishing no harm 
to anyone else. 
Because this basic good appeared to actually benefit in the area of 
promoting good relationships with those close to them, it is the negative impact on 
this basic good on which I will focus my suggestions . This 
is difficult because it 
deals with the actions of others, and the only thing that the patient can control is 
her response to these actions. Perhaps the only virtue that can be stressed is charity, 
in that it stresses that one is to love people who sin against you because they share 
the same God-given nature and have the same capacity for happiness. (2a2ae. 25.6. 
) 
However, the sin itself is not to be loved and this still leaves the problem of how to 
react to the vicious actions of others. In his writings on charity, Aquinas states that 
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fraternal correction is a spijjý almsdeed and so a work of charity. The sin of the 
other is harmful in two ways - it hurts the sinner him/herself and hurts others, so 
fraternal correction benefits both the sinner and others. (2a2ae. 33.1. ) Fraternal 
correction is perhaps an old-fashioned word which in present times could be 
captured in this context by the idea of standing up for oneself and one's rights in 
the face of injustice. 
Peace of conscience, or harmony between thoughts and deeds, was the 
first of two basic goods that could only be thought of as damaged as a result of the 
osteoarthritis. The iflness lirrýited the patients' abifity to express through actions 
their interior thoughts. Although it had to do with one's own conscience, it was 
mainly affected by the actions of others, hence it revolved around the virtues 
concerned with social justice. The patients worried that because they needed to be 
seated most of the time at parties, or asked for a specific chair, or that when asked 
how they felt that they told the truth, that then they would appear to others to 
possess the vices of ingratitude, 4ýing, quarrelling and boasting. VAýle the vices 
have not rea. Uy entered this dissertation much, it was suggested that perhaps their 
refusal to consider that they did possess these traits could be perceived as a lack of 
humility, impýing pride. 
The further exploration that pride may be present is about the only 
suggestion that can be made in regard to category. Because much of the damage 
was done by the actions of others, there is not much the patients can do to avoid 
adverse affects. One could suggest again Aquinas's fraternal correction and that the 
patients counter any wrong assertions or vicious actions by others. (2a2ae. 33. ) 
However this could only be done after the corrector examines the assertions to 
ascertain whether they are true, and only then correct the person. 
This implies that 
the person has the virtue of 
hunýlity, which was raised in doubt concerning this 
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basic good. Otherwise, other people could correctly see the patients as 
quarrelsome. 
Self-integration, or inner peace, was the fifth basic good to be affected. Like 
peace of conscience, this was a good that was only negatively affected. Like peace 
of conscience, it had mainly to do with social justice virtues, or rather vices. The 
attitudes of others negatively affected the patients' feelings of self-worth. They were 
asked out socially less often, accused of exaggerating the severity of their condition 
and treated with impatience. The acts of unjustly passing judgement and possessing 
a defect in friendliness could only be countered with patient and perseverance, 
which allow one only to endure a situation, not to thrive. The advice given for the 
previous two basic goods can be argued here. Fraternal correction is an appropriate 
antidote when the patients are being unjustly accused of possessing certain vices. 
Reasoned discussion with others could prompt the others to change their attitudes 
and so aid in avoiding damage done to self-integration. 
The final basic good that appears in the transcripts is that of God, or more 
accurately, a relationship with some more-than-human source. The patients did not 
choose to discuss in any depth their religious beliefs, making it difficult to 
understand their thoughts and feelings on the topic. What can be said with some 
certainty is that the patients, when confronted by the illness, became more 
appreciative of the positive aspects of human existence. The good of human health, 
the joy of loving relationships, and the splendour of creation were all brought into a 
sharper focus. 
This is possibly one of the most important basic goods for allowing one to 
achieve happiness. It was found that the patients' description of their theological 
beliefs was vague and analysis of it was better suited to GBF's basic good theory 
223 
than Aquinas's virtue theory. Rather than being a set of theoretical beliefs about 
reality, religion has the ability to order the whole of reality. Harmony- 
with the divine, the ultimate source of reality and meaning, has the capacity 
to provide a conceptual and motivational framework for organizing one's 
personal life and relationships with people. " 
Religion embraces the life of a morally good person and unifies it in a way 
that other goods do not. The benefit of using the basic goods theory is that it 
allows for a broader definition of religion, in that it understands it to include a 
relationship with a more-than-human source and to live in harmony with a set of 
impersonal principles. The patients only alluded to their beliefs as some organising 
presence behind creation. If these beliefs about the nature of creation and the role 
of human beings were developed in the patients, then they might be able to organise 
their patterns of behaviour around such deep-seated and important befiefs, and 
hopefufly giving them a sense of peace with creation. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the virtues are relevant to the lives of patients 
with osteoarthritis. It does not try to extend that claim beyond the specific 
boundaries of the pilot study. As was mentioned in the section on the 
generalisability of the study, any further claims of applying the virtues to chronic 
illness itself could only legitimately evolve from the accumulation of data from 
similar studies on different chronic Mnesses. While the patients did not verbalise 
the virtues explicitly, analysis demonstrates that they demonstrated virtuous action, 
a testament perhaps of the insight into human nature and the functioning of 
human 
beings possessed by virtue theory. The basic goods theory provided a framework 
96 Boyle, "The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and Groups", p. 6. 
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from which to understand how the illness affected the patients' pursuit of 
happiness. When it was determined how goods were affected, one could look to 
see which specific virtues the patients employed or should employ to aid in attaining 
that basic good. It then became apparent that a pattern of behaviour which utilises 
the virtues was evident when a person is diagnosed as having osteoarthritis and that 
all categories of virtue are applicable to this pattern: charity and fraternal correction 
from the theological virtues; the speculative and practical intellectual virtues; and 
some two dozen virtues from the cardinal virtues. This study is only the first in 
what hopefully will become a more pursued avenue of research in medical ethics. 
VVhile I have argued that there is some substance for supporting the claim that the 
virtues are relevant to at least one patient population with a chronic illness, any 
claim seeking to extend its reach outside of this patient population will need 
corroboration from future studies. Further qualitative studies may find that the 
virtues are not relevant as other ethical theories to patient populations, meta-ethical 
review may claim that the methodology needed in order to prove the link between 
virtue and chronic illness is not viable, or medical ethical criticism may argue that in 
western society's pluralism and individualism, it is impossible to argue for virtue 
theory in any significant sense. However, that is one possibility. A second 
possibility is that if this area study develops, enough studies may emerge that allow 
one to claim that patients with chronic illness as a group, or subgroups, tend to act 
with certain virtues and vices toward chronic illness. In the end, it may turn out that 







In his book, An Andm*&gist on Mars, Ohver Sacks writes: 
Sickness implies a contraction of life, but such contractions do not have to 
occur. Nearly all of my patients, so it seems to me, whatever their 
problems, reach out to life - and not only despite their conditions, but often because of them, and even with their aid. ' 
Sacks is struck by how the human body has the "capacity for the most striking 
adaptations" and he is inclined to: 
wonder whether it may not be necessary to redefine the very concepts of 'health' and 'disease'; to see these in terms of the ability of the organism to 
create a new organization and order, one that fits its special, altered disposition and needs, rather than in terms of a rigidly defined 'norm'. ' 
The temptation when first thinking about chronic Mness is to see it as a 
devastating blow from which the person will never be able to attain happiness 
because the illness has so radically removed them from the 'norm' of healthy 
existence. Re-reading my initial outlines and proposals in the first year of my 
studies, I believed at the time that most people with chronic illness would be bed- 
ridden, watching through the window as others went about their lives, merely 
counting the hours until they could reach over to the bedside table to take their next 
pill and a sip of water before lying back on the bed to resume the suffering which 
consumed their fives. However, this is not the case. As Sacks points out, the 
patients tend to reach out to fife and continue seeking out activities which wifl bring 
some fulfilment to their fives. The fact that over fifty per-cent of patients with 
disabilities report having a good to high quality of life indicates that sickness does 
not necessarily have to mean a contraction of fife. I think that this percentage gives 
support to the theory of virtue ethics: people are so oriented towards happiness and 
I Oliver Sacks, An Anthropologist on Mars, (London: Picador, 1995), p. xvi. 
2 Ibid, pp. xv-xvi. 
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are such remarkable creatures at adapting to this goal that great obstacles are 
overcome to achieve it. 
% her reviewing the dissertation, I believe that people achieve this through 
having an understanding of the basic goods, and acting virtuously allows them to 
achieve these goods. When illness is present and basic goods are damaged, people 
adapt in order to be able to achieve these goods in new ways. This means 
emphasising certain virtues so as to be able to compensate for losses in basic goods. 
Intellectual virtues, first of all, receive more cultivation as the physical activities of 
play and relaxation become more constricted. The social virtues under justice grow 
in significance as the patients discover that importance of the basic good of peace 
among family, neighbours and society. The importance of the allied social virtues 
of justice was one of the surprises emerging from the study. It was an unexpected 
discovery to find how necessary it is in order for an individual to flourish that others 
possess the virtues. While this statement appears obvious, it is in danger of being 
forgotten in our modem individualistic culture. 
I arrived at these conclusions through demonstrating the need for a patient- 
centred virtue ethics in medical ethics, suggesting that the few articles which exist 
on patient-centred virtue ethics are dualistic in the sense that they are only 
concerned with what virtues are necessary to make a good patient. These articles 
ignored that fact that people must integrate being a patient into the other roles 
which constitute their fives. I argued that the virtue theory of Aquinas offers a 
virtue ethics that is geared toward embracing almost all aspects of a person's fife. 
One could still have a chronic illness yet live out the virtues about which Aquinas 
writes, thereby avoiding the dualism of patient virtues/healthy person virtues 
inherent in contemporary articles. 
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However, this is not to imply that all people are capable of happiness. I do 
note that Aquinas probably believed that there are some people who are born with 
serious social, mental or physical burdens which preclude any possibility of 
meaningful happiness. I say 'probably' because Aquinas never directly wrote on this 
subject and there exists no secondary literature on this subject. I surmise that 
Aquinas most likely had in mind that when physical pain became too much, then 
happiness was precluded because the pain dominates one's consciousness and limits 
one)s ability to pursue rationally other avenues which lead to human flourishing. 
I also argued that Aquinas based his virtue theory in the natural law, and 
that acts which promote the natural law are virtues and those which attack the 
natural law are vices. This was important to my argument because it gave a basis 
from which to understand how osteoarthritis affected the lives of the patients. 
After reviewing Aquinas on natural law and the secondary literature and finding that 
it lacked specificity, I chose to pursue another natural law theory, one deeply 
indebted to Aquinas. The basic goods theory, with its seven basic goods, provided 
the specificity needed to offer a framework for understanding the themes arising 
from the narratives of the osteoarthritic patients. 
Once the patient transcripts had been analysed as to how the basic goods 
were affected by osteoarthritis, they were also examined for the presence of virtues 
operating in the patients' lives. Links could be seen between specific basic goods 
being affected, both negatively and positively, and the use of virtues to either limit 
the damage done to the basic good or to further promote its attainment. The 
patients had no explicit recognition of this which could fit easily into the language 
of meta-ethical discourse. However, I believe that this simply reinforces the validity 
of the claim that natural law and the virtues are inherent in the way wl-ých human 
beings operate in the world as they attempt to achieve happiness. 
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FALSIFICATION 
When summing up the dissertation, it is appropriate to examine the question 
of falsification. Falsification, used pre-eminently in the sciences, is a method of 
discriminating between useful and useless hypotheses. A hypothesis is useful to the 
extent that it is falsifiable. If no observation can falsify a hypothesis, then it adds 
nothing to our knowledge. One can easily create experiments to falsify the 
statement "Patients with osteoarthritis have higher levels of pain than patients with 
rheumatoid arthritis. " One cannot create experiments to falsify the statement 
"Patients with osteoarthritis either have higher, lower or the same levels of pain as 
patients with rheumatoid arthritis. " The sentence is true by definition, has no need 
of empirical observation and is not a scientific hypothesis? Avoiding untestable 
hypotheses allows science to progress because there is no possibility of refuting and 
replacing them with a more accurate theory. The process of conjecture and 
refutation, of trial and error, characteristic of scientific progress, is allowed to 
advance through the use of falsification theory. ' Having said that, it must be stated 
that I used qualitative studies in the dissertation, and qualitative studies are 
hypothesis-generating rather than hypothesis-testing. The study was a 'bottom up' 
analysis of how patients feel they five well through osteoarthritis. The analysis is 
based on what the patients state rather than on what the researcher or analyst 
decides is a virtue or vice. In other words, it was not a 'top down' study that has a 
theory in mind and forces the statements of the patients to fit into that theory. 
have discussed the comprehensiveness of Aquinas's theory in the 
introductory section of the Aquinas chapter. The virtues were meant to embrace aU 
areas of human action, therefore, a concern in virtue theory is not to 'read'virtues 
3 Nigel Warburton, Philosophy The Basics, 2 nd ed., (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 119. 
4 Ibid,, pp. 119-120. 
230 
into every action performed by a human. This is why Aquinas distinguishes 
between dispositions, habits and finally virtues. Virtues are patterns of behaviour 
which are consistent throughout a person's life and which are intended to lead to 
flourishing. Phoning a neighbour to ask for a recipe is not necessarily a sign of the 
virtues of social justice or temperance at work. It may simply indicate that the 
person has mislaid a recipe. However, it may be that person is motivated by having 
the opportunity to chat with a friend or move toward a more healthy diet. In this 
sense, the theory is not falsifiable because one can always say that a certain action 
demonstrates the presence of a virtue. One can look at any action and state that it 
is an example of a virtue. However, if care is taken to look for patterns of 
behaviour, rather than isolated examples, then one is more certain in stating that a 
virtue is present in a person's character. This is what I have tried to do in the 
analysis of the narratives in order to avoid a 'straw man'type of argument. 
Another concern regarding falsification is that this type of study has never 
been done before, so one can justly ask about the criteria for judging its competence 
and reliability. Comparing types of virtue theory in the abstract is one thing but 
applying the virtues to a patient's narrative is another. Difficulties of 'who is to say 
if this is actually a virtue we see' are inherent in the project. The ideal situation 
would have been to study a group of Thorrýistic scholars with osteoarthritis, but the 
situation just did not present itself. One is left with recruiting members of a public 
not familiar with the language of virtues and having to infer virtues from their 
narrative. However, through providing relevant quotes on specific virtues from 
Aquinas in order to support claims that such virtues are present in the lives of the 
patients', and by holding only to accepting clear patterns of 
behaviour in the lives of 
the patient, one can demonstrate the link between the patient's narrative and 
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Thorrýistic virtues and thereby provide some degree of surety in regard to the 
question of falsification. 
POINTS FOR FURTHER REFLECTION 
Having argued that the virtues are relevant to the fives of people with 
chronic illness, the question is now what to do with that knowledge. This is only a 
first attempt at the topic, and any conclusions must be restricted in their claims. 
While I believe that nryr conclusions are justified, they are only justified in the 
context of this one pilot study, and I would be unwilling to broaden those claiý to 
other chronic illnesses. Certain methodological refinements will. occur as more 
research into the subject takes place. The one main change which will occur is a 
shift from the 'in-depth' method of interview, described in the methodology section 
of the Introductory chapter. A move to a serni-structured interview style is needed, 
one which asks more directive, specific questions of the patients. One thing which 
became apparent in the interviews is that people are more comfortable with 
understatements when describing positive characteristics, lest they be seen as 
C tooting one's own horn'. Also, some people are not prone to self-reflection and 
need to be gently lead into discussing their experience of illness. 
It will be interesting to see whether the general pattern I describe of how the 
patients employ the virtues - courage, followed by prudence, temperance and justice 
- will hold up when the other studies from the EC project report 
back. Differences 
of culture, sex and disease will probably alter some of the allied virtues but I think 
the general pattern will stay the same on the basis that people will react in similar 
ways to the basic good of human life and 
health being attacked. Most people will 
want to secure this basic good and to 
do so they need courage to face the threat, 
prudence in order to understand 
how to five with the illness, temperance in order to 
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live with the illness, and justice in order to cope with the social changes that the 
illness may bring. 
One wonders whether patterns of vicious behaviour wiH emerge if the 
patients are given two or three interviews by the same person and feel more 
comfortable discussing these topics. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, when 
discussing the point that the patients did not appear to reflect that they did perhaps 
possess some of the vices they believed that others attributed to them, narratives are 
edited versions of reality and are neither impartial nor objective. The interviewee 
decides what to reveal. In an interview, a person constructs a narrative wlýich 
functions to reveal what is important to him/her, i. e., one's adequacy as parent, 
spouse, employee. ' What the interviewee chooses to reveal to a stranger is up to 
him/her. There is a difference between 'public talk' and 'private talk'. ' Tublic 
talk'takes into consideration the moral order and dominant ideology of society, and 
is basically the 'ought'type of expression acceptable to that society. One 'ought'to 
be thankful for any medical treatment or for still possessing fife. If patients appear 
happy, this is sometimes because they are trfing to conform to the expectation of 
them as patients to suffer silently and maintain a happy demeanour in the face of 
adversity. Trivate talk' considers the darker side of things and occurs between 
confidantes. One wonders if more vices would be evident in the patients' narratives 
as they grew more comfortable with the interviewer over several interviews. This 
would result in a more thorough understanding of how the illness affects the life of 
the patient. 
5 Riessman, "Strategic Uses of Narrative in the Presentation of Self and Illness: 
A Research Note", p. 1197. 
6 Patrick West, "The Status and Validity of Accounts Obtained at Interview: A Contrast between 
Two Studies of Families with a Disabled Child", Social Science & Medicine, v. 30,1990, p. 1229. 
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The question of employing the basic goods as the method of determining 
how the illness impacts the patient's life could subject renewed discussion. It may 
be possible or easier to examine the interviews of the patients and analyse the 
transcripts only in reference to the virtues. The basic goods operate so as to give a 
more thorough understanding of how the illness affects the fives of the patients. 
Because the natural law is the foundation of the virtues, the basic goods theory gives 
some context for understanding why certain virtuous activity is witnessed and why 
An area for further reflection is what to do with the results. Having argued 
that patients do employ the virtues, albeit without conscious knowledge of doing so, 
and that certain other virtues should be introduced so as to aid the patients even 
more, how does one impart this knowledge to them? While it wotAd be nice to 
hand out the second part of the Sunvm to each patient and have them study it for 
eight months, there may be more practical ways. This may turn out to be more the 
province of the faculty of education or the departments of psychology and 
psychiatry which are oriented toward teaching people new ways of employing 
knowledge or changing lifestyle patterns than it is of the faculty of arts or medicine. 
The remark about giving the patients copies of the Sunvm is not to be taken 
too lightly. It does capture something of the importance that religion can have on 
the happiness of a person's life. I think that the results concerning the presence of 
religion and spirituality in the fives' of the pilot study patients were disappointing, 
and that little can be meaningfully said about it in examining the results of the study. 
However, given the move to a more semi-structured interview style, I think that this 
result will change in future studies. As was mentioned in the 'Coping Strategies' 
section of chapter five, social science studies are discovering that religion is found to 
have beneficial effects concerning one's health and happiness. Now that one 
attempt has been made to understand how to evaluate the virtues working 
in a 
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person's life, I think it would be important, from a Thornistic point of view, to 
undertake a study to observe more closely the role of religion in the fives of 
patients. A study examining how religion informs the virtues of patients wih 
spiritual beliefs as compared to how the virtues operate in the lives of patients with 
no spiritual beliefs would allow one to better understand how Aquinas's virtues are 
shaped by the theological virtues and if it adds to the well-being of the patients. 
CONCLUSION 
A worry I had at the beginning of my research was that the sufferer of a 
chronic illness would be thought of, by him/herself and others, in terms of the 
disease and not the person. The disease would constitute a large part of the 
person's conception of hini/herself. It would no longer by a case of "Jane Doe" 
but "Jane Doe, the osteoarthritic sufferer". The disease and the person would 
become synonymous. "Jane" would cease to exist and be subsumed by "Jane the 
M". The fact that this is not the case is a tribute to a human nature which 
continually seeks out paths which lead to flourishing and fulfihnent, despite any 
obstacle placed in its path. I have argued that the virtues are forms or expressions 
of human nature and orient the person in the ways of acting that lead through 
obstacles in pursuit of fulfilling human nature. The points for further consideration 
mentioned above do not detract from the fact that the virtues are present in the 
fives of these patients. It is a testament to the theory that these people, over two 
thousand years since Aristotle fonnalised it in writing and some eight hundred years 
since Aquinas expanded it, demonstrate virtuous activity in an attempt to bring 
happiness to their fives. 
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APPENDIX A- CHARTS CORRELATING BASIC GOODS TO VIRTUES 
Themes Arising from the Pilot Study Interviews 
1) Having realistic perceptions about chronic Alness: 
- having a realistic picture of one's particular medical condition and its 
treatment, 
- listening to the body, 
- having a balanced perspective on fife with the condition, 
- being pragmatic about other's understanding of the condition. 
2) Gratitude: 
towards others, 
appreciation of more general concepts, i. e., previous good health, mildness 
of condition. 
3) Having strength to cope. 
4) Maintaining self-identity against threat. 
5) Insight into that which maintains quality of life. 
Overarching Pattern of Use of Virtues 
- Courage - to face the iHness. 
- Prudence - to find out how to Eve with the illness. 
-Temperance - makes use of findings of prudence and adjusts to 
new demands on lifestyle. 
-justice - reordering and re-evaluation of relationships with family, friends and society. Also that others possess the 
social virtues of justice affected the patients' happiness. 
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Basic Good ofHuman Life and Health 
Core Basic Good whose damage leads to the further harming of other basic goods: Loss of playful activities and meaningful work Self-integration and inner peace Peace of conscience 
Peace with neighbours and society 







forming a judgement, 
commanding action) 








Damaged basic good through reducing activity in valued pastimes, mainly 
physical. 
Promoted basic good in leading to a renewed appreciation of intellectual 
virtues. 
Viruies Affacted By 
Damam to the Basic Good 
Good Manners (Play) 
Speculative Intellectual Virtue 
of Intellect 
Vinues Affoc&d by PrwýMý 
oLthe Basic Good 








Self-integration and inner peace 
Questioned self worth because the attitudes of others caused them to 
question if they were responsible for their limitations. Believed others saw 
them as exaggerators, inconveniences, fussy. 
Patience 
Perseverance 




Peace of conscience and harmony between one-s thoughts and deeds 
The illness forced them to act in ways they would not act if they did not 
have osteoarthritis. (i. e., not mingling at parties, needing special 
requirements and assistance) 
Believed that many of their actions were not core traits of their personality. 







Peace with neighbours and society 
People who doubted their accounts of their illness or who showed 
impatience with them or socially neglected them damaged this basic good. 
The basic good was also promoted through being grateful for their 
important relationships with family and friends. Renewed appreciation for 
important of meaningful social relationships in order to flourish. 














Religion or some-more-than-human source 
Gratitude toward abstract qualities of human existence, such as good health, 
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